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Thesis Summary 
 
The contribution of this thesis is in understanding the origins in developing countries of differences 
in labour wage and household consumption vis-à-vis educational abilities (and by extension 
employment statuses). This thesis adds to the labour market literature in developing countries by 
investigating the nature of employment and its consequences for labour wage and household 
consumption in a developing country. It utilizes multinomial probit, blinder-oaxaca, Heckman and 
quantile regressions to examine one human capital indicator: educational attainment; and two 
welfare proxies: labour wage and household consumption, in a developing country, Nigeria. It 
finds that, empirically, the self-employed are a heterogeneous group of individuals made up of a 
few highly educated individuals, and a significant majority of ‘not so educated’ individuals who 
mostly earn less than paid workers. It also finds that a significant number of employers enjoy 
labour wage premiums; and having a higher proportion of employers in the household has a 
positive relationship with household consumption. The thesis furthermore discovers an upper 
educational threshold for women employers not found for men. Interestingly, the thesis also finds 
that there is indeed an ordering of labour wages into low-income self-employment (which seems 
to be found mainly in “own account” self-employment), medium-income paid employment, and 
high-income self-employment (which seems to be found mainly among employers), and that this 
corresponds to a similar ordering of low human capital, medium human capital and high human 
capital among labour market participants, as expressed through educational attainments. These 
show that as a whole, employers can largely be classed as experiencing pulled self-employment, 
as they appear to be advantaged in all three criteria (educational attainments, labour wage and 
household consumption). A minority of self-employed “own account” workers (specifically those 
at the upper end of the income distribution who are well educated), can also be classed as 
experiencing pulled self-employment. The rest of the significant majority of self-employed “own 
account” workers in this study can be classed as experiencing pushed self-employment in terms of 
the indicators used. 
 
Employers, Paid Workers, Self-Employed, Education, Labour Wage, Household Consumption 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It is conventional in the economics literature that individuals, as economic agents, maximise utility 
(or welfare); and that welfare or utility is, in large measure, a function of their consumption. Their 
ability to consume, in turn, is dependent on their income, or their ability to convert their human 
(and physical) capital into income streams. The development economics literature suggests that in 
developing economies – indeed, increasingly in developed economies as well – there is market 
failure that results in underutilisation or non-utilisation of human capital (or capabilities) such that 
an individual’s income is often not commensurate with his/her stock of human capital. 
 
These contexts are generally characterised by multi-tiered labour markets, whereby people with 
different levels of human capital are clearly clustered in different types of occupations. Ceteris 
paribus, the (relatively few) highly educated individuals tend to be in well-paid occupations, the 
dominant majority of individuals with low levels of education tend to be in occupations that are 
associated with low incomes, and individuals with intermediate levels of education tend to be in 
occupations that are associated with commensurately intermediate levels of income. 
 
This conventional view of labour markets in developing countries has important implications for 
the discussion about push vs pull self-employment. Consider for the moment that self-employment 
is homogeneous and that the alternative is paid employment. In that case, if the expected income 
from self-employment is higher, we would expect self-employment to be associated with 
individuals with higher human capital, on the one hand, and higher income (and consumption), on 
the other. The reverse would be true if the expected income from paid employment is higher. (Note 
that we deliberately exclude the issue of the relative variability in labour wages associated with 
these occupations, to keep the narrative simple at this stage; but a risk premium for self-
employment does not affect the fundamentals of the argument in any way.) 
14 
 
 
If, however, self-employment is heterogeneous, such that the expected labour wage from self-
employment can be higher or lower than the expected labour wage from paid employment, 
depending on the nature of self-employment, then the relationship between their current 
occupational status, human capital, and the income flows generated from their human capital may 
not be – for the lack of a better expression – aligned in a linear fashion. Speculatively, there may 
be an ordering of low-income self-employment, paid employment and high-income self-
employment that corresponds to a similar ordering of low human capital, medium human capital 
and high human capital among the labour market participants.  
 
Since rationality suggests that individuals would choose higher income (and consumption) over 
lower income (and consumption), this in turn would enable us to hypothesise and speculate about 
whether we observe push self-employment among a group of individuals who otherwise would 
have wanted paid employment and, at the other end of the distribution, a group of individuals who 
have chosen self-employment over paid employment on the basis of their expected labour wages 
from these two types of occupations. 
 
Consequently, this thesis draws from a segment of the literature that proposes that self-
employment in developing countries is an employment choice that individuals self-opt for; and 
from another strand of literature that suggests that self-employment may be an outcome that results 
involuntarily for individuals due to the stylised/conventional fact that the labour markets in 
developing countries do not clear.  
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It is currently agreed upon by a majority of the labour force literature (that will be surveyed in 
chapter 2),  that the occupational choice could be affected by a plethora of factors that typically 
fall into the psychological, social, economic and cultural categories.  These could include wage 
(pecuniary) and non-wage (non-pecuniary) factors; hence a lot of models with and without 
restrictions abound. Researchers in the labour market field have done superb work with exogenous 
and endogenous variables and under certain conditions e.g uncertainty, with more experience, 
entrepreneurial optimism, credit markets, government intervention e.t.c. Thus generally, the 
occupational decision could be affected by a profusion of variables some of which are captured in 
the diagram below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Figure 1: Some Variables Potentially Affecting Labour Force         
Participation Decision 
Psycological Factors 
Attitudes;Expectations for 
Self; Interests; Need for 
Achievement; 
Recognition & 
Independence; Fear of 
Success/Failure;Sex Role 
Conflicts; Self-Concept; 
Work Values; Risk 
Aversion; Ability; 
Motivation. 
Social Factors 
Age; Gender; Marital 
Status; Attitude of 
Spouse; Mobility; 
Number & Age of 
Children; Health, Social 
Class & Status; Race; 
Household 
Circumstances/Structure; 
Parental 
Background/Family 
Traditions; Social/Peer 
Influences; Lifestyle 
Choices. 
. 
Economic Factors 
Income; Credit 
Constraints; Education; 
Availability of Work; 
Types of Jobs Available; 
Barriers; Government 
Policy; Growth of 
Country; Country 
Economic Status. 
Cultural Factors 
Cultural Roles; Language; 
Religion; Region; Poverty 
Status; Relative Poverty; 
Gender Roles & 
Discrimination.  
Labour Force Participation/Occupation 
 Paid Work 
 Employer/Firm Owner 
 Self-Employed 
 Unemployed 
 Not in labour force 
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As can be seen in Figure 1 above, many variables can influence the labour force participation 
decision of individuals. It is also possible for the variables to interact with each other and some of 
these variables like age, gender, marital status, language, race, e.t.c. are clearly exogenous 
determinants of labour force participation/occupational choice, some variables are not clearly so 
and others are endogenous determinants. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the available 
variables utilizing data from a developing country to empirically investigate the relationship 
between labour force participation, educational attainments, labour wage and household 
consumption. Thus the reader should understand the caveats around interpreting the results of the 
thesis, especially for variables that are unavailable.  
 
With particular reference to the current literature on the labour force in developing countries, it is 
evident that eminent scholars have attempted contributed to the literature; and the evidence 
remains mixed as to whether self-employed individuals in developing countries are at an advantage 
or not, in terms of pecuniary and non-pecuniary indicators, when compared to those engaging in 
paid jobs. However, some general conclusions have been drawn from the literature so far. These 
are that gender, age, marital status, the availability of capital, local community acceptance, the 
economic sector individuals are engaged in, and individual educational attainments, could all 
influence the occupational status decision.  
 
This thesis consequently adds to the developing country labour force literature by further 
investigating the relationship(s) between labour force participation, educational attainments, 
labour wage and household consumption using the available variables. Since the occupational 
status held by individuals should influence labour wage and ultimately household consumption the 
thesis undertakes a specific investigation into labour force participation, labour wages and 
household consumption. It invokes rationality as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, which has 
implications for push and pull self-employment. 
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Epw > Ese  
Thus, the starting point of this thesis is a desire to understand the origins in developing countries 
of differences in labour wage and consumption vis-à-vis educational abilities, and by extension 
employment statuses. It addresses the need for a larger body of empirical evidence about the nature 
and impact of occupational statuses in developing countries. The conceptual model used 
throughout this thesis is shown below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual Model 
Ese > Epw  S.E  
P.W  
 E(P.W, S.E) = 0 S.E  
Labour Wage* Key 
Ese: Expected Labour Wage/Earnings from Self-employment. 
Epw: Expected Labour Wage/Earnings from Paid Work. 
S.E: (Outcome) Rational Individual chooses Self-employment. 
P.W: (Outcome) Rational Individual chooses Paid Work. 
E(P.E, S.E) Expected Wages/Earnings from any employment. 
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In the conceptual framework that is shown in Figure 2, an individual’s characteristics such as 
gender, age, marital status, economic sector, human capital (as captured by his/her educational 
attainment), geographical location, religion, region, community acceptance, etc. determines their 
occupation. The reader is again advised to be careful to understand the caveats when interpreting 
the results of the thesis as a full range of observed and unobserved variables are not included in 
the conceptual model. Consequently, as Figure 31 below shows in the case of labour wage, 
motivation also becomes a factor associated with the employment choices (as for example, 
individuals can be attracted to self-employment – pulled, or driven by a lack of work options – 
pushed). The individual’s occupation, in turn, determines his/her income flow, ceteris paribus, and 
influences his/her consumption. To this extent there is a clear (though not necessarily linear) 
mapping between an individual’s human capital, occupational status and income/wage. 
 
However, while an individual’s income/wage could influence his/her consumption to a significant 
extent, the mapping between income, which we can observe at an individual level, and 
consumption, which we observe at the household level, is mediated by household level bargaining, 
and by decisions that take into consideration other factors such as time flexibility associated with 
various occupations. In other words, it is not entirely possible to draw conclusions about push vs. 
pull self-employment on the basis of the mapping between educational attainment, occupation and 
individual income alone. Rationality would suggest we should take into consideration the 
relationship between the distribution of occupations among household member adults and 
household level consumption as well (two versions of per capita household welfare proxies, based 
on consumption are used, household consumption per capita and adult equivalised household 
consumption per capita). Thus the investigation is to be done in three phases. 
 
First, this thesis investigates how educational attainments affect the probability of holding any of 
the employment/occupational statuses highlighted in the conceptual model; this analysis is shown 
on the left hand side of Figure 2 and is represented by the notation “I”. As it stands, there is 
                                                          
1 Labour wage alone is often not the only determining factor for opting for an occupational status as non-pecuniary 
factors can also be considered. This has only been used to simplify the inquiry in this case. 
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substantial evidence to show that educational attainment could be the most important factor 
influencing employment status, especially in developing countries, and this part of the thesis is 
consistent with that literature. Educational human capital has especially been seen as a crucial 
factor influencing the occupational decision, since rational individuals should seek to maximise 
their returns on educational investments. The first part of the thesis thus seeks to answer the 
question: “How do educational attainments affect the probability of holding a specific occupational 
status in a developing country?” 
 
Education could affect the occupational status probability in differing ways; paid workers 
generally need to be educated to some degree, and the literature seems to suggest that they should 
be the most educated occupational group of individuals in developing countries. This is largely 
because education serves as a prerequisite for most paid sector jobs and serves as a signal to 
prospective employers in the job market, in addition to acting as a sorting mechanism both for job 
seekers and employers. Thus one would normally expect paid workers to exhibit higher levels of 
educational attainment compared to the rest of the labour market spectrum. 
 
Developing countries are also characterised by a large pool of individuals who report themselves 
as being in self-employment. The main question currently in the developing country labour market 
literature seems to be: “Are these individuals in productive self-employment out of choice or have 
they been forced into self-employment out of necessity because they cannot find paid sector jobs?” 
The literature seems to suggest that a significant majority of individuals engaged in developing 
country self-employment do this out of necessity because the labour markets in such countries do 
not clear; as a result such individuals cannot find paid jobs and hence resort to self-employment to 
make ends meet.  
 
In this case, labour force theory would expect individuals engaged in developing country self-
employment to be people who have lower educational attainments than paid workers. Since 
employers go to the labour market to seek the best (most qualified) candidates for the limited 
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number of jobs on offer, they should engage the cream of the educated population; and individuals 
with higher educational attainments should, in theory, be employed while individuals with lower 
educational attainments should be left without jobs. 
 
Employers are usually placed in the same class as the self-employed in the labour market/force 
literature because they are essentially self-employed individuals who employ other individuals. 
Thus they have been described by some as “the successful self-employed”, since they have moved 
out of “own account” self-employment (where a self-employed individual essentially works for 
himself/herself) to actually hiring other people, which suggests a higher turnover, larger budget 
and more business.  
 
However, recent studies seem to indicate that not distinguishing employers from self-employed 
“own account” workers could be misleading, as the two groups might be distinct. One of the major 
contributions of this thesis is to endorse such a distinction and to propose this in terms of an 
analysis of educational attainments, labour wage and household consumption. Specifically, for this 
element/part of the thesis, it will be important to see if employers and self-employed own account 
workers have distinct educational attainments.  
 
Unemployed individuals and people not in the labour force could also be affected by educational 
attainments. By standard definitions, the main difference between the two groups of individuals is 
that unemployed individuals are still actively/currently looking for work, while people not in the 
labour force are also unemployed, but are not actively/currently looking for employment. From an 
educational perspective, it could be suggested that unemployed people cannot find paid work due 
to their low educational attainments. From the same perspective, people not in the labour force 
might recognise that their educational attainments are too low for meaningful employment and 
decide to withdraw from employment activities to acquire some education if available; or simply 
that they too, like the unemployed, have low educational attainments when compared with paid 
workers or the self-employed. This is in addition to numerous reasons for unemployment and for 
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individuals not to engage in employment activities in developing countries due to pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary reasons. 
 
This way, we can see that educational attainments affect all the occupational groupings of 
individuals. This thesis additionally uses literature- appropriate control factors in terms of age, sex, 
marital status, sector, region, credit constraints, religion, having the ability to speak the local 
language, and other controls as available from the data. This is because clearly these controls can 
interact with educational attainments to affect the occupational outcome. Thus the first part of the 
thesis answers the question: “How do educational attainments affect the probability of holding a 
specific occupational status in a developing country?” 
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Epw > Ese  
Secondly, this thesis investigates how holding an occupational status affects the labour 
wage/income of individuals; this part of the thesis is represented by the Roman notation “IIIA” in 
Figure 2 (the conceptual model). Since ‘unemployed individuals’ and ‘individuals not in the labour 
force’ do not earn labour wages, they are not involved in the second part of the study2. For the 
second part of the analysis, the thesis invokes the assumption of expecting individuals to be von 
Neumann-Morgenstern rational utility maximisers with regards to occupational income/labour 
wage, in a relationship which can be expressed in Figure 3 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Occupational Decision of a Rational Utility Maximising Individual (Labour Wage 
Motivation) 
The second part of this thesis goes on to investigate how being in any of the 
occupational/employment status groups might affect labour wage/earnings. The preliminary 
concept has been expressed on the right hand side of Figure 2 (the conceptual model), while Figure 
3 above illustrates the occupational outcomes for a rational utility maximizing individual based on 
expected earnings from each employment status. The thesis aligns itself with the part of the 
literature that theorises that the employment decision is made by an individual who will decide 
which employment status to embark on, depending on the expected earnings/income that can be 
derived from each employment status.  
                                                          
2 In developing countries including the one investigated in this thesis, unemployment benefits are virtually non-
existent. Unemployed individuals typically either resort to some sort of petty self-employment to subsist or may rely 
on handouts from relatives and family members. Unemployment as it affects individuals in developing countries 
will be discussed in Section 2.4.1.6 of the thesis.  
Ese > Epw  S.E  
P.W  
 E(P.W, S.E) = 0 S.E  
Labour Wage* Key 
Ese: Expected Labour Wage/Earnings from Self-employment. 
Epw: Expected Labour Wage/Earnings from Paid Work. 
S.E: (Outcome)Rational Individual chooses Self-employment. 
P.W: (Outcome) Rational Individual chooses Paid Work. 
E(P.W, S.E) Expected Wages/Earnings from any employment. 
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Thus individuals will choose whatever employment status gives a maximum possible labour wage 
stream depending on their individual characteristics: in this case choosing between self-
employment and paid work, and settling for whichever gives more expected earnings. Thus the 
thesis also investigates how labour wage and later on, household consumption expectations could 
motivate individuals into opting for or being forced into an occupational status. 
 
A rational utility-maximising individual should consider all the variables on the right hand side of 
Figure 2; specifically his/her gender, age, marital status, economic sector, religion, region, local 
community acceptance, educational attainments and any relevant variable that can affect labour 
wage/income. Then he/she should pick an employment status that gives him/her the highest 
possible labour wage stream. Individuals are expected to choose rationally which occupational 
status to engage in because any possible utility (satisfaction) will only be derived through income; 
note that the thesis has ignored the many non-pecuniary benefits that might accrue from an 
employment/occupational status.  
 
For example, within self-employment, being one’s own boss, having more time for vacations, 
pursuing personal interests, having additional family time and other non-pecuniary factors have 
increasingly been highlighted as reasons for choosing self-employment, but this cannot be 
measured in the available data. Thus this thesis contributes to the branch of economics that views 
occupational rationality as a ‘von Neumann-Morgenstern’ function in terms of labour 
wage/income i.e. individuals choose what occupational status to engage in based on expected 
labour wage/income from the occupational status. 
 
Also, it is very important to note at this point that a departure from the model in Figure 2 will be 
an abnormality arising (a variation) from either a non-pecuniary benefit associated with the 
occupational status in question, or out of necessity; and would be akin to a “Dutch book” in terms 
of expected labour wage/income i.e. a loss in expected labour wage from engaging in that 
employment option as opposed to being engaged in another employment option. 
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The thesis is also careful to note that there can exist individuals whose expected labour 
wage/income from either paid employment or self-employment is zero, i.e. the individual has no 
chance of a paid sector or self-employment job. Such individuals can still opt for self-employment 
as an employment option no matter how little the proposed wage from that decision. This is 
because the self-employment option can at least in theory serve as a source of labour wage/income, 
however modest, which is better than a labour wage of zero. (The self-employment sector is also 
an attractive alternative as it usually has no significant legitimate barriers to entry apart from 
financial constraints and others as identified in the literature). This labour wage would be a better 
option than having no labour wage at all, especially since there are virtually no unemployment 
benefits in developing countries which the study in this thesis relates to. 
 
Thus in the conceptual model (Figure 2), there exists an indirect relationship between choice of 
employment (or unemployment) and labour wage/income. Specifically, self-employment is 
always an occupational option for an individual, irrespective of his/her educational status. 
Abstracting from non-pecuniary issues, what a person does is to compare the likely or expected 
labour wages from alternative sources of employment and choose the one that pays the highest. 
However, any individual can decide to go into self-employment whether it pays the highest return 
or not; while only those individuals who have the opportunity of being offered jobs in the paid 
sector enjoy the luxury of choosing the more rewarding employment option.  
 
This means that in the self-employment occupational category there could exist two groups of 
individuals. First, there are individuals who have decided to opt for self-employment because their 
monetary returns derived from being in self-employment are higher than they would have gained 
as paid workers; and second, there can also be individuals whose monetary returns derived from 
being in self-employment are lower than they would have been from earnings gained as paid 
workers. As Figure 3 shows, in a situation where rationality in terms of monetary returns is 
invoked, these individuals are in self-employment simply because they have no other choice but 
to be in self-employment; hence they remain in self-employment despite their lower returns in 
terms of labour wages/incomes.  
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Thus we can infer that the self-employment occupational category could be segmented with an 
ordering of “low-income self-employment”, “paid employment” and “high-income self-
employment” that corresponds to a similar ordering of low human capital, medium human capital 
and high human capital among the labour market participants. Trying to investigate conditional 
labour wages/incomes to decide which individuals belong to these two classes of self-employment 
will be a major cornerstone of this thesis and forms its second part.  
 
For the third part of the thesis, the researcher investigates how the distribution of household 
members among the employment states could affect household consumption; this analysis is 
represented by the Roman notation “IIIB” in the conceptual model (Figure 2). This investigation 
is imperative because in developing countries there could exist intra-household bargaining in the 
labour market for occupational/employment statuses, as households choose to maximise their 
combined household consumption from labour.  
 
For instance, in a household containing four employable individuals, two of these individuals could 
choose to venture into paid work, with the intention of ensuring a secure income stream and 
minimizing the risk of variation in earnings - especially since wage employment implies that a 
stable salary or income is received at the end of the stated contract period. The other two 
employable adults could choose to opt for self-employment and hence run the risk of some months 
of low income and other ‘more profitable’ months - especially since if these individuals are 
successful in the long run, they could return to the household with considerable dividends from 
their ventures.  
 
Note that the reason for individuals choosing their employment/occupational status in the above 
example has been considered from the point of view of combined household earnings. Thus it can 
be observed that at the household level, employment/occupational decisions are mediated by 
household level bargaining and decisions that might take into consideration other household 
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factors such as household consumption associated with various occupations, especially since 
engaging in certain activities could free individuals to pursue activities that benefit the entire 
household. 
 
Hence looking at occupational statuses through the lens of labour wage/income alone could be 
misleading, especially for a developing country context where household units play a fundamental 
role in everyday life. Also, most models and current studies in the literature that investigate the 
relationship between occupational statuses make use of individual variables - where the 
employment choice depends on the relative earnings from being either in self-employment or 
finding a paid job (essentially like the second part of this thesis).  
 
A technique needs to be used, and possibly adopted in the developing country labour market 
literature, that can take into account household data, and the conventional fact that in developing 
countries decisions on occupational choice are often made on a household level as households try 
to maximise their joint consumption.  
 
This thesis fills that gap in the literature by investigating the total household consumption for 
Nigerian households conditional on the proportion of household members in each of the 
employment/occupational statuses. Standard literature controls that show household head, 
demographic, geographic, employment and educational information are used to add validity to the 
findings. 
 
For this third assessment, theory would suggest that the employment/occupational statuses that 
bestow the highest income streams from the second assessment (“IIIA”; where labour 
wage/incomes were investigated) should also generate the highest household consumption levels. 
Hence if paid work generates high income streams, then having a higher proportion of paid workers 
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in the household should also confer higher household consumption levels, compared to having a 
higher proportion of self-employed individuals, and vice-versa.  
 
Thus the thesis contains three empirical investigations and proposes to show: 
 
1. The typical educational attainments of individuals in each occupational category; and by 
extension indicate if self-employment is dominated by less educated individuals, who are 
opting for self-employment as an occupational status because they lack the educational 
attainments to apply for paid/wage sector jobs; or if self-employment is dominated by 
highly educated individuals.   
 
2. How holding any of the employment statuses affects labour wage/income; and by extension 
indicate if self-employment is dominated by individuals who experience a penalty or 
premium in terms of labour wage/incomes, compared to paid workers. 
  
3. How proportions of household individuals engaged in each occupational status affect 
household consumption; and by extension indicate if having a higher proportion of self-
employed individuals/persons increases or reduces household consumption. 
 
The self-employed who are disadvantaged compared to paid workers in terms of education, labour 
wage or household consumption are usually described in the literature as being “pushed” into self-
employment while those who are advantaged along the same lines are normally described as being 
“pulled” into self-employment. The traditional self-employment literature typically assumes that 
self-employment in developing countries is of the pushed nature.  
In this case the premiums or penalties in relation to any of the occupational statuses will be seen 
in the part of the thesis represented by the Roman notation “II”, which is the sum of the total 
‘welfare’ proxy investigations containing the section where the thesis investigates labour 
wages/incomes (“IIIA”) and where it investigates two rough proxies of per capita household 
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welfare, household consumption per capita and adult equivalised household consumption per 
capita (“IIIB”). This is more relevant to the current literature and has implications for future 
research and policy, as both labour wage/income and household consumption could interact in 
diverse ways. Also the current literature seems to suggest that individuals with higher labour wages 
will also enjoy higher household consumption (a finding not particularly prominent in this 
enquiry). 
 
This thesis, therefore, adds to the labour force literature in developing countries by investigating 
the nature of employment and its resultant labour wage and household consumption consequences 
in a developing country, Nigeria, and by showing that, empirically, the self-employed are a 
heterogeneous group of individuals made up of a few highly educated individuals and a significant 
majority of ‘not so educated’ individuals, who mostly earn less than paid workers (depending on 
where they are located on the labour wage/income and household consumption quantile 
distribution). It also finds that a significant number of employers enjoy labour wage premiums, 
and having a higher proportion of employers has a positive relationship with household 
consumption. The thesis furthermore finds an upper educational threshold for women employers 
which is not found for men.  
 
Since it is also possible to observe if self-employed (employer and own account) individuals are 
worse or better off compared to paid workers, this thesis has implications for the push and pull 
self-employment literature, and policy implications in helping to distinguish those individuals who 
have possibly been pulled or pushed into self-employment in terms of educational attainments, 
labour wages and household consumption. 
 
The results show that as a whole, employers can largely be classed as pulled into self-employment 
as they appear to be advantaged in all three criteria (educational attainments, labour wage/income 
and household consumption). A minority of self-employed “own account” workers, specifically 
those at the upper end of the income distribution who are well educated, can be classed as pulled 
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into self-employment. The rest of the significant majority of self-employed individuals in this 
study can be classed as being pushed into self-employment. 
 
Overall, the thesis shows that in a developing country, as illustrated by Nigeria, occupational 
statuses, educational attainments, labour wages and household consumption are closely linked. It 
also shows that educational attainments are paramount in determining which employment status 
an individual holds, which in turn affects labour wage and household consumption in discernible 
patterns.  
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1.2 OVERVIEW 
 
In this section of the thesis, the researcher will briefly examine how the other dependent/control 
variables, located on the left hand side of the conceptual model in Figure 2, might influence the 
occupational status of individuals in developing countries. In other words, how gender, age, marital 
status, economic sector, religion, local community acceptance and credit constraints might 
influence the occupational status of individuals in developing countries. 
 
The gender debate as regards employment in developing countries is a volatile one. Males are 
traditionally viewed as bread winners in such societies and are conventionally expected to choose 
an occupational status that provides a high enough income stream for their families. Women in 
such countries (and indeed in developed countries) could need to perform maternal duties and 
could face some bias in the labour market pushing them into self-employment. Married women 
who have children in particular may opt for self-employment if they find that the employment 
option offers them the time flexibility to cater for their families. For literature purposes however, 
the thesis is mainly concerned with how gender might affect the occupational outcome, and 
whether men and women have differing probabilities of holding an occupational status. In addition, 
the thesis also investigates how gender might affect labour wage in developing countries.  
 
Age has also been identified as a factor that could influence the occupational status decision. It has 
already been established that age and income usually have an inverted U-shape relationship. 
Additionally, younger workers might want to “try their luck” in the self-employment sector given 
the energy and vigour associated with youth. However, older workers might be better suited to the 
self-employment sector since they could have acquired more capital in terms of experience and 
monetary savings from working in the paid sector. Age could thus have an ambiguous relationship 
with occupational status even though its relationship with income is more apparent in the economic 
literature.  
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Marital status, economic sector and religion have all been found to have a very ambivalent 
relationship with occupational status and labour wage/incomes. Married individuals in particular 
could feel more pressured to resort to self-employment to support their families if paid sector jobs 
are unavailable. So far in the literature several studies have also reported mixed findings as regards 
economic sector and religion; it will thus be beneficial to engage in an inquiry that controls for 
these variables. 
 
Local community acceptance could possibly play a major part in occupational status decisions as 
studies show that if individuals reside in communities where a high social status is associated with 
self-employment or paid work, individuals would like to move to such occupations. Also, other 
related constraints like the availability of credit and local infrastructure could influence the choice 
whether or not to be self-employed, since self-employment usually involves some sort of capital 
investment and the use of local infrastructure. Studies additionally show that having a social 
network could be beneficial to self-employment; thus being able to communicate in the local 
language might be a sign of belonging to the local community, and could possibly help in 
negotiating business contracts informally (and formally in some instances).  
 
Regional differences especially within developing countries like the one being investigated, 
Nigeria, can also influence the occupational status decision. If there are regional variations related 
to religion, local community acceptance and available opportunities, this might impact how 
individuals decide what occupational statuses to opt for. 
 
Finally, the contextual motivation associated with the employment choices could influence what 
occupational statuses individuals opt for in developing countries. Individuals could be attracted to 
self-employment (pulled) or driven into self-employment by a lack of work options (pushed). 
Figure 3 has pointed out that A rational utility-maximising individual should consider all the 
variables on the right hand side of Figure 2; specifically his/her gender, age, marital status, 
economic sector, religion, region, local community acceptance, educational attainments and any 
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relevant variable that can affect labour wage/income. Then he/she should pick an employment 
status that gives him/her the highest possible labour wage/income stream. Individuals are expected 
to choose rationally which occupational status to engage in because any possible utility 
(satisfaction) will only be derived through income; note that the thesis has ignored the many non-
pecuniary benefits that might accrue from an employment/occupational status.  
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1.3 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The interest for this thesis as stated earlier is the desire to understand where differences in labour 
wages/incomes and household consumption levels come from in developing countries, as they 
might depend on any of the employment statuses shown in the conceptual model captured in Figure 
2.  
 
The section of the analysis labelled “I” seeks to answer the question: “How do educational 
attainments affect the probability of belonging to any of the employment states in a developing 
country?” By investigating this, the thesis aims to discover patterns in educational attainment (if 
any) as they affect the occupational statuses expressed in the conceptual model. This enquiry 
should be useful since human capital has already been identified as a major determinant of 
occupational capital in developed economies. It would therefore be extremely beneficial to 
empirically investigate for developing countries if there are patterns that might reflect the 
probability of having a particular employment status, depending on individual human capital 
expressed in educational attainments. 
 
The whole of the investigation marked “II” is dedicated to the main research objective of this 
thesis, which aims to uncover how differences in labour wage and household consumption levels 
relate to any of the employment statuses shown in the conceptual model; this investigation is done 
in two parts. The aim of the first part of the analysis marked “IIIA” is to empirically analyse how 
labour wage is determined by labour force participation status after the thesis has observed how 
educational attainment reflects occupational status in part “I”. The second part, marked “IIIB”, 
seeks to determine how household consumption expenditure is determined by the proportion of 
individuals in each occupational category.  
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Therefore the thesis makes use of three specific, testable (falsifiable) hypotheses. They are based 
on precise predictions made from the existing literature and consist of: 
 
Expected Prediction i : From the literature that will be surveyed in section 2.3.1, it is expected 
that as individuals become more educated in developing countries, they will opt paid work over 
self-employment. This means that the expected pattern for the data from a developing country is 
to predict that more educated individuals will be engaged in wage work/paid employment while 
less educated individuals are expected to be in self-employment. Thus the hypothesis 1 seeks to 
address this inquiry.  
 
i. “Hypothesis 1”𝐻1: Educational attainments will affect the probability of belonging to an 
employment status in a developing country. 
 
The Hypothesis 1 addresses the portion of the conceptual model labelled “I” which seeks 
to answer the question: “How do educational attainments affect the probability of 
belonging to any of the employment/occupational states in a developing country?”  By 
performing this analysis, the thesis aims to discover if there are patterns in educational 
attainments as they affect the occupational statuses. Precisely, the thesis aims to investigate 
if more educated individuals are to be found in self-employment or paid-employment/wage 
work.  
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Expected Prediction ii: From the literature that will be surveyed in section 2.4.1, it is expected 
that self-employed individuals in developing countries will experience a labour wage penalty when 
compared to wage earners/paid workers. This means that the expected pattern is to predict that 
individuals in self-employment in the data from a developing country should experience a labour 
wage penalty compared to wage earners. Thus the hypothesis 2 seeks to address this inquiry.  
 
ii. “Hypothesis 2”𝐻2: Workers experience a labour wage penalty or premium depending on 
their occupational status in a developing country. 
 
The Hypothesis 2 addresses the portion of the conceptual model labelled “IIIA” which 
seeks to empirically analyse how labour wage is determined by labour force participation. 
By performing this analysis, the thesis aims to discover if there are patterns in occupational 
statuses as they affect labour wage. Precisely, the thesis aims to investigate if paid/wage 
workers typically earn more or less than self-employed individuals conditional on 
observable characteristics.  
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Expected Prediction iii: From the literature that will be surveyed in section 2.4.2, it is expected 
that self-employed individuals in developing countries are disadvantaged across a number of 
welfare indicators when compared to wage earners. This means that the expected pattern is to 
predict that individuals in self-employment in the data from a developing country should be worse-
off in terms of household consumption when compared to wage earners. This also means that 
having a higher proportion of self-employed individuals in the household workforce should have 
a negative relationship with total household consumption and having a higher proportion of wage 
earning household workforce should have a positive relationship with total household 
consumption. Thus the alternate hypothesis 3 seeks to address this inquiry.  
 
iii. “Hypothesis 3"𝐻3: Total household consumption expenditure will depend on the 
employment status composition of employable household adults in a developing country. 
 
The Hypothesis 3 addresses the portion of the conceptual model labelled “IIIB” which 
seeks to determine how total household consumption is determined by the proportion of 
household individuals in each occupational category. By performing this analysis, the 
thesis aims to discover if having a higher proportion of a particular occupational category 
is beneficial or detrimental to household consumption.  
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Taken together, the central aim of this thesis therefore is to examine one human capital indicator 
– educational attainment; and two welfare proxies – labour wage and household consumption for 
workers, in order to establish their relationship(s) with occupational statuses in developing 
countries. By extension, since we have the relationship expressed in Figure 2 where rationality 
should imply that individuals choose whatever employment status gives higher returns in terms of 
labour wage and household consumption, we can observe if individuals and households are 
advantaged or disadvantaged (in terms of labour wage/income and total household consumption), 
given their employment characteristics. 
 
Worthy of note is the conventional fact that labour wage and household consumption could have 
an influence on each other. Labour wage is expressed at the individual level while household 
consumption is measured at the household level. The portfolio optimisation of households leads 
to choices of individual employment that might be aimed at maximising household consumption. 
This way we can see that activities of individuals as regards labour force activities have an 
impact on overall household income and hence consumption (less savings and investments). This 
way, the consumption set of households might be a richer measure of household welfare than is 
currently reported in the literature. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW/PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the nature of this enquiry involves related strands of labour force literature, it might be 
beneficial to begin this section by defining and examining the occupational statuses the thesis aims 
to empirically investigate according to the literature, before delving into previous research that 
could have specific implications for this investigation.  
 
Distinguishing employers from “own account” self-employed workers in transition economies, 
Earle and Sakova (2000) argue that on the one hand, a self-employed worker may be a successful 
business owner exploiting new opportunities and inventing new products, production processes, 
and distribution methods. At the other extreme, self-employment status may result from a forced 
recourse to a residual sector in which the individual's activities and income differ little from those 
in unemployment; this mirrors the views expressed in Figure 3.  
 
Based on this they argue that the employers are clearly genuine business owners because as 
employers they are creating jobs for others, implying that they have had some success in their 
business. Employers have been able to hire capital and other inputs (including employees) and 
combine these to run a business; employers are also more likely to be engaged in self-employment 
voluntarily. This view agrees with the developing country literature, as previous research shows 
that employers typically have substantial financial and social capital compared with own account 
workers (Gollin, 2008, Desai, 2009, Yamada, 1996, Hanley, 2000).  
 
Such a distinction in the self-employment occupational category was also made in a household 
level analysis by Tamvada (2010); and will additionally be used in this thesis. The author 
distinguishes between employers, own account workers as well as paid workers, and concludes 
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that households with a higher proportion of employers enjoy the highest welfare in terms of 
household consumption, while households with a greater proportion of wage/paid workers come 
second. These are followed by those with a higher proportion of own account workers; households 
with a greater proportion of casual labourers come last in the welfare distribution. In line with the 
current literature, this thesis also defines employers as self-employed persons who have other 
individuals working for them and receiving incomes. 
 
“Self-employment” has been defined as the employment of persons operating individual 
enterprises or businesses (Fields, 2013). Self-employment in broad terms can also be classed as 
the residual category of employment not remunerated by wage (Pietrobelli et al., 2004). Another 
description of the self-employed is individuals who earn no regular wage or salary but derive their 
incomes by exercising their profession or business on their own account and at their own risk; 
many of them operate sole proprietorships (an unincorporated business owned by one person); and 
those that have no employees are called own account workers (Parker, 2009).  
 
Historically,  self-employment  may  well  be  the  natural  economic  status  of  human  beings. 
However; with the advent of settled agriculture and modernisation, driven by the division of 
labour, gradually paid jobs arrived on the scene (van Stel et al., 2010). By the end of the 
eighteenth century the prevalence of self-employment had already declined to below 50% 
of the labour force in several of the present day developed countries (Parker, 2004). This led to 
the traditional hypothesis of a negative relationship between the share of self-employed workers 
in the labour market of a country and the development performance (Kuznets, 1973, Kuznets, 
1966).  
 
Paid workers are individuals who work for other persons and receive wages or salary at the end of 
a stipulated contractual period (hourly, daily, weekly, monthly, annually, etc.). The activities these 
individuals engage in are very diverse, much like their counterparts in self-employment. However, 
paid employment might be a more secure employment option because there is less variation in 
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earnings, unlike self-employment that might be characterised by some profitable seasons and other 
lean periods.  
 
As commonly defined, “unemployment” is a condition whereby an individual is without work but 
shows a desire for work by actively seeking employment; as opposed to a situation where 
individuals are without work but are not actively engaged in searching for work. This latter group 
of individuals are described as being “Out of the Labour Force” (Standing, 2000).  
 
Most researchers regard unemployment as a negative experience as it usually connotes adverse 
consequences for labour wage/income, status, morale and social integration. Since it is a 
conventional fact that individuals must receive some income in order to survive, this may take 
several forms expressed as a simple identity by Standing (2000) as: 
 
𝑆𝐼 = 𝑊 + 𝐶𝐵 + 𝐸𝐵 + 𝑆𝐵 + 𝑃𝐵 
 
Where 𝑆𝐼 is the individual’s total social income, 𝑊 is the labour wage or income received from 
work (the variable used in this thesis), 𝐶𝐵 is the value of benefits or support provided by the 
family, kin or the local community, EB is the amount of benefits provided by the enterprise in 
which the person might be working, 𝑆𝐵 is the value of state benefits provided (which can take 
the form of insurance benefits or other transfers), and 𝑃𝐵 is private income benefits, gained 
through investment, including private social protection.  
 
For the purposes of our investigation, 𝐶𝐵, 𝐸𝐵 and 𝑃𝐵 are not included, as they are not a part of 
the conceptual model due to data limitations and anyway should not affect our results significantly 
because the literature suggests that they are erratic in developing countries. It is also a conventional 
fact in the literature that 𝑆𝐵 is negligible in developing countries, as most developing countries, 
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including the one we investigate, do not provide unemployment benefits or any form of support to 
individuals directly or indirectly. Thus we are left with 𝑊, which represents the labour 
wage/incomes of individuals. Furthermore, since the unemployed and those not in the labour force 
do not report or earn any labour wages, their part in this analysis is limited.  
 
 
42 
 
2.2.1 LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
 
This part of the thesis focuses on labour force participation and its observed relationship(s) with 
education, labour wage and household consumption, as currently described in the literature. 
 
 
Figure 4: Conceptual Model (as Figure 2) 
 
As regards unemployment and not belonging to the labour force, literature indicates that 
unemployment is still a striking symptom in many developing countries, and in many cases, open 
unemployment could affect between 10 – 30 per cent of the urban labour force. In addition, large 
portions of the labour force in these countries are underemployed – in the sense of lacking the 
resources and opportunities for increasing their incomes to levels comparable to people with paid 
work in the modern urban sector.  
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The sociological literature on developed countries also recognises that different occupations 
sometimes allocate individuals with different social statuses, and so workers benefit not only from 
the wage they receive but also from being associated with a particular occupation. Occasionally, 
cultural differences among societies may translate into different statuses for occupations, and can 
therefore affect the choice of education and occupation individuals participate in and consequently 
the equilibrium level of output and wages (Fershtman and Weiss, 1993). 
 
Moreover, the very meaning of seeking work in developing countries - on which the statistics of 
open unemployment depend – to some extent reflects attitudes and ambitions for a particular type 
of working life, often in wage earning white-collar paid work, rather than the total lack of an 
alternative source of income or economic activity (Jolly et al., 1973). The fact still remains that, 
as was the case four decades ago, each year large numbers of school leavers aspire to paid jobs far 
in excess of the number of available openings. Many of these individuals adjust to the realities of 
the job market either to take what is going in the way of paid work, or some might decide to make 
what they can from the self-employment option. 
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2.3.1 LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND EDUCATION 
 
The main contribution of this section is that the thesis provides an emphasis on human capital: in 
particular educational attainment and its association with labour force participation. 
 
 Figure 5: Conceptual Model (Education and Labour Force Participation) 
 
Several researchers have in the past attempted to identify the link between labour force 
participation and education. In this vein, some authors have made theoretical contributions while 
others have made empirical contributions to this literature. Looking at occupational status through 
the lens of educational human capital should thus give insightful results for a number of pertinent 
reasons.  
 
The literature already proposes that endowments in human capital significantly affect the 
probability of being in self-employment or paid employment (Robinson and Sexton, 1994, Casson, 
1995, Van der Sluis et al., 2005, Parker, 2004). Educational human capital has especially been 
seen as a crucial factor influencing the occupational decision, as individuals seek to maximise their 
returns on educational investment. Education also serves as a prerequisite for most paid sector jobs 
and a signal to prospective employers in the job market in addition to acting as a sorting mechanism 
both for job seekers and employers. This part of the thesis thus aims to add to the literature by 
answering the question: “How does educational attainment affect the probability of holding any of 
the employment statuses in a developing country?” The literature so far is discussed now.  
Labour Force Participation 
• Paid Work  
• Employer/Firm owner 
• Self-employed 
• Unemployed 
• Not in labour force  
Educational 
Attainment 
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According to the existing literature, economic theory would expect formal education and paid 
work to have a positive relationship. Since educational attainment is an affirmative sign of human 
capital endowments prospective employers (including the government, multinationals, NGO’s, 
indigenous employers and other job creators) are likely to sort through potential candidates and 
employ individuals with relevant skill sets that are needed for the paid/wage earning job. 
Educational qualifications have been identified as essential employment criteria across a wide 
range of studies (Jolly et al., 1973, Parker, 2009).  
 
Moreover, Bates (1995) finds that owner educational background is a major determinant of both 
business survival and the financial capital structure of business start-ups: a finding which has 
implications for the educational attainment of employers themselves, as outlined below. 
  
The link between self-employment and formal education is generalised in the literature and views 
have gradually evolved over the decades as the literature has become more robust3. It was initially 
argued that formal education and business ownership would have a positive relationship. This is 
because education should theoretically, according to the human capital literature, endow business 
owners with analytical and transaction expertise and information about business opportunities in 
addition to an understanding of markets and proper business processes: for example, how to apply 
for business loans, or the right procedures to be taken when engaging in different profitable 
ventures (Casson, 1995, Parker, 2009).   
 
Adam Smith used the example of a small grocery to illustrate this point: “The owner of such an 
enterprise (a business) must be able to read, write, account, and must be a tolerable judge too of 
perhaps, fifty to sixty different sorts of goods, their prices, qualities, and the market where they 
                                                          
3 The earliest theories and studies made no distinction between business ownership, entrepreneurship and 
self-employment, so one has to review the earliest literature under the general umbrella of “business 
ownership” and formal education. 
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are to be had cheapest.” (Smith and Garnier, 1845). This example shows that the business owner 
needs a modest amount of education to function profitably. 
 
While the media sometimes provide folkloric examples focusing on the “high-school dropout” 
who reportedly made it big in the business world armed with an education from the “school of 
hard knocks”, this indeed happens infrequently (Robinson and Sexton, 1994). The capability of 
the self-employed is usually represented by two main components, which are ‘entrepreneurial 
ability’ and ‘access to finance’ (Evans and Leighton, 1989a). Entrepreneurial ability is a very wide 
term that refers to the aptitude of individuals to recognize and exploit business opportunities in a 
form of arbitration; this relates to concepts such as imagination (Shackle, 1979), alertness (Kirzner, 
1973) and a knowledge of the market (Jovanovic, 1982).  
 
Entrepreneurial perception and awareness is further heightened by greater access to information 
and an ability to analyse information critically and for profit. Therefore business contacts4 
(McGuire, 1976), social capital (Estrin et al., 2013) and - specifically for the purpose of this thesis 
- ‘education’ (Schultz, 2002) become important attributes; and one would expect them to influence 
productivity positively (Burke et al., 2002). In this way, educational attainment should have a 
positive relationship with business ownership.  
 
Furthermore, according to theoretical models by Lucas Jr (1978) and Leibenstein (1968); 
individuals with greater “entrepreneurial ability” (say “X”) enter into entrepreneurship. “X” enters 
the entrepreneur’s cost function in a negative manner and their production function in a positive 
manner. The question then is whether “X” can be a proxy for educational attainment; here the 
literature branches out into two different strands.   
                                                          
4 For comprehensive reviews on social capital and business formation, see PARKER, S. C. 2004. The 
economics of self-employment and entrepreneurship, Cambridge University Press, ESTRIN, S., 
KOROSTELEVA, J. & MICKIEWICZ, T. 2013. Which institutions encourage entrepreneurial growth 
aspirations? Journal of Business Venturing, 28, 564-580.  
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On the one hand empirically, Robinson and Sexton (1994) find in Canada that general education 
has a strong positive influence on becoming self-employed and on success in business. Keeble et 
al. (1993) report in the UK that many opportunities for the self-employed exist in knowledge-based 
industries (e.g. accounting, law and art) and greater levels of education should promote self-
employment because more educated individuals are better informed about business opportunities. 
This view is supported by Van der Sluis et al. (2008) who found that the effect of schooling on 
business performance was unambiguously positive in a meta-analysis of 69 studies in developed 
countries (although the impact of education on selection into business ownership was 
insignificant). 
 
Lazear (2004) also reported that business owners were very likely to be “jacks-of-all trades” 
because they were found to take a more diverse set of educational courses than their colleagues 
who went into paid employment – this might be explained by arguing that the “wider variety of 
more generalised” courses helps the potential business owner by endowing him/her with a wider 
array of knowledge. Conversely, paid workers might need thorough and specialised education so 
as to be professionals in chosen fields e.g. a typical gynaecologist or a mathematics professor will 
need significant formal education, while business owners might not need such specialised 
knowledge  and could decide not to acquire such education (Parker, 2004). 
 
In general, this school of thought argues that business owners will need to have a broader range of 
skills than paid workers to be able to cope with the various challenges of a business5. In the 
Nigerian (developing country) context however, where there may be a lot of push/necessity self-
employment according to the traditional labour theory of Harris and Todaro (1970), education may 
also have a positive relationship with paid work, as individuals look to receive higher returns on 
                                                          
5 Leading to a claim that entrepreneurs are generally “Jack of All Trades” by LAZEAR, E. P. 2004. 
Balanced Skills and Entrepreneurship. The American Economic Review, 94, 208-211. 
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their human capital investments in paid work than they might gain from business ownership with 
low returns in an economic environment that could be harsh for business. 
 
On the other hand however, Casson (2005) argues that skills that are used by good business-owners 
are not likely to be found in formal education but by partaking in real life businesses and 
apprenticeships. This school thus argues that business owners are not likely to possess high 
educational attainments, because they do not need a formal education, but instead require real life 
business training. 
 
 Van der Sluis et al. (2008) also talk about a “Bill Gates” (Drop Out) effect; in their analysis, 
college drop-outs were significantly more likely to be self-employed. They also found that in 
developing countries, more educated workers typically end up in wage employment and prefer 
non-farm entrepreneurship to farming (thus less educated individuals were engaged in non-farm 
business ownership). As pointed out earlier, Nigeria being a developing country offers an 
interesting scenario. This is because while education could serve as a catalyst for the self-employed 
to ‘escape’ push self-employment and get into the formal paid jobs market, education might also 
give potential business owners the skills they need to thrive in the business environment, thereby 
also making it more likely for individuals with high educational attainment to opt for self-
employment. 
 
Other research has focused on the effect of education on business ownership motivation. Maloney 
(2004) suggests that the size of the self-employed workforce in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina 
seems to diminish with more years of schooling. Parker (2004) and Le (1999) are of the opinion 
that the relationship between education and self-employment is likely to depend on the 
econometric specification used; although they also agree that as education attainments increase, 
the probability of being self-employed falls. Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2009) reported that having a 
low level of education is not quite conducive for entrepreneurship and business ownership in the 
real sense of the word. 
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The prevailing view seems to be that some education is needed for business owners, but not so 
much that the opportunity cost tied to education is too high, as then prospective entrepreneurs 
might decide to find compensation in the labour market through paid jobs. The literature also 
agrees that business owners should have sufficient knowledge about the field they are engaged in, 
even though some business owners can hire specialists and advisers to supplement their 
knowledge.  
 
Van Praag (2003) examined young white self-employed men in the US and showed that self-
employment performance was significantly enhanced by schooling, giving evidence of pull effects 
for education and self-employment in a developed country. However, a meta-analysis also 
conducted by Van der Sluis et al. (2005) on developing countries showed that OLS estimates 
underestimate the self-employment returns to education; and that while this is lower in developing 
countries than developed countries, it is quite significant. This study found that returns to education 
were estimated at 5.5% for each additional year of schooling for self-employment and 6.1% for 
paid work, showing that more educated individuals were better off in paid employment. The 
researchers also reported that for developing countries, additional education reduced the likelihood 
of being in self-employment, giving support for the push kind of self-employment in developing 
countries.  
 
The literature on developing countries thus far seems to indicate that formal educational 
attainments have a negative relationship with self-employment (Blau, 1985, Van der Sluis et al., 
2005, Robinson and Sexton, 1994). The consensus is that since the costs of acquiring a formal 
education in developing countries are so high, individuals might seek to maximise their returns 
and such investments in human capital by opting for wage/paid work. These studies seem to 
indicate that since a prerequisite for being qualified for wage sector jobs is a formal educational 
qualification, such as a degree e.g. a BSc, MSc or HND in a relevant field for the job, the 
probability of having a wage job increases with higher educational attainment: while conversely, 
the probability of being in self-employment falls as educational attainment increases. This 
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therefore suggests that individuals in self-employment in developing countries will probably be 
those with low educational attainments, who have been forced/pushed into such lower paying jobs, 
as they do not have the level of educational attainments to seek paid jobs. 
 
The literature predicts that more educated individuals in developing countries are less likely to be 
in self-employment than in developed countries (Van der Sluis et al., 2005). Coupled with the 
Harris and Todaro (1970) theory that the self-employed in developing countries are a 
disadvantaged group, the expectation would be that the self-employed individuals in Nigeria will 
be uneducated people who have been pushed into self-employment because they have low 
educational skills/attainments. More educated individuals would be found in paid work, where 
they can make higher returns on the investment in their human capital. Also, formal educational 
degrees are prerequisites for a majority of paid jobs in developing countries such as Nigeria - so 
those with significant amounts of formal education are expected to be in paid-employment. 
 
This thesis also recognizes the opportunity for an empirical investigation to explore the 
relationship between occupational status and education from a micro-level perspective in a 
developing country, and to make the vital distinction between employers, paid-employees and own 
account workers. As stated earlier, Earle and Sakova (2000) argue that on the one hand, a self-
employed worker may be a successful business owner exploiting new opportunities and inventing 
new products, production processes, and distribution methods. On the other hand, self-employment 
status may result from forced recourse to a residual sector in which the individual's activities and 
income differ little from those in unemployment.  
 
Based on this they argue that the employers are clearly genuine business owners/entrepreneurs 
because employers are creating jobs for others. Tamvada (2010) also reports that employers enjoy 
higher welfare, in terms of adult equivalent household consumption levels, than both paid workers 
and self-employed “own account” workers. This thesis thus makes these occupational distinctions 
(employer, paid worker and self-employed “own account”) when investigating the relationship 
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between employment statuses and education – a view not previously found in the developing 
country literature. 
 
The unemployed as a collective category are expected to be uneducated and unskilled, although in 
developing countries including Nigeria, self-employment and farming can be a last resort (Jolly et 
al., 1973), while those not in the labour force could have an ambiguous relationship with 
educational attainments, as it is not clear who these individuals are and why they have decided not 
to enter the labour market. For example, they could be full time housewives/care-givers or 
individuals who have simply quit the labour market for differing reasons. It is however expected 
that they too will report lower educational attainments than paid workers, since it would be 
irrational to make educational investments and not seek to recoup especially in developing 
countries where the opportunity costs of education are very high (Fields, 2013, Fields, 1980). 
 
In summary, from the existing research and literature, we would expect those in self-employment, 
the unemployed and individuals not in the labour force to have lower educational attainments when 
compared to those who are in paid work. We are not sure what to expect from employers at this 
point; the first empirical analysis at this stage will thus aim to answer the question; “How do 
educational attainments affect the probability of holding any of the employment statuses in a 
developing country?” 
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2.4.1 LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND LABOUR WAGE/INCOME 
 
This section of the literature review will focus on the relationship between labour force 
participation and labour wage/income as it currently exists in the labour force participation 
literature. 
 
 Figure 6: Conceptual Model (Labour Force Participation and Labour Wage/Income) 
 
Closely related to the problems of ‘employment’ in developing countries is the question of income 
distribution, in the sense of how much income different occupational groups of the population 
receive (Jolly et al., 1973). In other words, “How does having any particular employment status 
affect income?” This is a major gap in the literature that this thesis hopes to contribute to filling.  
 
As stated earlier, a very important conventional fact is that in developing countries, self-
employment is increasingly viewed as an alternative to paid employment, serving as an option 
facing both the potential entrant into the labour market and the unemployed (Maloney, 2003, Rees 
and Shah, 1986). Thus individuals in developing countries could choose not to accept the patterns 
of work opportunities and the prospective labour wage offered by the labour market and resort to 
working on their own; the other alternatives would be unemployment and not belonging to the 
labour force.  
Labour Wage Labour Force Participation 
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This thesis is also timely and relevant to the current debate, because unlike traditional economic 
labour market models that assume that self-employment is synonymous with poverty in developing 
countries (Harris and Todaro, 1970), recent studies show that self-employment in developing 
countries is an employment option that individuals choose: for non-pecuniary reasons in the view 
of Maloney (2004) and for pecuniary reasons (Mohapatra et al., 2007, Yamada, 1996). In other 
words, there is the possibility that people may be pulled towards (or be attracted to) self-
employment in developing countries on account of non-pecuniary and pecuniary factors.  
 
This thesis focuses on pecuniary factors relevant to employment; and consequently for the second 
empirical analysis, the thesis investigates how holding any of the employment statuses affects the 
labour wage of individuals. Labour wage or income received from work is the dependent variable 
in this analysis as the thesis aims to investigate if belonging to any of the occupational statuses can 
induce a labour wage premium or penalty.  Since the unemployed and those not in the labour force 
do not earn labour wages, they are not directly involved in the second part of the study6. 
 
For the second empirical analysis investigating labour wage, the thesis begins with the well-known 
employment models of Lewis (1954) and Fei and Ranis (1964), who posit that the developing 
economy comprises two sectors – the agricultural, subsistence sector characterised by surplus 
labour; and an industrial, modern sector into which labour from the agricultural sector is gradually 
transferred.  Both transfer and labour absorption in the modern sector take place over time and the 
model assumes two things: surplus labour in the rural sector and constant real wages in the urban 
sector. 
 
                                                          
6 In developing countries, including the one investigated in this thesis, unemployment benefits are 
virtually non-existent. Unemployed individuals typically either resort to some sort of petty self-
employment to subsist or may rely on charity/handouts from relatives and family members. 
Unemployment as it affects individuals in developing countries will be discussed in detail later in the 
thesis.  
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As the transfer of labour proceeds, unemployment (or underemployment) will be reduced as 
employment in the modern industrial sector increases, until the point where surplus labour in the 
rural areas disappears. In reality, the typical situation in developing countries has been for urban 
wages to rise considerably, both absolutely and relative to rural living standards, even in the 
presence of open unemployment (Jolly et al., 1973, Fields, 2013).  
 
The elements of these models have been modified into the now famous Harris-Todaro model 
(Harris and Todaro, 1970). This model was developed to fit the context of East Africa by John 
Harris and Michael Todaro. According to this model, there are certain events that occur as 
developing countries move to self-sustaining growth. The starting point posits that in order to be 
hired for a formal wage sector job, it is necessary for individuals to be physically present in the 
urban areas where such jobs are located. As workers search for more jobs than there actually are, 
employers will hire some of them (but not all of them). Those not hired end up unemployed ex-
post: thus open unemployment is possible. The Harris-Todaro model is discussed next. 
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2.4.1.1 THE HARRIS-TODARO MODEL 
 
The Harris and Todaro (1970) model proceeds as follows. In essence, employers in the formal 
sector hire workers until the point where the marginal product of labour equals the wage rate in 
the formal sector ?̅?𝐹. On the other hand, in the informal sector made up of the self-employed, 
unemployed and agricultural workers, there is assumed to be free entry; thus all people who wish 
to work in the informal sector may do so. Each person employed in the informal sector earns a 
wage ?̅?𝐼 <  ?̅?𝐹. Workers are thus assumed to consider the mathematical expected wages from 
each of two search strategies:  
 
a) Searching for a formal paid job, which pays a relatively high wage but runs the risk of 
unemployment, or 
b) Taking an informal sector occupation, which offers a lower wage but has no risk of 
unemployment.  
 
The insight of this model was that workers would be expected to allocate themselves between 
formal and informal sector search strategies so that the expected wages from the two strategies 
are equalized:  𝐸(𝑊𝐹) =  𝐸(𝑊𝐼). 
 
Thus the wage equilibrium condition becomes?̅?𝐹
𝐸𝐹
𝐿𝐹
=  ?̅?𝐼 , where 𝐸𝐹 is employment in the 
formal sector and 𝐿𝐹 is labour force in the formal sector.  
 
Because  ?̅?𝐹 >  ?̅?𝐼, it follows that 
𝐸𝐹
𝐿𝐹
< 1. This means that the formal sector labour force 
exceeds formal sector employment, and hence individuals who cannot get jobs in the formal 
sector will be forced to join the informal sector. This model thus implies that the self-employed, 
56 
 
those in the agricultural sector and all individuals in the informal sector7 will be worse-off in 
terms of earnings compared to individuals in wage employment8.  
 
The model thus has the policy implications of encouraging formal sector employment creation and 
rural sector development in order to create jobs for the unemployed, and also of creating rural 
sector opportunities to stop rural-urban migration in the first place. Indeed when the model was 
first published, the government of Kenya carried out an integrated rural development programme 
and unemployment in the country fell. This model has been extended to allow for on-the-job search 
from rural agriculture, preferential hiring of better-educated individuals, employment fixity, 
duality within the rural sector, mobile capital, endogenous urban wage setting, risk aversion, a 
system of demand for goods and other relevant factors (Fields, 2004). 
 
However, following this Harris-Todaro model and other theoretical work by Ranis and Fei (1961), 
Fields (1990), Lewis (1954) and particularly Stiglitz (1976), who also develops a model of 
segmentation and hierarchy in wages for different sectors and in different employment categories 
showing that the self-employed should earn lower wages, it is assumed that the self-employed are 
worse-off in the labour wage hierarchy relative to paid workers (Tamvada, 2010, Günther and 
Launov, 2012, Jolly et al., 1973, Fields, 2013). Indeed empirical studies conducted by Bosch and 
Maloney (2010), Bromley (1978), Chen and Doane (2008) and Tokman, (1992) seem to point in 
this direction; and the literature on developing countries traditionally classifies the self-employed 
as a distressed residual group of people rationed out of formal sector jobs who should report lower 
labour wages compared to paid workers (Tamvada, 2010, Bargain and Kwenda, 2011, Gindling 
and Newhouse, 2012, Maloney, 2003). 
 
Empirically, several studies find a negative earnings premium, called an ‘labour wage/income 
penalty’, for self-employment; and these include research by Jhabvala et al. (2003) in India, Gong 
                                                          
7 And also unemployed. 
8 Especially Formal Wage Employment. 
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and Van Soest (2002) in Mexico, and Loayza (1996) with Tokman (1992) in Latin America. This 
literature has also been used to show that the self-employed in developing countries are in a 
negative position when to compared paid workers.  
 
However other recent studies have shown that those in the informal sector, and specifically for our 
study purposes the self-employed, might actually be advantaged compared to formal sector 
workers – a view based on two strands of literature with two bases. The first school founds its 
arguments on a combination of non-pecuniary grounds, combined with the observable 
characteristics of self-employed individuals compared to wage workers, while the second school 
has purely monetary grounds for challenging the traditional Harris-Todaro strand of literature. The 
core question on self-employment in emergent countries now is the following: “Do self-
employment individuals choose to work in this sector to earn competitive wages and 
commensurate returns to their abilities, or do they stay self-employed for the reason that they have 
no better option and are essentially waiting for paid employment?” (Pietrobelli et al., 2004). 
 
To contribute to this literature, Cunningham and Maloney (2001) investigated the Mexican work-
force using factor and cluster analysis techniques to detect unobserved heterogeneity in the 
informal sector. They found different clusters of the self-employed, some who were arguably 
better-off compared to paid workers and others who were not. Günther and Launov (2012) develop 
an econometric model, where they assume that the formal sector is homogenous but the informal 
sector can be heterogeneous. They then develop an econometric model using the Heckman (1979) 
technique on a general household survey from Cote d’Ivoire. They reported that 55.2% of the 
informal labour market in the country were voluntary workers who self-opted for these 
occupations, and they are predominantly found in the higher-paid informal sector. Bosch and 
Maloney (2010) notably used a Markov process on panel data from Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
to find that a substantial part of the self-employed workforce corresponded to voluntary entry. 
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Maloney (2003), in a study of workers in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and Chile, makes theoretical 
contributions to developing countries in general and gives a wide range of motivations why 
workers might want to be self-employed, ranging from higher earnings compared to formal paid 
work to non-pecuniary benefits.  Fields and Pfeffermann (2003) find in a collection of developing 
countries that self-employment is a viable route out of poverty and can help individuals live 
“successful” lives in terms of overall well-being. Studies from other developing countries have 
also focused on other non-wage features of the informal sector, where individuals maximise their 
utility rather than their earnings (Maloney, 2004). Likewise other studies indicate that workers 
might have a comparative advantage in one sector or employment status and hence would not do 
better in any other (Gindling, 1991, Bosch and Maloney, 2010, Pratap and Quintin, 2006, 
Rosenzweig, 1988, Cunningham and Maloney, 2001). 
 
 
Some studies also report that the informal sector made up predominantly of self-employed workers 
in developing countries might not be homogenous (Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2007, Paulson and 
Townsend, 2004, Günther and Launov, 2012). For instance Fields (2004) reports that the informal 
self-employment sector is made up of two distinct parts, consisting of an “upper” and “lower” tier. 
The upper tier consists of individuals who voluntarily enter this sector because given their 
characteristics, they expect to earn more in the informal self-employment sector than they would 
earn in the formal paid sector; while the lower tier is made up of individuals who actually expect 
to earn less in self-employment than they would in paid work, but such individuals have no choice 
but to persist in self-employment despite these expected lower earnings/income levels.   
 
However, studies drawing on this empirical view of heterogeneity in developing countries are very 
few, to the best of this researcher’s knowledge (Cunningham and Maloney, 2001, Günther and 
Launov, 2012, Tamvada, 2010, Bargain and Kwenda, 2011). Cunningham and Maloney (2001) in 
particular made use of cluster analysis to find 6 clusters of the self-employed in Mexico; they 
reported that 70% of these individuals voluntarily entered into this self-employment and 2 of the 
6 clusters were actually advantaged compared to paid workers.  
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Some researchers have found outright that the self-employed actually have better or comparable 
incomes when contrasted with paid workers. For instance, Hart (1973) found that the self-
employed in Ghana had comparable and sometimes higher incomes than paid workers. Magnac 
(1991), also found some proof of wage comparative advantage in self-employment for women in 
Colombia. As this part of the literature is very inconclusive and volatile, the estimations performed 
by this thesis on employment/occupational status and labour wages will focus for the first 
investigation on the relative premiums or penalties in self-employment earnings compared to paid 
workers and will attempt to investigate if individuals in self-employment actually have premiums 
or penalties in labour wages when compared to paid workers.  
 
An important addition to the literature and one important  for this thesis involves the findings of  
Earle and Sakova (2000)  and recently Tamvada (2010) who argue that “employers” belong to an 
employment category distinct from self-employed “own account” workers as described in the self-
employment literature. For this reason, this thesis will also make a distinction between employers, 
paid workers and self-employed “own account” workers when carrying out all empirical analyses: 
an empirical and theoretical assessment much needed in the developing country literature. After 
the first empirical analysis, the second investigation thus asks the question: “How does holding 
any of three labour wage earning employment statuses (employer, paid worker or self-employed 
“own account” worker) affect labour wage in a developing country?” 
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2.4.1.2 THE OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE DECISION 
 
Parker (2009) summarizes different models of occupational choice where individuals work for 
themselves and trade-off risk and rewards (of loss and profit), rather than opting for the safe returns 
(of labour wage) in paid employment. In line with these theories, some authors provide static 
models, whereby risk-neutral agents choose between working in paid employment for a wage “W” 
or working for themselves and producing output independently and earning “π” (Johnson and 
Darnell, 1976, Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Parker, 2009). Workers are expected to choose the 
employment position with the highest returns between “W” and “π” (like the relationship 
expressed in Figure 3). These models can be extended to accommodate abilities in the case of 
Lucas Jr (1978) or risk aversion in the case of Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), whereby agents with 
higher abilities or lower risk aversion will choose to work for themselves rather than be engaged 
in paid work. 
 
Jacobs (2004) propounds that since human capital endowments are varied, workers will choose 
which employment sector (paid work or self-employment) to enter into depending on their 
preferences and expected incomes. Some studies have thus attempted to link earnings and 
employment exclusively9. Bernhardt (1994) in a Canadian study found that comparative potential 
earnings were the dominant determinant of the occupational choice for individuals. In the US, 
researchers reported that returns to self-employment relative to paid work earnings were central 
themes in the reason for occupational choice (Brock and Evans, 1989, Evans and Leighton, 1989b, 
Lofstrom, 2009).  
 
In the UK, Rees and Shah (1986) found a positive selection bias in observed earnings, such that 
the probability of self-employment depended positively on the earnings difference between self-
employment and paid work, and that education and age were significant determinants of self-
employment. Taylor (1996) also found that individuals were attracted to self-employment because 
                                                          
9 Chapter 4 of this thesis adds to that literature by specifically performing an inquiry to investigte the 
relationship between employment status and labour wage via the estimation of labour wage 
premiums/penalties for employed workers. 
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of higher expected earnings relative to paid employment and by the freedom from managerial 
constraints that it offered. Earle and Sakova (1999) in their study of six eastern countries, further 
reported that the estimated self-employment earnings premium was positive and implied an 
increased probability of selection to self-employment. On the other hand some authors report in 
the US that most individuals who are self-employed “own account” workers have both lower initial 
and expected earnings, but might persist in self-employment for non-pecuniary reasons  (Hamilton, 
2000, Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990).  
 
In Canada, Bernhardt (1994) found that in the occupational choice decision for white men relative 
potential earnings were the main determinant of choice between self-employment and paid work. 
The study also found that paid workers had higher potential earnings in both sectors but with a 
greater advantage for those belonging in the paid work category, thus confirming that workers are 
rational economic agents who will analyse which occupational choice will give them more labour 
wage and opt for the occupational choice with a greater earnings premium (the relationship 
expressed in Figure 3).  
 
Taylor (1996) also approaches this gap in the literature by using a three stage utility maximization 
model to investigate the relationship for a sample of UK workers between self-employment and 
three variables: expected earnings, the desire for independence and the ability to find paid 
employment. His results indicated that individuals were attracted to self-employment because of 
the higher expected earnings relative to paid employment and by the freedom from managerial 
constraints the employment option offered: giving more evidence for the prosperity pull argument 
for self-employment and rationality in the occupational choice decision.  
 
This finding is further supported by Rees and Shah (1986) who develop an econometric model that 
features simultaneous determination of employment status and earnings in the UK, allowing for 
self-selectivity. The estimation of their model allowed for the self-employment/paid work earnings 
differential and showed that there was a positive selection bias in the observed earnings of paid 
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work and more specifically for this thesis, the probability of self-employment or paid work 
depended positively on the earnings difference between self-employment and paid work.  
 
Gindling (1991) reports that in Costa Rica many self-employed workers have self-opted for this 
employment choice for a variety of positive reasons, including but not limited to higher labour 
wages, a claim supported by Magnac (1991) in a Colombian study that finds some proof of wage 
comparative advantage for women in self-employment. Pratap and Quintin (2006) in an 
Argentinean study find no evidence of a formal wage employment premium – in fact sometimes 
the premium becomes negative, indicative of a penalty. Bosch and Maloney (2010) find in a South-
American study covering Argentina, Brazil and Mexico that a substantial part of the informal 
sector, particularly the self-employed, corresponds to voluntary entry, although informal salaried 
work may correspond more closely to the standard queuing view, especially for younger workers. 
 
De Wit and Van Winden (1989) utilized an endogenous switching model on Dutch data to find 
that the probability of self-employment also depended on the earnings differential between self-
employment and paid work, confirming the theoretical models that link the employment decision 
with monetary earnings in terms of expected labour wages (the relationship expressed in Figure 
3). A number of studies in the US also confirm these findings (Brock and Evans, 1989, Evans and 
Leighton, 1989b, Lofstrom, 2009). On the other hand, however, some researchers  find the 
opposite in the US and report that most individuals who are self-employed “own account” workers 
have both lower initial and expected earnings: but these individuals persist in self-employment for 
non-pecuniary reasons, such as independence, better control over one’s time and being one’s own 
boss (Hamilton, 2000, Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990)10.  
                                                          
10 These findings are also supported by LE, A. T. 2002. Empirical studies of self‐employment. Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 13, 381-416. who uses Australian, Canadian, Dutch, UK and US labour markets data 
and studies to show that self-employment is influenced significantly by factors such as individual abilities, 
family background, liquidity status10 and earnings compared to wage/salary employment.  
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However, given the dissimilarities highlighted in the literature between developed and developing 
countries (Banerjee, A. V. and A. F. Newman; 1993), some researchers have attempted to address 
the disparity in welfare (comprising labour wage and household consumption) amongst workers 
in developing countries, often depending on employment status or formality/informality status. 
The idea that disparate wages are paid to workers in developing (and sometimes developed 
economies) has been incorporated largely without question into job search theory. Consequently, 
a whole class of theoretical models has arisen where workers are presumed to search among 
employers for the best possible opportunities primarily in terms of labour wages/incomes (Fields, 
2004). Also, it is a conventional fact that developing countries have a larger percentage of workers 
in the informal self-employment sector than developed countries; this has given rise to the 
literature discussed below.   
 
64 
 
2.4.1.3 FORMALITY VS INFORMALITY 
 
In relation to this inquiry, certain theories and sources from literature overlap and intertwine and 
some of the contrasts can be expressed as dichotomies; the first dichotomy is a clear one as it 
involves self-employment versus the paid work sector – the primary focus of this thesis. The 
second one involves the formal versus the informal sector. The distinction between self-
employment and paid work is a clear one; self-employed individuals work for themselves and 
receive rewards for their labour, their physical capital and their entrepreneurial skill, while paid 
workers only get a reward to their labour and human capital - as determined by their employers 
and  usually stipulated in contractual terms.  
 
Informality, as it is described in the literature, happens when a business is not registered with the 
relevant governmental authorities. It usually assumes an evasion of taxes and government 
regulations, predicated by not registering with relevant government bodies for a host of reasons11; 
and can also occur in paid work when the employment contract is undocumented and the employer 
can raise or lower the employee’s wage at any time; usually in such cases, either can terminate the 
contract at any time (Yamada, 1996).  
 
In addition, the literature recognizes that individuals in self-employment in developing 
countries may choose to remain in the informal sector until they perceive that the benefits of 
becoming formal outweigh the costs – hence firm ‘formation’ does not necessarily mean firm 
‘generation’ (Acs et al., 2008). In developed countries there are advantages to operating in the 
                                                          
11 See: LOAYZA, N. V., SERVÉN, L. & SUGAWARA, N. 2009. Informality in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, PERRY, G. 2007. Informality: Exit and exclusion, World Bank Publications, MALONEY, W. 
F. 2004. Informality revisited. World Development, 32, 1159-1178, MALONEY, W. F. 2003. Informal 
self-employment: Poverty trap or decent alternative. Pathways Out of Poverty.(Boston: Kluwer), 
HEINTZ, J. & VALODIA, I. 2008. Informality in Africa: A review. SIDA by the WIEGO Network, 
available online at: http://wiego. org/files/publications/files/Heintz-Valodia-Informal_Economy_Africa-
2008. pdf (accessed 18 February, 2012), BOSCH, M. & MALONEY, W. F. 2010. Comparative analysis 
of labor market dynamics using Markov processes: An application to informality. Labour economics, 17, 
621-631. 
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formal sector, which include tax breaks and the possibility of getting additional business, 
contracts and jobs: such incentives are scarce in developing countries.  
 
Furthermore in developing countries, there is the problem of how one measures entrepreneurship 
and separates the “entrepreneurs” from the “ o r d i n a r y  self-employed”? Unlike in developed 
countries, where available data can easily be analysed to differentiate ‘true entrepreneurs’ from 
‘petty traders’, based on available data like number of employees in the firm, the business type 
and amount of working capital, such informative data are very scarce in developing countries. 
For example,  a large scale business tycoon and a petty shop owner both hold some legitimate 
claim to being entrepreneurs even though they operate in different spheres. 
 
The difference between formal and informal entrepreneurship is thus usually determined by 
registration status. If a firm has been registered with the appropriate government agency, then it 
is a formal entity that is authorised to do business; if not – then it is informal.  The classification 
of a firm in the formal or informal category does not depend on the nature of its business activities 
or their externalities, but rather to its presence within the formal (taxable) sector or the informal 
sector (Desai, 2009). Firms are defined as formal because they operate in the formal economy: 
this does not provide any indication of the legality or illegality of their business activities. The 
size of the informal workforce may vary, but can reach more than fifty per cent in some countries 
according to the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2014). 
 
 
In many developing countries, there are a few incentives for entrepreneurs to function in the 
formal sector as mentioned earlier, particularly if business operations are carried out on a 
small scale. Entering the formal sector can be a deliberate decision based on the trade-off 
between regulatory disadvantages such as taxes, and formalisation advantages like better access 
to export markets and credit facilities (Torgler and Schneider, 2007, Dreher and Schneider, 2010). 
Acs et al. (2008) found that business owners were less likely to incorporate except when they 
perceived that doing so would provide their business with benefits such as reduced taxes (e.g. 
shell companies) and avoidance of regulatory burdens (e.g. labour laws) or access to formal 
financing and labour contracts.  
Furthermore, the incentive to register firms might be greater in developed countries than in 
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developing countries (Acs et al., 2008). As this researcher has pointed out above, being in the 
formal or informal sector does not in any way affect the legality of the business. It is possible 
for a formal business to engage in illegal activities and also for an informal business to engage in 
legal activities and both options allow businesses to partake in rent seeking (Baumol, 1990, 
Baumol, 1996). 
 
For the purpose of this thesis however, it is interesting to note that a majority of the self-employed 
in developing countries are almost completely outside government control and are primarily found 
in the informal sector, as such countries usually concentrate their tax collection efforts on large 
national and multinational firms (Yamada, 1996). Hence the modelling of the informal sector and 
self-employment in developing countries is yet to be consolidated, even though certain 
researchers have made very valuable contributions that this thesis will draw on. Most theoretical 
models currently see the informal sector as the training and sorting mechanism for self-employed 
individuals who later become large scale “entrepreneurs”, and also as the natural home of self-
employed individuals (Yamada, 1996, Günther and Launov, 2006, Günther and Launov, 2012, 
Maloney, 2004, Fields, 2004).  
 
Some studies even go as far as assuming that all the self-employment in developing countries is 
in the informal sector (Yamada, 1996, Fields, 2013, Gindling and Newhouse, 2012), and Yamada 
(1996) in his Peruvian study further reported that individuals who were doing poorly in the 
informal self-employment sector moved out to join the formal wage sector.. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, it will suffice to mention that the self-employed are mostly found 
in the informal sector of most developing countries, even though quite a significant number of the 
self-employed can also exist in the formal sector depending on the economy and labour market 
characteristics of the country being investigated. In the data used in this study, it is not possible 
to distinguish between the formal and informal sector workforce of either self-employed or paid 
worker individuals. However, it is currently estimated that about 85% of the self-employed in 
Nigeria operate in the informal sector (NBS, 2014).  
 
This thesis will concentrate on the most relevant literature that examines the differentials in the 
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formal-informal dichotomy. The Harris-Todaro (1970) model discussed previously is the primary 
model used in the self-employment literature for developing countries because it specifically 
makes predictions about the nature of self-employment in developing countries and also the 
informal sector in such economies.  Its predictions have moreover proved to be largely correct 
even though it is being challenged by recent studies of which this thesis forms a part.  To 
summarize once again, the Harris-Todaro model suggests that in developing countries self-
employed workers will be worse off when compared to paid workers. 
 
68 
 
2.4.1.4 OPPOSITION TO THE HARRIS-TODARO MODEL 
 
 
Recent studies have shown that those in the informal sector and - specifically for our purposes 
and study - the self-employed - might actually be advantaged compared to formal sector paid 
workers, based on two strands of literature. The first school bases its arguments on a 
combination of non-pecuniary grounds combined with the observable characteristics of the self-
employed individuals compared to paid workers, while the second group in the literature has 
purely monetary reasons for challenging the traditional school of the Harris-Todaro (1970) 
model.  
 
From the first school, Bosch and Maloney (2010) used a Markov process on panel data from 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico to find that a substantial part of the self-employed workforce was 
associated with voluntary entry. Maloney (2003), in a study of workers in Argentina, Mexico, 
Brazil and Chile, makes a number of theoretical contributions relevant to developing countries in 
general and offers a wide array of motivations as to why workers might want to be engaged in self-
employment, ranging from higher earnings compared to formal wage work to non-pecuniary 
benefits. Yamada (1996) also reports in a study utilizing Peruvian household data that individuals 
engage in informal self-employment by choice due to competitive earnings and other non-
pecuniary benefits. 
 
From the second school, Cunningham and Maloney (2001) investigate the Mexican work-force 
using factor and cluster analysis techniques to detect the unobserved heterogeneity in the informal 
sector. They find 6 clusters of the self-employed, some who are arguably better-off compared to 
paid workers and others who are not. Günther and Launov (2012) develop an econometric model 
where they assume that the formal sector is homogenous but the informal sector can be 
heterogeneous. They then apply an econometric model using the Heckman (1979) technique on a 
general household survey from Cote d’Ivoire and report that 55.2% of the informal labour market 
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in the country are voluntary workers who self-opted for informal self-employment and they are 
predominantly found in the higher-paid informal sector. 
 
Combining both schools, Fields and Pfeffermann (2003) find in a collection of developing 
countries that self-employment is a viable route out of poverty and can help individuals live 
“successful” lives in terms of overall well-being. Studies from other developing countries have 
also focused on other non-wage features of the informal sector where individuals maximise their 
utility rather than their earnings; and such studies indicate that workers might have a comparative 
advantage in one sector of employment (either paid work or self-employment), hence they would 
not do better in any other choice of employment status (Gindling, 1991, Bosch and Maloney, 2010, 
Pratap and Quintin, 2006, Rosenzweig, 1988, Cunningham and Maloney, 2001). 
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2.4.1.5 UPPER AND LOWER TIERS? 
 
 
A novel school of thought has recently risen in the literature, from researchers who report that the 
informal self-employed sector in developing countries might not be a homogenous group (Guha-
Khasnobis et al., 2007, Paulson and Townsend, 2004, Günther and Launov, 2012). For instance, 
Fields (2004) reports that the informal sector is made up of two distinct parts: an “upper” and 
“lower” tier. The upper tier consists of individuals who voluntarily enter this sector because given 
their characteristics, they expect to earn more in the informal sector or self-employment than they 
would earn in the formal sector or wage-employment, while the lower tier is made up of individuals 
who actually expect to earn less but have no choice but to persist in self-employment.   
 
However, studies empirically supporting this view of heterogeneity are very few, to this authors’ 
knowledge (Cunningham and Maloney, 2001, Günther and Launov, 2012, Tamvada, 2010, 
Bargain and Kwenda, 2011). As Earle and Sakova (2000)  and Tamvada (2010) argue that 
employers belong to an employment category distinct from own account workers (in the self-
employment literature -a claim now being accepted in the labour force literature), this thesis will 
also make a distinction between employers, paid workers and self-employed “own account” 
workers when carrying out the labour wage analysis: an empirical and theoretical exercise it is 
suggested as being very much needed in the developing country literature. Perhaps ‘employers’ 
belong to the so-called “Upper Tier” and ‘self-employed own account’ workers belong to the 
“Lower Tier”.  
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2.4.1.6 THE UNEMPLOYED AND NOT IN LABOUR FORCE 
 
The evidence indicates that the main problems in developing countries are poverty and inequality, 
in which ‘underemployment’ might be more pervasive than open unemployment (Standing, 2000), 
so the relationship between occupational statuses, labour wage and unemployment might be more 
complex than originally thought.  
 
Significantly, unemployed persons might decide to resort to disguised unemployment or 
underemployment in the self-employed sector in other to earn some sort of labour wage to survive, 
as there is currently no indication that developing nations can afford to provide unemployment 
benefits. Indeed, most members of the self-employed workforce in developing countries are 
assumed to be forced to be in disguised unemployment. This has led scholars to come up with the 
terms “pushed” and “pulled” self-employment.  
 
Simply put, an individual is pushed into self-employment if it is not one’s preferred choice, 
but one has been constrained by economic factors or necessity into being in self-employment. 
On the other hand, an individual is pulled into self-employment if one opts for it out of one’s 
volition, either because of a perceived opportunity or some other attractive feature (Amit and 
Muller; 1995)12.  
 
Paralleling the push-pull self-employment debate in the ‘entrepreneurship’ literature is the “necessity-
opportunity” entrepreneurship debate. Much like push self-employment, necessity entrepreneurs 
engage in entrepreneurial activities basically to avoid unemployment, whereas like pull self-
                                                          
12 Apart from the perceived negative connotations for pushed self-employment,  Amit and Muller (1995) 
distinguished between pushed and pulled business-owners using a likert scale and showed that pull 
business-owners in Canada (a developed country) were more successful than push ones. However 
Solymossy (1997) and Dahlqvist et al (2000), in a study of Hungarian business-owners, conclude that 
the evidence is inconclusive about the link between ‘push-pull’ motivations and outcome. 
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employment, opportunity entrepreneurs start businesses to pursue a recognized opportunity for 
profit (Reynolds et al; 2002).  
 
Block and Koellinger (2009) regard necessity entrepreneurs as those who have started businesses 
because they have no better choices of work. In other words, push/necessity factors take hold 
when an entrepreneur would rather be engaged in paid work but has had to opt for the current 
state of business ownership as the next best alternative; in this regard the position is quite similar 
to push self-employment. Pull factors on the other hand are related to opportunity entrepreneurs; 
they are those attractions that draw an individual into entrepreneurship voluntarily. In plain terms, 
push factors mean those influences that “push or force” individuals into entrepreneurship, pull 
factors on the other hand are influences that “pull or attract” individuals into entrepreneurship. 
 
According to Desai (2009), necessity entrepreneurs make up an important part of the total set of 
entrepreneurs in developing countries because of the large pool of unemployed workers in 
developing countries, and they may be less common in developed countries.  In support of this 
claim, Cowling and Bygrave (2002) reported rates of necessity entrepreneurship for Brazil, 
Argentina, India and Chile (developing countries) to be within the range of 6.5 % to 7.5 %, while 
the necessity entrepreneurship rates for Denmark and Finland (developed countries) were 0.33 % 
and 0.43 % respectively13.  
 
Labour market characteristics, self-employment rates and welfare indices are very disparate 
between developed and developing countries. Added to this, there could exist contextual 
differences between such countries, as well as micro and macro-economic indicator differences 
(World Bank, 2014). An investigation into push and pull self-employment in developing countries 
is therefore warranted and our analyses of labour wages will have implications for this; it is an 
investigation much needed for the literature on developing countries.  
                                                          
13 Reynolds et al (2002) reported that across 29 countries participating in the 2001 Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM study), necessity entrepreneurs constituted 43 % of all entrepreneurs 
and opportunity entrepreneurs 54 %, the authors also observed that opportunity entrepreneurs were more 
likely to be found among the older age group (35-44 years) and necessity entrepreneurs in the younger 
group (18-24). 
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2.4.1.7 PUSHED INTO SELF-EMPLOYMENT? 
 
“Why does the current labour force literature on developing countries expect a lot of the workers 
engaged in self-employment in developing countries to be pushed into this occupational status?” 
The obvious starting point would be the traditional hypothesis of a negative relationship between 
the share of self-employed workers in the labour force and economic development performance 
(Kuznets, 1973, Kuznets, 1966). Also the Lucas traditional model of size distribution of firms 
shows that the average firm size is an increasing function of the wealth of the economy if the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is less than unity (Lucas Jr, 1978). 
 
These studies and models seem to suggest that self-employment has a negative relationship with 
economic development; and this view seems to be borne out in a good deal of the literature as 
several researchers have reported that developing countries have a higher proportion of self-
employed workers. Also as GDP grew for most present day developed economies, the proportion 
of the self-employed workforce in such economies fell (Gollin, 2008, Parker, 2009, Smith et al., 
2002, Charmes, 2009).  
 
Furthermore, numerous studies and theories seem to suggest that self-employment in developed 
countries and developing countries might not entail the same conditions/implications, and that self-
employment could be a less than desirable employment option in developing countries. For 
example, while only about 10% of workers in OECD countries report being in self-employment, 
surveys indicate that up to 70% of the labour force in developing countries are in self-employment 
(ILO 2014).  
 
Evans and Leighton (1989b) showed some evidence of push factors contributing to self-
employment when they highlighted the role of unemployment as a factor influencing new firm 
formation in the US; since theoretical models already predicted that unemployed individuals would 
opt for self-employment, the study supported that theory. Mason (1989) found that preceding the 
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1979 recession, the motivations for individuals to start businesses in the US were essentially pull 
factors such as market opportunities, financial ambition and new products. These motivations 
changed during the recession period, and individuals increasingly reported push factors, most 
significantly unemployment and job insecurity, as reasons for venturing into self-employment.  
 
Ritsilä and Tervo (2002) used panel data models and micro-level data from Finland to find support 
for the push hypothesis by showing that unemployment is significant in new business formation, 
while Evans and Leighton (1990) reported that unemployment was linked with self-employment - 
again in the US. Meager (1992) also found a positive relationship between unemployment and 
self-employment in European Commission (EC) countries. 
 
The current literature recognises that self-employment in developing countries has some distinct 
attributes that may improve the probability of personal success or increase the chances of failure 
in such business environments. For instance, on the one hand, there are more opportunities for the 
self-employed in their local markets: but there are also more economic and political risks and a 
heightened sense of business insecurity (Fields, 2013). Underdeveloped financial markets and 
limited sources of funding in developing countries also make it difficult to start viable businesses. 
Personal and family savings are by far the most common means of providing start-up capital as 
bank lending and venture capital are very limited in such countries (Lingelbach et al., 2005). There 
are also substantial differences in terms of infrastructure, human capital, market orientation, 
welfare and other economic indicators such as poverty, technology and growth (Bell and Pavitt, 
1997)14.  
 
From the literature specifically linking self-employment, unemployment and labour wages in 
developing countries, Mandelman and Montes-Rojas, (2009) report that in Argentina, self-
                                                          
14 A detailed analysis of the differences between countries (developed and developing) as they affect self-
employment can be found in studies by ACS, Z. J., AUDRETSCH, D. B. & EVANS, D. S. 1994. Why 
does the self-employment rate vary across countries and over time? : CEPR Discussion Papers, 
BANERJEE, A. V. & NEWMAN, A. F. 1993. Occupational choice and the process of development. 
Journal of political economy, 274-298. 
75 
 
employment is unlikely to be as a result of an optimal and voluntary decision taken by high-skilled 
individuals who are pursuing optimal incomes. The motivation for views like this comes from the 
previously discussed literature, whereby authors provide a theoretical model which assumes a 
stagnant and unproductive informal sector that serves as a refuge for the urban unemployed and 
for new migrants who resort to self-employment (Harris and Todaro, 1970, Ranis and Fei, 1961).  
 
Recall that those authors construct an explanatory model of developing countries’ transition from 
stagnation to self-sustaining growth. A number of concepts evolve involving urban unemployment, 
rural-urban labour migration and the welfare implications of various policies. One of the salient 
presumptions is that if there is a higher minimum wage in the wage sector; those in the agricultural 
sector, the self-employed and the unemployed will be worse off.  
 
Consequently, as regards developing countries, there is a large body of literature that views 
individuals in the self-employment sector as being pushed there due to their negative welfare, 
measured in terms of labour wage: this school is sometimes regarded as holding the pessimistic 
view. To buttress this point, Jhabvala et al (2003) propound that the informal sector15 in developing 
countries, consisting chiefly of the self-employed, is a survival activity of the very poor and of 
disadvantaged workers who are typically unskilled and less educated. This view is further 
advocated by authors who classify this group as the “working poor”, who engage in such activities 
to escape unemployment (Turnham and Jaeger, 1971, Squire, 1981, Fields, 1980, Lewis, 1954).  
 
Gindling and Newhouse (2012)  support the pessimistic view of self-employment in developing 
countries by reporting that the self-employed work for themselves and earn little, either because 
they have been rationed out of wage jobs or because they prefer the autonomy and flexibility of 
                                                          
15 Self-employment is sometimes equated with working informally, but equating the two is not 
empirically correct. “Informal Employment” is thought to comprise those who are outside the protection 
and regulation of the state and it is difficult to seure data on how many of the self-employed are informal 
by this definition and how many are not. FIELDS, G. S. 2013. Self-Employment in the Developing 
World. 
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self-employment. For several years the dominant view has been that large numbers of self-
employed workers in developing countries reflected the rationing of employment opportunities in 
the paid jobs/wage sector, due to regulations or efficiency wages that pushed wages above market 
clearing level (Fields, 2004, Tokman, 2007, De Mel et al., 2010). 
 
This view is also supported by Leibenstein (1968), who propounds that self-employment in 
developing countries entails surmounting constraints imposed by a poor economy and 
infrastructure and is not opportunistic. Bromley (1978), in a meta-analysis that studied a group of 
developing countries, determined that self-employment in developing countries is an activity of 
the poor. Similarly, Gong and Van Soest (2002), in a Mexican study, found that self-employment 
is a sign of distress and is typically undertaken by the unskilled and less educated. Research in 
Latin-America also established that self-employment is a sign of economic failure and a status for 
the disadvantaged (Loayza, 1996, Tokman, 1992).  
 
All these authors and studies seem to indicate that self-employment and labour wages are 
negatively linked in developing countries, and thus provide proof for pushed self-employment in 
developing countries. By virtue of being in self-employment as a negative reaction with regard to 
the labour market and paid work, individuals are seen to be in self-employment primarily to escape 
unemployment and the resultant zero labour wage.  
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2.4.1.8 PULLED INTO SELF-EMPLOYMENT? 
 
Recently however the push view of the self-employed being a disadvantaged group has been 
challenged, as modern studies show that self-employment in developing countries may be a 
desirable employment option that individuals self-select and opt for due to a variety of reasons, 
some monetary and others non-monetary (Maloney, 2004, Bosch and Maloney, 2010, Bosch and 
Maloney, 2007). For example, Office (1972) found earlier in Kenya that many individuals choose 
to be self-employed for a variety of reasons: many of them being beneficial when compared to 
paid employment, although a lot of these reasons were non-pecuniary. 
 
In addition, Mohapatra et al. (2007) concluded that self-employment in rural China showed 
features of a productive small business sector and not a stop-over for disadvantaged individuals; 
while Fields and Pfeffermann (2003) showed from a group of developing countries that self-
employment was a viable route out of poverty and could help individuals live “successful” 16 lives;  
Balán et al. (1973) showed that in Mexico, self-employment was seen as a desirable employment 
option, albeit for non-monetary reasons. 
 
To recap, according to the economic literature, ‘pull factors’ have optimistic connotations and they 
attract individuals into self-employment. They include increasing demand for entrepreneurial 
activities/products, higher wage rates and higher returns for the self-employed both in monetary 
and non-pecuniary terms; the phenomenon is also referred to as “opportunity driven self-
employment”. ‘Push factors’ on the other hand are characterized by negative connotations like 
unemployment, getting fired and job dissatisfaction. In this case the individuals might persist in 
self-employment despite lower returns simply because there is no other viable alternative; this 
position is also sometimes referred to as “necessity self-employment”17.  
                                                          
16 Success was measured in this study in terms of escape from poverty (labour wages) and general 
wellbeing.  
17 Paralleling the entrepreneurship terminology.  
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In relation to this inquiry, Johnson and Darnell (1976) start from the premise that new-firm 
formation implies a movement from paid employment/work (or unemployment) to self-
employment. They suggest that the decision will be made when the perceived net benefits 
(pecuniary and non-pecuniary) of self-employment (Ps) exceed those of remaining in paid 
employment (Pe). This gives rise to the relationship expressed in Figure 7(a). A fall in Pe, Ps 
remaining constant, will “push” a latent or potential entrepreneur into self-employment. On the 
other hand, a rise in Ps,,Pe remaining constant, will have the effect of “pulling” an individual into 
self-employment; as the perceived net benefits of self-employment exceed those of paid 
employment expressed in Figure 7(b) (Harrison and Hart, 1983)18. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                
Figure 7: The Process of New Business Formation. (a) Effect of a fall in Pe, Ps remaining constant 
(Push); (b) effect of a rise in Ps, Pe remaining constant (Pull). It is the position of the individual 
potential founder in time t; I(t+1) is his position in time (t+1). Source: (Harrison and Hart, 1983). 
 
Consistent with research about self-employment rates, a considerable number of researchers also 
identify push and pull factors as reasons why individuals could be in self-employment (Hakim, 
                                                          
18 This theoretical framework would mean that in terms of welfare (Pe or Ps), if the self-employed are 
observed to enjoy net remunerations exceeding that of paid-employees (Ps >Pe), they are most likely to be 
“pulled” into-self-employment. On the other hand however, if paid-employees are observed to be 
experiencing net rewards surpassing those of the self-employed (Pe >Ps), those who persist in self-
employment could be described as being “pushed” into it; and then comes the question whether they 
persist in such employment due to non-pecuniary reasons.  
 
 Ps > Pe (Self-Employment) 
 Ps > Pe (Self-Employment) 
Ps        
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It 
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1989, Harrison and Hart, 1983, Gilad and Levine, 1986, Oxenfeldt, 1943). A push factor would 
occur w h e n  a defensive reaction in relation to the state of the job market and/or personal 
difficulties is the reason for going in self-employment e.g. unemployment. In contrast, pull factors 
arise from a proactive scheme, in which case initiatives are more likely to come from strong 
professional and/or personal ambitions possibly stemming from the identification of a market 
opportunity e.g. the identification of a service/product that can be used for profit19. This implies 
that the self-employment rates in countries could be generated as a result of these two factors; and 
indeed the literature has proceeded to group the self-employed into pushed and pulled categories, 
with the self-employed in developing countries traditionally viewed as being pushed into self-
employment primarily due to the high unemployment rates in such economies. 
 
                                                          
19 Such activities must not be rent seeking in nature or organized crime; these kind of activities are termed 
destructive or unproductive entrepreneurship by BAUMOL, W. J. 1990. Entrepreneurship: Productive, 
unproductive, and destructive. Journal of political economy, 893-921.  
80 
 
2.4.1.9 THE UNEMPLOYED AND NOT IN LABOUR FORCE VS LABOUR WAGE 
 
As this thesis has sought to highlight, the situation might not be so obvious in developing countries, 
as regards unemployment, not belonging to the labour force and the relationship with labour wage. 
In developing countries that typically provide no unemployment compensation, the only people 
who can refrain completely from work are those who are supported in some way by others20. This 
could lead to overcrowding in low-productivity sectors (or self-employment) by people who need 
to gain some sort of labour wage. In developed countries, such individuals would remain 
unemployed and be entitled to unemployment benefits or compensation. However, most 
developing countries can neither afford nor administer extensive schemes to redistribute income 
(Morse, 1970).  
 
Unemployment in the strict statistical sense refers to a situation where an individual has no 
substantial source of earned income, is looking actively for work, will accept work at the going 
wage and has been unable to find work. In the last resort, the real tragedy of those without jobs is 
the poverty into which they slip, and which they share with all those with very low incomes; hence 
they are likely to resort to low income self-employment to escape such poverty (Jolly et al., 1973).  
 
As is standard in the literature and for the purposes of this thesis, “individuals not in the labour 
force” will include persons who are either unwilling or unable to engage in productive activities 
for various reasons. Hence it will not include individuals below 16 years and those above 65 years 
(the legal working and retirement ages in Nigeria); neither will it include individuals in the military 
or any institutionalized people. However, it will include anyone who is of employable age, is 
unemployed and actively or inactively seeking work.  Individuals unemployed and still seeking 
work will be classed as ‘unemployed’, while individuals who are unemployed and not seeking 
                                                          
20 Or individuals with substantial savings. 
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work will be classed as ‘not in the labour force’ (e.g. homemakers and marginal workers); this 
group is collectively referred to as the “non-active labour force”21.  
 
The unemployed as a collective category exist at the margins of society in many developing 
countries. While their political power has considerable potential, economically, they are 
disadvantaged due to the fact that most of the unemployed are unskilled and thus cannot readily 
be placed in employment; although in many African societies, including Nigeria, farming has 
always been a last resort and can also provide a means of livelihood (Jolly et al., 1973).  
 
In the rural areas of many developing countries, there could be unemployment as a result of 
landlessness or the low intensity of land use, while in the urban areas there could be unemployment 
of very disparate kinds. Some of the unemployed in the urban areas could be those who have 
recently moved to the town (urban regions) from the rural areas in search of jobs that they have 
not yet found; another set of the unemployed consists of individuals who have lived in the urban 
areas for a long time but who have not found work, and these include individuals who have little 
or no advanced education and individuals with no education at all who simply cannot find paid 
work (Morse, 1970).  
 
Individuals with certain characteristics – lack of educational qualifications, problematic social 
status (where there is a bias), physical or mental challenges, old age, marginal ethnicity, gender 
(where there exists a bias) and religious status (if there is also a bias), might have higher or lower 
probabilities of being unemployed compared to other individuals, depending on the market 
characteristics and context of such countries (Standing, 2000). To address these contextual issues, 
this thesis also investigates these relationships, since Nigeria has the archetypal features of a 
developing country where the associations of these characteristics sometimes occur.  
 
                                                          
21 These issues are dealt with in Section 4.10 and are highlighted in Table 6.  
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Since wealth in terms of labour wage/income is conferred by occupational status, it can be argued 
that the unemployed and those not in the labour force will be disadvantaged in terms of labour 
wages when compared to other occupational categories; and typically they report labour wages of 
nil except for monies that they can perhaps acquire through charity, begging, from friends, or from 
illegal or undocumented activities, etc. (Indeed unemployed individuals have reported labour 
wages of nil/zero in the data that will be used for the empirical analyses).   
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2.4.1.10 INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE RESULTANT SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
 
This thesis also draws on the work of Dasgupta and Ray (1986) as regards their explanation for 
involuntary unemployment in developing countries. Even though the main concerns of these 
researchers were inequality, malnutrition and unemployment in developing countries, they asked; 
“Why some individuals in developing countries do not get employed and earn a wage– and thus 
become unemployed?” While other authors have argued that this is because such individuals live 
in economies that are resource-poor22, Dasgupta and Ray (1986) propound that this must be an 
incomplete answer because “Some do escape unemployment and get paid jobs while others, who 
are similar in all other respects do not.” In other words, “the labour market often does not clear in 
such economies and the non-clearance manifests itself in the form of voluntary unemployment.” 
 
Dasgupta and Ray (1986) thus defined involuntary unemployment as that which arises because an 
“individual cannot find employment in a market which does employ a person very similar to 
him/her and if the latter person by virtue of his/her employment in this market is better off than 
the unemployed.” This definition is helpful for investigative analyses and is practical for the 
empirical analyses conducted by this thesis, since the thesis is trying to investigate the differences 
in labour wage and household consumption that result from different occupational statuses.  
 
Consider that the labour market in developing countries is heterogeneous and does not clear; 
furthermore individuals get to be employed due to capabilities, entitlements or endowments in 
terms of education, social networks, age, gender etc. A positive fraction of the population of the 
labour market is thus employed while the rest are kept out. Since production enterprises are profit 
maximising and each person aims to maximise his/her labour wage given his/her “entitlements”, 
production enterprises will seek to employ individuals who can signal superior entitlements when 
compared to other individuals who have applied for the same job. This way, theory would expect 
                                                          
22 And this itself is an object of contention. 
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those individuals with superior entitlements to get jobs while other individuals will remain 
unemployed voluntarily.  
 
This theoretical model further helps with this thesis because it is possible to additionally postulate 
that individuals who do not get employed should be worse off in terms of labour wages and 
household consumption compared to those who do get employed; and indeed a majority of the 
literature from developing countries regards the self-employed individuals in developing countries 
as those individuals who have not been able to get jobs in the paid employment sector and have 
had to resort to self-employment involuntarily, to escape the consequent unemployment; thus they 
have been pushed into self-employment.  
 
Another related and relevant theoretical model that can help with involuntary unemployment in 
developing countries comes from Sen (1983), in defining exactly what “entitlements” are 
(Devereux, 2001). Entitlements have been defined by Sen (1983) as “the set of alternative 
commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and 
opportunities that he or she faces”. In other words, “a person’s “entitlement set” is the full range 
of goods and services that he or she can acquire by converting his or her “endowments (assets and 
resources, including labour power) through exchange entitlement mappings.” 
 
In this case entitlements, or more specifically endowments, are those variables that have been 
identified in the top left hand corner of the conceptual model i.e. gender, age, marital status, 
economic sector, religion, local community acceptance and educational attainments; and the 
exchange entitlement mappings occur in the labour market where individuals can thus be paid 
workers, employers, self-employed (own account workers), unemployed, or not in labour force, 
based on their entitlements/endowments with implications for labour wage and household 
consumption. 
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It might be beneficial to note that the theoretical models by Dasgupta and Ray (1986) and Sen 
(1983) do not detract from the Harris and Todaro (1970) model in explaining involuntary self-
employment, but they complement Harris and Todaro (1970). Indeed they all seem to point to one 
conclusion: that the labour markets in developing countries do not clear, leaving some individuals, 
probably the unskilled, less educated, entitled or endowed, with no jobs in the paid jobs sector and 
with consequent implications for labour wage and household consumption. 
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2.4.1.11  GENDER DIFFERENCES IN EMPLOYMENT 
 
The literature has also recognized that gender differences might exist in the nature of 
employment/occupational status. Boden Jr (1996) reports that  women are more likely than men 
to shoulder family-related obligations, especially child rearing: and there is evidence that this 
affects the female propensity to become self-employed (Boden, 1999, Caputo and Dolinsky, 1998). 
Also, women might experience some discrimination/bias in paid employment jobs (commonly 
called a “glass ceiling”) and a gender inequality in terms of earnings has also been mentioned and 
documented in the employment status literature (Hughes, 2003).   
 
Furthermore, Allen et al. (2007) found that in all but two countries – Peru and Japan-  in a study 
that sampled a collection of developed and developing countries - participation rates of women in 
entrepreneurship were substantially lower than those of men. The study also found that some 
countries had up to twice as many as male entrepreneurs as female entrepreneurs, adding to a 
considerable amount of research that has found lower participation rates for women in business 
ownership compared to men (Parker, 2009).   
 
Hundley (2000) also investigated the earnings gap associated with self-employment and reported 
that self-employed male earnings increased with marriage and family size. He also found that 
women tended to choose self-employment to facilitate household production while men choose to 
be self-employed to achieve higher earnings (probably to enable them provide for their families as 
males were traditionally viewed as breadwinners). Maloney (2004) reported that married women 
were very likely to quit their paid sector jobs to become self-employed when they became 
pregnant; and Wellington (2006)  suggested that married women with greater family 
responsibilities were more likely to be self-employed. Devine (1994) used Current Population 
Survey (CPS) data from the US over 1975 – 1987 to estimate the earnings of females (in order to 
compare potential earnings by occupational status) and reported that the predicted employment 
earnings of the self-employed females exceeded those of females who were paid workers.  
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Georgellis and Wall (2005) examined the factors that influenced transition into self-employment 
paying particular attention to gender differences. They found that men were more responsive to 
the wage differential between paid work/wage employment and self-employment; liquidity 
constraints were more important for men and the link between father's self-employment status and 
the probability of self-employment was stronger for men when compared to women. Overall, the 
researchers suggested that for women, self-employment was a closer substitute for part-time work 
and labour-market inactivity than it is for men. They attributed such differences to 
the different labour market opportunities and occupational strategies of women.  
 
In developing countries especially, there might be some perceived gender roles for women and 
perhaps a cultural bias against women in formal paid employment which might ‘push’ females 
once again into self-employment. For example in our country of study – Nigeria - it is reported 
that one third of its labour force are women, and although women occupy about 30% of all posts 
in the public sector, they only occupy 17% of senior positions. Women at every educational level 
also earn less than their male counterparts, which is evidence of a bias (British Council, 2012). 
While there are no gender-specific laws in Nigeria, there are inequalities most notably in formal 
sector representation for women in the country. Women are also five times less likely to own land 
despite accounting for 70% of the rural labour force, and the haphazard “Sharia Law” in some 
northern states of the country might affect women in ways that are different to men (British 
Council, 2012).  
 
Given these potential gender disparities, this thesis will also undertake an empirical analysis of 
occupational differences, labour wages and household consumption levels as they depend on 
gender. It is hoped that this gender analysis will add to the gender literature and the results will 
throw further light on the situation identified by the research while contributing to the literature.  
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2.4.2 LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 
 
This section of the literature review will focus on the relationship between labour force 
participation and household consumption. 
 
 Figure 8: Conceptual Model (Labour Force Participation and Household Consumption) 
 
Though the literature is replete with studies that examine the occupational status debate from an 
individual motivational point of view, the view that households could be strategic in terms of how 
they participate in the labour force seems to be sparsely researched. Most models and studies 
currently available in the literature make use of individual variables - where the employment 
choice depends on the relative earnings of an individual being either in self-employment or finding 
paid work (Bosch and Maloney, 2010, Günther and Launov, 2012).  
 
A technique that can take into account household data and the conventional fact that in developing 
countries decisions on occupational choice could be made on a household level as households try 
to make the most of their joint utility23, by ensuring that the whole household achieves a 
                                                          
23 How exactly “Utility” is captured in this thesis is explained later in section 5.2.  To summarise, the thesis 
measures utility in terms of labour wages and household consumption after invoking strict rationality in 
preferences. 
Household 
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“maximum” consumption stream, seems to be almost missing from the literature. To the best of 
this author’s knowledge, only two studies have taken this into account in developing countries. 
 
Firstly, Tamvada (2010) measured welfare by “household adult equivalent per-capita consumption 
expenditure” for a sample of Indian households, and used quintile regressions to find strong 
empirical evidence that employers had the highest welfare in terms of consumption, while the self-
employed with no employees had slightly lower returns than paid workers, but a higher welfare 
than casual labourers. In particular, he found that having a higher proportion of individuals in the 
employer category had a positive relationship with adult equivalent household consumption, 
followed by having a high proportion of paid workers, then the self-employed and finally casual 
labourers. 
 
Secondly, Gindling and Newhouse (2012) take into account households via household 
consumption; this was when they tested to see if the self-employed predominantly lived in 
households where the per-capita consumption was above the $2/day poverty line in their West–
African study. They found that a high proportion of the self-employed came from quite poor 
households and could not move on to “success” in terms of household consumption.  
 
Thus while the occupational status debate has been raging in the developing country literature, 
authors seem to have overlooked the possibility that decisions are often made on a household level 
in developing countries as regards employment; because household units might seek to maximise 
their combined consumption. 
 
This thesis takes this into account and postulates that households could decide how many 
individuals will go into each occupational category as they jointly seek to maximise the total 
consumption of the household. For example, in a household of 5 individuals who are eligible for 
work, the household could decide to send 3 individuals into paid work and 2 individuals into self-
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employment, because the household is being strategic about achieving a maximum consumption 
stream.  
 
If there actually is a relationship between labour force status and labour wage or consumption, 
households would have to deliberate how to apportion employable individuals; and having 
individuals in paid work could be a sort of buffer for the household, as paid jobs are known to be 
associated with less variation in labour wages (because such incomes are specified in the 
employment contract). While it could be true that individuals in self-employment could have more 
months of higher and lower variation in labour wages/incomes from their more risky 
“entrepreneurial” ventures, the household could still apportion them to such a labour status in the 
hope that they could achieve high income streams and achieve success in some instances of self-
employment. 
 
Thus the proportion of individuals in each occupational category could have implications for total 
household consumption. Also since labour wage/ income (influenced by savings, transfers and 
investments) should directly influence consumption positively, it will be beneficial to the overall 
inquiry to see if the relationship between occupational status and labour wages holds true for the 
proportions of occupational statuses and household consumption as well. 
 
This thesis thus makes a further contribution to the developing country debate by allocating each 
household into proportionate groups showing employers, paid workers, self-employed “own 
account” workers, unemployed individuals and individuals not in the labour force. It thereby 
examines the relationship between occupational status proportion and household consumption: a 
concept pioneered by Tamvada (2010), in the Indian context. It is hoped that the results derived 
from this final analysis will throw added light on the primary examination: to understand where in 
developing countries differences in income and consumption via occupational statuses come from.  
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2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
As the thesis has highlighted by the literature review carried out in this chapter, there has been 
quite a significant amount of theoretical and empirical interest in the subject of occupational status 
and its resultant economic outcome. For this particular inquiry, the current array of researchers are 
now roughly grouped into three schools, with some overlaps24: a first group who expect the self-
employed in developing countries to be a disadvantaged group of the working poor, a second group 
who view the self-employed in developing countries as an advantaged faction, and a third group 
who view the self-employed in developing countries as a mixture of advantaged and disadvantaged 
individuals.  
 
However, although a considerable amount of work has been done at both theoretical and empirical 
levels to investigate these occupational outcomes, there are often differences in the results that are 
reported. These differences might be due to dissimilarity in data samples, varying methodologies 
and/or other undetermined factors.  
 
Therefore there are still interesting analyses that require refinement especially in the area of 
occupational choice and how it might influence welfare in terms of labour wage or consumption, 
especially in developing countries where certain resources could be scarcer than in developed 
countries. With this thesis, the researcher aims to fill a significant gap in the literature by looking 
at three indicator variables, education, labour wages and household consumption, and  using 
methodologies that offer useful insights. The researcher will also take advantage of a data set that 
offers essential and interesting variables that also allow for distinctions to be made between 
employers, paid workers, self-employed “own account” workers, unemployed individuals and 
individuals not in the labour force, including the possibility of  gender differentiation.  
                                                          
24 Some authors can be cited from different groups and have changed their views over time. 
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CHAPTER 3: DATA SETS 
 
3.1 SOURCE - NIGERIA 
 
The data used for this analysis originates from the Nigerian Living Standards Survey (NLSS), 
otherwise known as the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), for the years 2004 and 
200925.  The NLSS is an extensive survey and detailed in its coverage of various topics; it serves 
as a good basis for an in-depth analysis of households and individuals in the country. This survey 
was conducted by the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS) a body that has undergone training by 
and receives technical support from the World Bank. The data set provided will help in the present 
analysis, with its comprehensive provision of essential variables useful to the empirical study. 
 
3.1.1 OVERVIEW OF HOW SURVEYS WERE CONDUCTED 
 
The history of Nigerian Living Standard Survey (NLSS) dates back to three periods. The pre-1993 
period, 1993-1999 period, and the 2000-2008 period. Each of these periods are unique in their own 
way. During the pre-1993 period, there were no national efforts at monitoring poverty and the 
National Consumer Survey (NCS) as NLSS was then known approached the measurement of 
poverty with different objectives.  
 
However, during the 1993-1999 periods, national effort started in May 1993 when the NBS (then 
Federal Office of Statistics; FOS) collaborated with the World Bank to conduct several national 
consumer surveys. This period marked the beginning of a search for Nigerian data.  
The search further led the World Bank to collaborate with the NBS and National Planning 
Commission (NPC) under the National Committee on poverty to produce the first ever poverty 
report in Nigeria. Using the NCS data of 1985-1992, three draft reports were produced leading to 
what is called “the evolution of poverty and welfare in Nigeria 1985-1992”. This was followed by 
                                                          
25The researcher is grateful to the NBS for the data. All standard data collection procedures were followed 
leading to ethical approval by Aston Business School Ethics Committee.   
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the “Poverty Profile for Nigeria 1980-1996” published in 1999 and was made possible through the 
World Bank support to NBS for the NCS of 1996 and the extended analysis to the NCS data of 
1980/81.  
 
The Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Survey (HNLSS) is an instrument for regular monitoring 
of welfare and social trends for different population groups of the society especially the poor. The 
aim of this data is that it will be useful especially to the Federal Government of Nigeria, all states 
in Nigeria, Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), International Development Partners such as 
the World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF, and other institutions involved in monitoring welfare and 
poverty across the globe. Due to the comprehensiveness and relaibility of the data, it was used in 
this thesis. 
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3.1.2 SAMPLING PROCEDURE 
 
The sample design employed for the surverys is a 2-stage cluster sample design in which 
Enumeration Areas (EAs) or Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) constitutes the 1st stage sample 
while the Housing units (HUs) from the EAs make up the 2nd stage sample or the Ultimate 
Sampling Units (USUs). 
 
3.1.2.1 Sample Size: Sample sizes must meet some minimal requirement in order to obtain reliable 
estimate. Hence, for NLSS Surveys, the sample size varies from state to state depending on the 
number of Local Government Areas (LGAs) in each state. Ten (10) EAs were selected in each 
LGA making a total of 7,774 EAs to be canvassed for throughout the federation from the 774 
LGAs including the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja. In totality, the data contains 100,685 
individuals in the 2004 survey, and 533,838 individuals in the 2009 survey. 
 
3.1.2.2 Selection Procedure: The 7,740 EAs were selected directly from the population of the 
EAs in the National Population Commission (NPopC) with equal probability of selection. Prior to 
selection, all the contiguous EAs were arranged in serpentine order in each LGA of the state. This 
arrangement ensured that there was no overlapping. 
 
The 2009 survey was more intensive and covered a larger sample than the 2004 survey. For the 
2009 survey, a total of 77,390 households were covered from a sample of 77,400 households giving 
the survey coverage rate of 99.9 percent. Of all the six zones, it was only the South West (SW) 
zone that had the least response rate of 99.9 percent. The response rate in the remaining zones was 
100.0 percent each. However, this does not mean that the responses were all valid or useful for the 
thesis. For example, this thesis made use of the total household consumption variable for 
households and only 6,919 households provide this information. At the household level, out of the 
77,390 retrieved, only 73,329 were able to be scanned and thus included in the total data. 
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3.1.2.3 Weights: The NLSS, like most household surveys, is based on the NISH 
framework/design. The NISH design is a two-stage design with EA's as first stage units and 
households as second stage units. Ten enumeration areas (EAs) were randomly selected each 
month and five household were systematically selected from the household listing of each selected 
EAs. Population level estimates are made by multiplying the data for each household by two 
factors, one equal to the inverse of the probability of selecting that household from the total list of 
households in its EA, and one equal to the inverse of the probability of selecting that EA from the 
list of EAs in its state. The variable Household weight was used in the data set for the weight. 
These weights were taken into account in all calculations in this thesis.  
The weighting factor is at the EA level in each state where:  
 
Nh = the total number of EAs in state h. 
nh = the number of sampled EAs in state h. 
Mhi = the number of listed households in ith EA of state h. 
nhi = the number of sampled households in ith EA of state h. 
Xhij = the number of persons in the jth household in ith EA of state h. 
Phij = the poverty score for the jth household in ith EA of state h. 
 
The above will apply to all the individual members in order to give the population. However, the 
above weighting factor will be multiplied by average household size, when there is need to take 
the household aggregates to the population. These individual weights were used accordingly in 
sections 5.4 and 5.6 for the individual assessments and household weights were applied in 
section 5.8 household for the household assessment.  
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3.1.3 DATA COLLECTION 
 
The Federal Office of Statistics (FOS) permanent Field staff who were resident in the enumeration 
areas were responsible for data collection during the survey. These interviewers conducted 
interviews with the households. There were seven interviewer visits to each selected household at 
a minimum of four-day interval in a cycle of 30 days.  
 
Composition of the Teams for data Collection: Every State had 20 roving teams, while FCT, 
Abuja operated with 10 teams. A team was made up of one supervisor and one enumerator. The 
teams were structured into two groups, which worked alternatively each month to cover the 
selected EA. 
 
Supervision and Quality Control: A number of measures were put in place to ensure that the 
NLSS data were of good and acceptable quality. For instance, a supervisor was attached to each 
team to observe interviews and confirm the pre-selected households. He was to verify and edit 
completed questionnaires. The State officers and zonal controllers conducted regular monitoring 
visits to the EAs. Headquarters monitoring groups also visited states on quarterly basis, for on-the- 
spot assessment of the quality of work. An independent firm was engaged to monitor the fieldwork 
in the States from the commencement to the end of the survey. A World Bank Mission team from 
Washington also took part in the monitoring exercise.  
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Supervisors Instructions: The following instructions were given to the supervisors of each team. 
 
(i) Publicity: You must supervise the delivery of the letters of introduction to the local authorities 
and chiefs in the rural areas and, to the households in the urban areas. You will introduce the team 
and explain the purpose of the survey in each selected cluster. 
 
(ii) Finding the Selected Household: You should help the interviewers find the selected 
households, using the maps and information established during the pre-survey stage. You should 
correct the maps where necessary. Also, help the interviewers to persuade reluctant households to 
participate. For those households which persist in refusing or those which cannot be traced, it is 
your responsibility to replace these households with others from the list of replacement 
households. If the selected household has left the dwelling, and a new household now lives there, 
then you should select the new household as the replacement household. If the dwelling is now 
vacant, then you should take the next "replacement" household on your sample list. 
 
(iii) Verification of Questionnaires: At the end of every visit, you will have to check that the 
questionnaires have been correctly completed before the team leaves the field. If necessary, you 
will have to ask the interviewer to go back to the household to complete the questionnaire. 
 
(iv) Observing Interviews: At least thrice every cycle during the survey, you must accompany 
each interviewer to observe his interview techniques. 
 
(v) Verification of Interview: Every day, you should visit at random, one of the households 
interviewed on the previous day to ascertain whether the interviewer actually visited the house to 
conduct an interview. 
 
(vi) Sending the completed questionnaires to the Data Entry Operator: The first round data 
cover sections 1-8 and the second covers 8-13. At the end of the third visit, when data in sections 
1-6 will have been collected, you should send the completed part of the questionnaire to the Data 
Entry Operator. And at the end of the cycle (seventh visit) you should send the second part 
(sections 8-13) of the questionnaire to the Data Entry Operator so that she/he enters the data while 
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you leave the cluster. 
 
(vii) Checking the Printouts: After data for each round have been entered in the computer, you 
should compare the printout with the data on the questionnaires. You should also look for any 
errors made by the interviewer, using tests for coherence in the computer programme. You will 
have to mark in red ink, on the printout and on the questionnaire all errors detected by the data 
entry operator so that the interviewer and the data entry operator can clarify these as soon as 
possible. 
 
In addition, you will be responsible for collecting information on the localities surveyed 
(community questionnaire) and also supervise or help collect information on prices. You are also 
responsible for ALL the industry codes in the questionnaire. As soon as the interviewer 
finishesadministering a section, you should do the coding before sending the questionnaires to the 
data entry operator. The various tasks and responsibilities for you are explained in detail in the 
following sections. 
 
Retrieval of Completed Questionnaires: Completed Questionnaires were sent to zonal offices 
from the States for onward transmission to the NBS headquarters for data extraction and data 
processing. The retrieval of records was done on a monthly basis. 
 
Data Processing Training: The first level of training for the survey to ensure that the data quality 
was unquestionable consisted of three categories of officers, namely, the trainers at the zonal level, 
fieldwork monitoring officers and data processing officers who were crucial to the successful 
implementation of the survey. The intensive and extensive training lasted for five days. Zonal 
Level Training The training took place in the six zonal FOS [now NBS] offices representing the 
six geo-political zones of the country. These are Ibadan (South West) Enugu (South East), Calabar 
(South South), Jos (North Central), Maiduguri (North East) and Kaduna (North West). 
The composition of the team from each State to the six different zones were the State officer, one 
scrutiny officer and two field officers, making four persons per state. Two resource persons from 
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the headquarters did the training with the zonal controllers participating and contributing during 
the five-day regimented and intensive training. State Level Training  
The third level training was at the State level. A total of 40 officers were trained, comprising 20 
enumerators, 10 editing staff and 10 supervisors. The State Statistical Agencies, as a matter policy, 
contributed 5-10 enumerators. The ten-day exercise was also regimented, intensive and extensive 
because the enumerators were also crucial for the effective implementation of reliable data 
collection (NBS; 2014).
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3.2 PRIMARY INDICATORS OF NIGERIA 
 
An overview of Nigerian macroeconomic and microeconomic indicators reveals that the country 
shows features typical of a developing country. This section will divulge the Nigerian primary 
indicators so as to put the research question in context. Recall that the interest for this thesis as 
stated earlier is the desire to understand where differences in labour wages/incomes and household 
consumption levels come from in developing countries. The primary indicators analysed in this 
section will establish that Nigeria at present shows features of an archetypal developing country.  
 
With a population of about 168 million people, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and 
accounts for 47% of West Africa’s population. Nigeria is classed as a middle-income (lower) 
country with a GDP of $262.6 billion and a GNI per capita of $1,440 in 2012. It is also the biggest 
oil exporter in Africa, with the largest natural gas reserves in the continent. At the time the data 
for this analysis was collected, it was Africa’s second largest economy and according to 2011 
estimates, the GDP was comprised of 35.4% agriculture, 33.6% industry and 31% services.   
According to 2007 government figures, about 66% of the Nigerian population was in the labour 
force, and the country’s population growth rate from 2005 to 2010 was estimated at 2.3% per 
annum (World Bank, 2013).  
 
In April 2014, Nigeria rebased the GDP of the country via the National Bureau of Statistics under 
the advice and supervision of the World Bank26 so as to include sectors that were not previously 
in the National Income figures. This applied especially to the telecommunications sector and the 
entertainment industry. The result increased the country’s GDP for 2013 by 89% to $509.9 billion, 
making Nigeria the biggest economy in Africa.  
 
                                                          
26 Global best practice of rebasing is every 5 years but Nigeria had not rebased in 24 years since 1990. 
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The labour force participation rate in Nigeria for adult27 women was 47.9% in 2011, 38.7% in 
2007, 38.1% in 2005 and 37.0% in 2000. For adult men, the labour force participation rate was 
recorded at 63.3 % in 2011, 70.6% in 2007, 71.7% in 2005 and 73.7% in 2000 (United Nations, 
2014, SLOAN, 2014). According to 2004 World Bank estimates, the Nigerian labour force 
distribution by occupation was 44.6% in agriculture, 11.5% for industry, and 41.7% for services.  
70.9% of men and 74.8% of women in the total civilian employed labour force reported being self-
employed in 2005 (SLOAN, 2014). The self-employed in Nigeria are made up of a heterogeneous 
group of individuals, some engaged in highly skilled capital and technology intensive businesses 
at one end, while others are involved in mundane labour-intensive everyday jobs that have low 
returns28.  
                                                          
27 ‘Adult’ is defined as being between the ages of 15 and 60 (The official working age in Nigeria). 
28 There is a high level of inequality within the country as identified by the high Gini-coefficient of 0.49. 
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3.3 ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
Throughout the last 10 years, Nigeria has been carrying out an ambitious reform agenda. The most 
far-reaching element was to base the budget on a conservative reference price for oil, with the 
excess saved in a special, “Excess Crude Account” (ECA). The economy responded with strong 
growth between 2003 and 2010, with further growth expected in the next decade (World Bank, 
2014). Table 1 below highlights the recent real GDP growth rate in the country over the last decade.   
 
Table 1 : Real GDP Growth Rate in the Last Decade 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Growth Rate (%) 8.2 21.2 10.3 10.6 5.4 6.2 7 6 7 8 7.2 
 Source: (GlobalFinance, 2014) 
 
Inflation during the past decade has averaged 12% and the World Bank reports that the country is 
still over-reliant on oil as a source of revenue and this causes increased macroeconomic risks. Oil 
accounts for close to 90% of exports and roughly 75% of consolidated budgetary revenues. 
Nigerian GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) has almost trebled from $170 billion in 2000 to 
$451 billion in 2012; however the World Bank estimates that the size of the informal sector (which 
is not included in official figures) puts the actual numbers closer to $630 billion. Correspondingly, 
the GDP per capita doubled from $1400 per person in 2000 to an estimated $2,800 per person in 
2012. (Again, with the inclusion of the informal sector, it is estimated that GDP per capita hovers 
around $3,900 per person). The population also grew from 120 million in 2000 to 160 million in 
2010. These figures might be revised upwards by as much as 40% since the country completed the 
rebasing of its economy in 2014. 
 
The greatest hindrances to the growth of the Nigerian economy as identified by the World Bank 
are the lack of adequate infrastructure, especially as regards electricity and transportation, and also 
government corruption; factors that for individuals might influence the occupational option and 
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eventual decision to engage in an employment option. The north of the country is substantially 
poorer than the south, and there has been some religious extremism in the north of the country. 
Economists have described a sort of “resource curse", understood to mean an abundance of natural 
resources, which fuels official corruption; reportedly, 80% of Nigeria's energy revenues flow to 
the government. Nigeria currently ranks 6th worldwide and 1st in Africa in farm output, 
44th worldwide and 3rd in Africa in factory output and 63rd worldwide i.e. 5th in Africa in services 
output. 
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3.4 UNEMPLOYMENT  
 
According to Trading-Economics (2014) between 2006 to 2011, the unemployment rate averaged 
14.6 %. Notably, unemployment in the country reached an all- time high level of 23.9% in 
December 2011 and a noteworthy low level of 5.3% in December 2006. A breakdown of the 
official unemployment rates in the last decade for Nigeria, as reported by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), is shown in Table 2 below: 
Table 2: Unemployment Rates during the Last Decade 
Sourc
e 
Age 200
1 
200
2 
200
3 
200
4 
200
5 
200
6 
200
7 
200
8 
200
9 
201
0 
201
1 
201
2 
LFS29 Male  
 
7 
 
 
 
7.8 
 
 
 
7.7 
 
 
 
8.2 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
8.1 
 
 
 
7.5 
 
 
 
6.9 
 
 
 
8.9 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
8.8 
 
 
 
9.8 
 
LFS Femal
e 
10.5 
  
 
 
9.8 
 
 
 
9.6 
 
 
 
10.4 
 
 
 
9.9 
 
 
 
9.7 
 
 
 
8.6 
 
 
 
7.9 
 
 
 
9.4 
 
 
 
9.7 
 
 
 
9.7 
 
 
 
10 
 
LFS Total  
 
8.6 
 
 
 
8.7 
 
 
 
8.6 
 
 
 
9.2 
 
 
 
8.9 
 
 
 
8.8 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
7.4 
 
 
 
9.1 
 
 
 
9.3 
 
 
 
9.2 
 
 
 
9.9 
 
LFS 15-19 23.2 
  
 
 
24.1 
 
 
 
22.5 
 
 
 
25.7 
 
 
 
26.1 
 
 
 
29.1 
 
 
 
25.9 
 
 
 
23.8 
 
 
 
30.8 
 
 
 
29.5 
 
 
 
29.3 
 
 
 
32.7 
 
LFS 20-24  
 
16.7 
 
 
 
17.7 
 
 
 
16.4 
 
 
 
18.8 
 
 
 
19.2 
 
 
 
19.7 
 
 
 
17.2 
 
 
 
17.2 
 
 
 
21.3 
 
 
 
21.1 
 
 
 
20.3 
 
 
 
21.8 
 
LFS 25-29 10.8 
  
 
 
10.8 
 
 
 
10.9 
 
 
 
11.6 
 
 
 
10.9 
 
 
 
10.3 
 
 
 
10.4 
 
 
 
9.2 
 
 
 
11.8 
 
 
 
12.2 
 
 
 
12.6 
 
 
 
12.9 
 
LFS 30-34  
 
8.9 
 
 
 
8.9 
 
 
 
8.7 
 
 
 
9.6 
 
 
 
8.7 
 
 
 
8.7 
 
 
 
7.8 
 
 
 
6.7 
 
 
 
8.6 
 
 
 
8.9 
 
 
 
8.8 
 
 
 
9.9 
 
LFS 35-39  
 
7.8 
 
 
 
7.6 
 
 
 
7.6 
 
 
 
8.2 
 
 
 
8.7 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
6.9 
 
 
 
6.5 
 
 
 
7.3 
 
 
 
7.7 
 
 
 
7.7 
 
 
 
8.1 
 
LFS 40-44  
 
6.7 
 
 
 
6.7 
 
 
 
7.1 
 
 
 
7.2 
 
 
 
6.7 
 
 
 
6.5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
5.5 
 
 
 
6.9 
 
 
 
7.5 
 
 
 
7.3 
 
 
 
7.5 
 
LFS 45-49  
 
6.2 
 
 
 
6.1 
 
 
 
6.8 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
5.9 
 
 
 
5.9 
 
 
 
5.4 
 
 
 
5.1 
 
 
 
6.1 
 
 
 
6.1 
 
 
 
6.1 
 
 
 
7.1 
 
LFS 50-54  
 
6.2 
 
 
 
6.7 
 
 
 
6.2 
 
 
 
7.1 
 
 
 
6.4 
 
 
 
6.2 
 
 
 
5.7 
 
 
 
5.3 
 
 
 
5.9 
 
 
 
6.1 
 
 
 
6.4 
 
 
 
6.9 
 
LFS 55-59  
 
6.3 
 
 
 
5.7 
 
 
 
5.7 
 
 
 
6.5 
 
 
 
5.3 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
5.3 
 
 
 
4.8 
 
 
 
6.3 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
7.5 
 
LFS 60-64  
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3.1 
 
 4.7 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
4.5 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
3.8 
 
 
 
5.6 
 
 
 
5.2 
 
 
 
4.7 
 
 
 
6 
 
Source (ILO, 2014, World Bank, 2013) 
 
                                                          
29 Labour Force Survey 
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These official reports indicate that the country has a high rate of unemployment; especially 
amongst young people. As unemployment has been highlighted in the literature as a possible factor 
pushing people into self-employment, these unemployment analyses provide additional motivation 
for conducting this study. This is also relevant because if individuals perceive that there are few 
jobs in the labour market, they might be willing to settle for whatever paid jobs are offered without 
running the risk of searching for better offers; or they might venture into pushed self-employment 
if there are no available paid jobs. In addition, the reported lack of adequate infrastructure, 
especially as regards electricity and transportation, could push the cost of doing business upwards, 
making it difficult for individuals with inadequate capital to compete fairly, and hence resort to 
the push form of self-employment if they cannot find paid work. At the same time these elements 
could be providing opportunities for other individuals who could possibly take advantage of these 
lapses to run profitable businesses. 
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3.5 POVERTY 
 
The WorldBank (2014) reports the poverty headcount ratio for Nigeria as 46% in 2009/2010, down 
from 48% in 2003/2004. In terms of per capita levels the poverty ratio was recorded as 64% and 
62% respectively for both years. A breakdown of the poverty ratio is given below, as recorded by 
Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2014) for both years surveyed for this study, and 
using the same data that will be used for the empirical analyses in this thesis: 
Table 3: Recent Poverty Rates 
Source (NBS, 2014) 
 
3.5.1 REGIONAL POVERTY AND TRENDS 
 
The NBS reported that relative poverty was most apparent in the North of the country compared 
to the South-West and South-East. Some analysts speculate that it is such poverty and 
underdevelopment has been exploited by religious extremists leading to incidents of violence in 
the North of the country30. A further breakdown of the latest poverty figures and indexes by the 
2009/2010 Living Standards survey conducted by (NBS, 2014) throws more light on poverty in 
the country: 
 
1) Relative poverty is defined by reference to the living standards of majority in a given 
society. In 2004, Nigeria’s relative poverty measurement stood at 54.4%, but increased 
to 69% in 2010. The North-West and North-East geo-political zones recorded the highest 
                                                          
30 Most notably and recently by the “Boko-Haram” sect. 
  Revised Absolute 
Poverty 2003/04 (Per 
Capita Methodology) 
Revised Absolute 
Poverty 2009/10 (Per 
Capita Methodology) 
Revised Absolute Poverty 
2003/04 (Adult Equivalent 
Methodology) 
Revised Absolute Poverty 
2009/10 (Adult Equivalent 
Methodology) 
NATIONAL 64.20 62.60 48.40 46.00 
RURAL 73.40 69.00 57.50 52.80 
URBAN 52.20 51.20 36.80 34.10 
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poverty rates in the country, with 77.7% and 76.3% respectively in 2010, while the South-
West geo-political zone recorded the lowest at 59.1%.  
 
2) Absolute poverty is defined in terms of the minimal requirements necessary to afford 
minimal standards of food, clothing, healthcare and shelter. Using this measure, 54.7% of 
Nigerians were living in poverty in 2004 but this increased to 60.9% in 2010. Among the 
geo-political zones, the North-West and North-East recorded the highest rates at 70% and 
69% respectively, while the South-West had the least at 49.8%.   
 
3) The-dollar-per-day measure refers to the proportion of those living on less than a US$1 per 
day poverty line. Applying this approach, 51.6% of Nigerians were living below US$1 per 
day in 2004, but this increased to 61.2% in 2010. Although the World Bank standard is 
now US$1.25, the old reference of US$1 was the standard used in Nigeria at the time that 
the survey was conducted. The North-West geo-political zone recorded the highest 
percentage at 70.4%, while the South-West geo-political zone had the least at 50.1%.  
 
4)  Subjective poverty is based on self-assessment and “sentiments” from respondents. In this 
regard, 75.5% of Nigerians considered themselves to be poor in 2004, and in 2010 the 
number was up to 93.9%.  
 
5) Income inequality. The survey suggests rising income inequality in the country as 
measured by the Gini coefficient. By this measure, income inequality rose from 0.429 in 
2004 to 0.447 in 2010, indicating greater income inequality during the period.  
 
 
6) Consumption Expenditure Distribution. Analysis of consumption expenditure distribution 
indicates that the top 10% income earners were responsible for about 43% of total 
consumption expenditure, the top 20% were responsible for about 59% of total 
consumption expenditure, and the top 40% were responsible for about 80% of total 
consumption expenditure in 2009/2010. 
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The implication of these reports for our investigation is twofold. Firstly, since there is 
significant poverty and income inequality in the country, and occupation has been highlighted 
as the main means of income distribution for developing countries like Nigeria where there are 
no unemployment benefits or any form of welfare for the disadvantaged, we should be able to 
clearly observe if indeed occupational status influences labour wage and household 
consumption through penalties or premiums. Furthermore, since there exist regional 
differences in economic indicators e.g. poverty, these regional differences need to be taken 
into account in any empirical estimation. 
 
Secondly, the income and consumption expenditure reports could imply that those with higher 
income levels also enjoy higher consumption expenditure. However, these reports have not 
controlled for occupational statuses. An investigation might throw further light on the 
relationship between income and household consumption, and this will be undertaken in the 
third analysis of the thesis.  
 
Since the data used for the empirical sections of the thesis are the 2003/2004 and 2009/2010 
Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) data by the NBS, the poverty analysis by the 
NBS is especially suitable. The different measures of poverty have further reinforced the 
notion that about half of the country can be defined as poor by standard conventions. This, as 
the thesis has highlighted, could provide additional support for our motivation for this 
assessment. How can the occupational statuses and the resultant labour wages and 
consumptions influence poverty levels, especially since increased income and consumption are 
associated with an escape from poverty? 
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3.5.2 OTHER INDICATORS  
 
Concerning other relevant indicators, the literacy level of the country has risen steadily over the 
years, from 55% in 1991 to 61% in 2009; and primary school enrolment was recorded at 81% in 
2010 (World-Bank, 2013, World-Bank, 2014, NBS, 2014). As already noted, the country had a 
Gini-coefficient of 0.49 in 2013, indicating that there is a very high degree of inequality. The 
country has also been notoriously plagued by corruption. It was reported by Transparency 
International as the second most corrupt country in the world in 2001, although this position has 
improved to 144th out of 177 in 2013 (Transparency International, 2014). The Nigerian 
Government has undertaken various projects aimed at reducing poverty and boosting development 
aided by numerous international bodies like the UN, the World Bank, the IMF and numerous 
charity organizations. 
 
3.5.3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CORRUPTION AND INEQUALITY INDEXES ON THE 
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN NIGERIA 
 
 
Given the high indexes of inequality (consistently high Gini-coefficients of 0.429 in 2004, 0.447 
in 2010 and 0.49 in 2013) and corruption in Nigeria (Transparency International (2014) and 
World Bank (2014)), there could be the subversion of legal, political and regulatory institutions by 
the powerful for their own benefit, as proposed by (Glaeser et al., 2003).  
 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) show that inequality can reduce economic growth, especially in 
democracies; and Smith and Garnier (1845) argue that good economic institutions must secure 
private property against expropriation and such confidence in the rule of law encourages 
individuals to invest physical capital and thereby fosters economic growth. For instance, some 
researchers have argued that in some countries individuals coming from poorer backgrounds, and 
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with fewer connections, may feel less secure about their property rights or access to the legal 
system than those who have stronger connections and greater wealth.  
 
In line with this, Glaeser et al (2003) argue that inequality is detrimental to the security of property 
rights and therefore to growth because it enables the rich to subvert the political, regulatory and 
legal institutions of society – and they also argue that if the courts are corruptible, then the legal 
system will favour the rich and not the just. Glaeser et al (2003) further argue that a strong middle 
class develops only when institutions protect it from the powerful, and they use data from the 
American Gilded Age between 1865 and 1914, when industrialization created large inequalities in 
wealth and huge corruption in the USA, along with the Gini-coefficient and the “Rule of Law31” 
index for a range of countries and concluded that inequality coupled with a poor rule of law32 was 
bad for growth and business in general. 
 
Estrin et al. (2013) use GEM surveys for 42 countries between the period of 2001 -2006 to test the 
impact of corruption, weaker property rights and government activity on the aspirations of business 
owners. They find that business owners benefit from a strong government (in the sense of property 
rights enforcement) and even by smaller governments, but are constrained by corruption. They 
also report that social networks can mediate some but not all institutional deficiencies. Relevant to 
Nigeria, Buccellato and Mickiewicz, 2009 show that hydrocarbons were a leading determinant of 
increased gaps between the rich and the poor in Russia, a finding that they claim can be extended 
to similar oil-rich countries like Venezuela, Iran and Nigeria. These studies all seem to highlight a 
negative relationship between inequality and corruption vis-à-vis the business environment, and 
that being a net exporter of oil could exacerbate the situation.  
 
Estrin, Korosteleva et al. (2013) also argue that social capital could influence the business 
environment more in countries with weak institutions and high levels of corruption than in 
                                                          
31 From the International Country Risk Guide. 
32 For countries with a good rule of law, inequality had no effect on economic growth. 
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countries with strong institutions, courts and the rule of law. In particular, they view trust as a key 
dimension of social capital and distinguish between “particularised trust” (Rothstein, 2003) and 
“extended trust” (Raiser, 1999). Particularised trust has been identified as that which emerges 
between two or more individuals, such as family members and friends, based on the knowledge 
that they belong to a particular group - say for instance the same ethnic group or religion. Extended 
trust on the other hand is more abstract and enables transactions to take place with only a limited 
amount of information about the counterpart’s specific attributes.  
 
These authors argue that in a modern market economy extended trust, unlike particularised trust, 
enables individuals to engage in transactions beyond the closed circles of friends and family, and 
that such links are necessary for the division of labour and for growth aspirations. Given the high 
index for perceived corruption, especially in the Nigerian government, and the reputation for 
“advance fee fraud” by certain33 individuals, this could signify that extended trust could be limited 
and particularised trust more dominant in this context. This has implications for the business 
environment in Nigeria and could indicate that significant social and financial capital could be 
needed in some instances for business owners to achieve high growth status.  
 
All these seem to indicate that the relationship between the employment categories could also be 
influenced by social and human (educational attainment) capital. Those who move to the upper 
tiers of society (theoretically employers and high earners in the paid jobs sector) could be 
individuals with a high degree of social capital and educational attainment. We should also expect 
to see distinct patterns in labour wages and consumption amongst these groups since the reports 
show such a high degree of inequality. 
 
Furthermore, given the theoretical and empirical background as regards poverty, income 
distribution and corruption, theory indicates that corruption will be bad for business aspirations 
and growth, and that social capital could be a determining factor for business success in developing 
                                                          
33 Albeit a minute amount.  
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countries like Nigeria. Since it is hoped that the findings from this study might be generalisable to 
similar countries, it might also be worth mentioning countries with similar indicators to Nigeria in 
terms of Gini-coefficients, corruption and sometimes poverty. Therefore in addition to the 
developing country literature, especially as regards Sub-Saharan Africa, countries with similar 
Freedom from Corruption Indexes (FCI)34 and Gini-coefficients (GC) to Nigeria (FCI 22.7 & GC 
0.49) include Russia (FCI 22.1 & GC 0.42), Kenya (FCI 21 & GC 0.47), Cote d’Ivoire (FCI 22.1 
& GC 0.42), Ecuador (FCI 26 & GC 0.49) and Uganda (FCI 23.2 & GC 0.44). It is anticipated 
that, ceteris paribus, findings from this thesis can be generalisable to these and other developing 
countries.  
                                                          
34 The FCI score is derived mainly from the Transparency International Corruption Perception Indexes; a 
score closer to 100 indicates relative freedom from corruption and lower scores indicate more corruption.   
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3.6 PRIMARY INDICATORS: LABOUR MARKET REGULATIONS AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT SAFETY NETS (DOING BUSINESS IN NIGERIA) 
 
The Nigerian Government does not provide unemployment safety nets and housing benefits35. 
There are however no substantial government barriers to entry into either formal or informal 
employment, although there are procedures for starting a formal business. Due to the high self-
employment and business ownership rates in the country, of major concern to this study is also the 
ease by which individuals can open and operate businesses, as this can affect the self-employment 
and employer categories.  
 
The “Doing Business” international report addresses this issue. It sheds light on how easy or 
difficult it is for a local entrepreneur to open and run a small to medium-size business when 
complying with relevant regulations in different countries around the world. It measures and tracks 
changes in regulations affecting 11 areas in the life cycle of a business: starting a business, dealing 
with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting 
investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency and 
employing workers (Doing Business, 2014). 
 
In a series of annual reports Doing Business (DB) presents quantitative indicators on business 
regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 189 economies. The 
indicators refer to a specific type of business, generally a local limited liability company operating 
in the largest business city. Nigeria ranked 147th in the Doing Business index, and it also ranked 
as the 122nd to start a business. This low score was primarily due to the low scores on electricity 
and registering property where it was placed 185 out of 189 countries in both instances. The Doing 
Business indicators for Nigeria and a few comparable countries are shown below in Table 4: 
 
 
                                                          
35 So unemployed individuals have no reliable source of income and could resort to self-employment 
according to the literature.  
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Table 4:  Doing Business indicators for Nigeria and a few comparable countries. 
Indicator  Nigeria 
DB2014 
Nigeria 
DB2013  
Ghana 
DB2014  
India 
DB2014  
Kenya 
DB2014  
South 
Africa 
DB2014  
United 
Kingdom 
DB2014  
Best 
Performer 
Globally 
DB2014  
Starting a 
Business (rank)  
122  114  128  179  134  64  28  New Zealand 
(1)  
Procedures 
(number)  
8  8  8  12  10  5  6  New Zealand 
(1)*  
Time (days)  28.0  28.0  14.0  27.0  32.0  19.0  12.0  New Zealand 
(0.5)  
Cost (% of 
income per 
capita)  
58.3  63.1  15.7  47.3  38.2  0.3  0.3  Slovenia (0.0)  
Paid-in Min. 
Capital (% of 
income per 
capita)  
0.0  0.0  3.7  124.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  112 
Economies 
(0.0)*  
Dealing with 
Construction 
Permits (rank)  
151  146  159  182  47  26  27  Hong Kong 
SAR, China 
(1)  
Procedures 
(number)  
18  18  15  35  9  16  12  Hong Kong 
SAR, China 
(6)  
Time (days)  116.0  116.0  246.5  168.0  125.0  78.0  88.0  Singapore 
(26.0)  
Cost (% of 
income per 
capita)  
3,504.8  3,842.7  259.6  2,640.4  191.3  9.9  66.0  Qatar (1.1)  
Getting 
Electricity 
(rank)  
185  184  85  111  166  150  74  Iceland (1)  
Procedures 
(number)  
8  8  4  7  6  5  5  10 Economies 
(3)*  
Time (days)  260  260  79  67  158  226  126  Germany (17)  
Cost (% of 
income per 
capita)  
960.5  1,086.8  2,295.3  230.7  1,090.7  1,432.1  91.9  Japan (0.0)  
Registering 
Property 
(rank)  
185  185  49  92  163  99  68  Georgia (1)  
Procedures 
(number)  
13  13  5  5  9  7  6  4 Economies 
(1)*  
Time (days)  77.0  77.0  34.0  44.0  73.0  23.0  21.5  New Zealand 
(1.0)*  
Cost (% of 
property value)  
20.8  20.8  1.2  7.0  4.3  6.1  4.7  5 Economies 
(0.0)*  
Getting Credit 
(rank)  
13  11  28  28  13  28  1  Malaysia (1)*  
Strength of 
legal rights 
index (0-10)  
9  9  8  8  10  7  10  10 Economies 
(10)*  
         
Table 4 Cont’d        
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Depth of credit 
information 
index (0-6)  
5  5  5  5  4  6  6  31 Economies 
(6)*  
Public registry 
coverage (% of 
adults)  
0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  Portugal 
(100.0)*  
Private bureau 
coverage (% of 
adults)  
4.9  4.1  10.4  19.8  4.7  55.6  100.0  22 Economies 
(100.0)*  
Protecting 
Investors 
(rank)  
68  67  34  34  98  10  10  New Zealand 
(1)  
Extent of 
disclosure  
5  5  7  7  3  8  10  10 Economies 
(10)*  
Extent of 
director 
liability index 
(0-10)  
7  7  5  4  2  8  7  Cambodia (10)  
Ease of 
shareholder 
suits index (0-
10)  
5  5  7  8  10  8  7  3 Economies 
(10)*  
Strength of 
investor 
protection 
index (0-10)  
5.7  5.7  6.3  6.3  5.0  8.0  8.0  New Zealand 
(9.7)  
Paying Taxes 
(rank)  
170  167  68  158  166  24  14  United Arab 
Emirates (1)  
Payments 
(number per 
year)  
47  47  32  33  41  7  8  Hong Kong 
SAR, China 
(3)*  
Time (hours 
per year)  
956  956  224  243  308  200  110  United Arab 
Emirates (12)  
Trading Across 
Borders (rank)  
158  159  109  132  156  106  16  Singapore (1)  
Documents to 
export 
(number)  
9  9  6  9  8  5  4  Ireland (2)*  
Time to export 
(days)  
22  24  19  16  26  16  8  5 Economies 
(6)*  
Cost to export 
(US$ per 
container)  
1,380  1,380  875  1,170  2,255  1,705  1,005  Malaysia (450)  
Documents to 
import 
(number)  
13  13  7  11  9  6  4  Ireland (2)*  
Time to import 
(days)  
33  39  42  20  26  21  6  Singapore (4)  
Cost to import 
(US$ per 
container)  
1,695  1,540  1,360  1,250  2,350  1,980  1,050  Singapore 
(440)  
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Enforcing 
Contracts 
(rank)  
136  138  43  186  151  80  56  Luxembourg 
(1)  
Time (days)  447  457  495  1,420  465  600  437  Singapore 
(150)  
Cost (% of 
claim)  
92.0  92.0  23.0  39.6  47.2  33.2  39.9  Bhutan (0.1)  
Table 4 
Cont’d 
        
Procedures 
(number)  
40  40  36  46  44  29  28  Singapore 
(21)*  
Resolving 
Insolvency 
(rank)  
107  107  116  121  123  82  7  Japan (1)  
Time (years)  2.0  2.0  1.9  4.3  4.5  2.0  1.0  Ireland (0.4)  
Cost (% of 
estate)  
22  22  22  9  22  18  6  Norway (1)  
Outcome (0 as 
piecemeal sale 
and 1 as going 
concern)  
0  0  0  0  1  0  1   
Recovery rate 
(cents on the 
dollar)  
27.9  28.2  26.2  25.6  24.7  35.5  88.6  Japan (92.8)  
Source: (Doing Business, 2014).  
 
According to data collected by Doing Business, starting a registered business in Nigeria requires 
8 procedures, takes 28.0 days, costs 58.3% of income per capita and requires paid-in minimum 
capital of 0% of income per capita. It is also worth mentioning that the informal sector in Nigeria 
consisting of unregistered businesses is quite substantial. Globally, Nigeria stands at 122nd in the 
ranking of 189 economies on the ease of starting a business (Doing Business, 2014). 
 
In Nigeria, there also exists duality and a high level of informality; and the formal and informal 
sectors have not developed proper linkages that could lead to economic competitiveness, high 
levels of productivity and growth (World Bank, 2007). It is also reported that wages are higher in 
the formal sector than in the informal sector (World Bank, 2013, World Bank, 2014). Hence while 
individuals have the ability to choose what sector to enter into in the country, they might find the 
formal paid work sector to be preferable due to monetary reasons and as an escape route out of 
poverty as would be expected from the literature.  
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3.7 THEORETICAL REASONS FOR PULLED & PUSHED SELF-EMPLOYMENT IN 
NIGERIA 
 
As evidenced by the unemployment data presented above, Nigeria has a high incidence of youth 
unemployment. There are also reports that official statistics grossly underestimate unemployment 
and disguised unemployment and  some speculate that youth unemployment is as high as 60% 
(World Bank, 2013). The Nigerian Government does not have unemployment safety nets and 
housing benefits and there is a considerable amount of poverty, especially in the north of the 
country. Another potential quagmire for potential business owners is the lack of substantial sources 
of capital; these factors would seem to lend credence to the pushed self-employment case. High 
unemployment and poverty rates are typically seen as factors pushing people into self-employment 
in the literature, and Nigeria does have features that support this argument. 
 
On the other hand, there exist opportunities for non-oil related sources of wealth, especially as the 
country has an abundance of natural resources coupled with its large population. Reports indicate 
that the manufacturing, service, export and local consumption sectors are expanding rapidly, and 
could be a source of good prospects for individuals with an entrepreneurial streak. Indeed Africa’s 
richest man “Aliko Dangote” and a substantial number of successful business men and women 
started out as self-employed youths in Nigeria; and Nigeria is known for a multitude of successful 
start-ups because of opportunities for arbitragers  (WorldBank, 2007). These examples can also 
serve as motivations for pulled self-employment. 
 
A Gallup poll in 2008 showed that 67% of Nigerians have thought about starting a business 
compared to the West-African median of 44% (The West-African median includes Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone). 
This poll shows a high interest in entrepreneurship in Nigeria (Gallup, 2011). Almost half (45%) 
of Nigerians said they planned to start a business in the next 12 months, and 80% of them were 
very confident that a newly created business will do well in their own country.  
Such optimism for business success in Nigeria signals that there is ample room for opportunity 
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or pull self-employment for individuals who might start businesses, to take advantage of the 
growing economy and government ineptitude, by providing amenities and services in terms of 
housing, medical services, agriculture, education, security and power generation – for example, 
Nigeria is the world’s largest importer of private generators (Economist 2011). There is 
however also room for push self-employment for those who might have been forced into self-
employment either by unemployment or other negative factors. This can also be said to be the 
case in many developing countries and one of the aims of this research will be to determine 
which effect is stronger and to differentiate between the two. 
 
 
 
Ekpo and Umoh (2011) also report that the contribution to the growth of the Nigerian economy 
by the informal sector, which is made up mainly of the self-employed, is quite significant in 
terms of output and employment. In September 2010, the Education minister urged new 
university graduates to seek self-employment and to develop entrepreneurial skills. Over the 
years, the Federal and State governments of Nigeria have played significant roles in new 
business development. The Federal Government in the late 1980s initiated the 
Entrepreneurship Development Programme (EDP) run by the National Directorate of 
Employment (NDE). Under this policy, the Federal Ministry of Labour sought to address the 
graduate unemployment problem through the NDE programme which provided participants with 
the opportunity to acquire entrepreneurial skills and secure loan capital to enable them establish 
and operate their own small scale enterprises. The Federal Ministry of Industry has been in 
the forefront of efforts to promote the development and acquisition  of  entrepreneurial  skills  
as  part  of  its  efforts  to  support  Small  and  Medium Enterprises (SMEs). To this end, the 
Ministry established Industrial Development Centres in various parts of the country with the 
mandate to: 
 
(i) Promote small-scale enterprises through the provision of extension services;  
(ii) Train entrepreneurs and staff; 
(iii)  Assist with product design;  
(iv) Process loan applications;  
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(v) Render, free of charge, technical and managerial services including advice on quality 
control, product improvement, etc. 
 
The State Governments have also been involved in providing support to SMEs. Many states have 
Small Scale Credit Schemes which provide SMEs with financial and technical support. Since 
the late 1980s, the Federal Ministry of Industry has been supporting efforts by the states to build 
functional industrial estates for SMEs by way of partial reimbursement of money actually spent 
on the provision of industrial estates for SMEs.  The “Work  for  Yourself  Programme" 
(WFYP),  a scheme introduced by the Federal Ministry of Industry and assisted by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the British Council, which aims to develop 
entrepreneurial skills in the SME and informal sector, is one of such schemes being implemented 
with international assistance. 
 
 
 
 
International organizations such as the African Development Bank (ADB), World Bank and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have also supported efforts to aid the informal 
sector. In other cases, the Federal or State Governments, as the case may be, co-finance small- 
scale businesses which benefit from external financial assistance. Loans under the World Bank 
- Nigeria Small and Medium-Scale Enterprises development programme provide financial and 
technical assistance to these groups of entrepreneurs/business-starters. For example, the 
Technology Incubator Scheme was promoted and executed by the Lagos State Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, with UNIDO's financial and technical assistance and supported by the 
organized private sector in Lagos State and the Federal Government. The scheme was designed 
to promote the development of technology based SMEs in Nigeria (Ekpo and Umoh 2011). 
  
 
 
3.8 GLOBAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR (GEM) DATA ON NIGERIA 
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Another very important source of information regarding self-employment/entrepreneurship in 
Nigeria is the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) (Kelley et al., 2012). The GEM study is a 
worldwide survey conducted each year to provide data on societal issues, participation levels of 
individuals at different stages of the entrepreneurship process, and the characteristics of 
entrepreneurs and their businesses. It provides information that can be comparable within and 
across individual economies, geographic regions and economic development levels. GEM defines 
necessity-driven entrepreneurs as those who are pushed into starting businesses because they have 
no other source of income, while opportunity-motivated entrepreneurs are described as those who 
enter such activities primarily to pursue an opportunity (GEM, 2012)36. 
 
GEM reports that necessity-driven motives tend to be highest in the factor driven economies 
(mostly developing countries). With greater economic development levels, the proportion of 
entrepreneurs with necessity motives generally declines and improvement-driven opportunity 
increasingly accounts for a greater proportion of motives. Nigeria has been described in the study 
as a factor driven economy as were most of the Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
Certain indices from the GEM (2012) survey are crucial in laying the foundation for our empirical 
analysis. The survey reports that 68% and 63% of male and female entrepreneurs respectively 
surveyed in Nigeria were opportunity entrepreneurs i.e. pulled into entrepreneurship to pursue 
opportunities, while 32% and 37% of entrepreneurs surveyed were necessity entrepreneurs i.e they 
had no other work options and needed a source of income. This is not far off from the UK and US 
opportunity indexes of 82% and 74% and 76% and 74% for males and females respectively. Since 
Nigeria is classed as a developing country, compared to the other countries that are classed as 
developed, this also clearly contradicts the widespread and intuitive perception that most 
entrepreneurs from developing economies (like those involved in the survey) are a disadvantaged 
                                                          
36GEM data collected this way has some merits and weaknesses primarily because there is an overlap in 
the self-employment and entrepreneurship definitions. Some self-employed individuals are entrepreneurs 
but many are not (as they are not a homogenous group). The GEM surveys do not make this distinction 
and herein lies a conceptual dilemma. However the study serves as a fantastic base to compare and 
contrast entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial attitudes for all the countries surveyed.   
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group of individuals who pursue these activities because they have no other means of generating 
earnings; and serves as an additional catalyst for this enquiry. According to this GEM survey, the 
country has a bizarrely high level of opportunity entrepreneurship given its characteristics.  
 
Furthermore, the GEM defines Total Early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) as the percentage 
of adults (aged 18-64) in an economy who are nascent and new entrepreneurs.  Typically, TEA 
tends to have an inverse relationship with economic development. The trend is for economies with 
low GDP per capita to have high TEA rates and with high proportions of necessity-motivated 
entrepreneurs. On the other hand, high GDP economies show lower TEA rates, but a higher 
proportion of those with opportunity-motivations. As expected, Nigeria had a TEA index of 34% 
for males and 36% for females, the Sub-Saharan African average being 30% for males and 27% 
for females - higher than the UK’s 12% for male and 6% for females and the USA’s 15% and 10% 
respectively. The worldwide average was 15.4% for males and 10.4% for females.  This could be 
interpreted to indicate that there are a lot of necessity-motivated entrepreneurs in Nigeria. 
 
However, Table 5 clearly demonstrates the inconsistency between theory and current data as 
reported by the GEM survey. According to the classical literature and by GEM definitions, high 
income countries in terms of GDP per capita should experience higher improvement-driven 
opportunity TEA rates. While the theory fits well with some countries like Japan, the Netherlands 
and arguably the USA, developing countries with lower GDP per capita including Nigeria, Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico report higher “opportunity TEA” rates than Germany, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. This paradox provides some motivation for the present empirical study, as quite a 
considerable number of economies exhibit high rates of opportunity entrepreneurship despite their 
lower GDP per capita. 
 
Table 5: GEM Survey; Opportunity Total Early Stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) 
COUNTRY PER CAPITA 
GDP (2012) 
IMPROVEMENT DRIVEN OPPORTUNITY 
 (% OF TEA) (2012) 
Nigeria 1,555 53 
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Zambia 1,469 46 
Botswana 7,191 48 
South Africa  7,508 40 
Japan 46,720 66 
China 6,091 39 
Brazil 11,340 59 
Mexico 9,742 52 
Chile 15,363 69 
Egypt 3,187 23 
Germany 41,514 51 
Netherlands 46,054 66 
Poland 12,708 30 
Sweden 55,245 49 
United Kingdom 38,514 43 
Russia 14,037 31 
Croatia 13,227 36 
United States 49,965 59 
Source (Kelley et al., 2012, World Bank, 2014) 
Traditional labour theory (e.g. the Harris-Todaro and Ranis-Fei models) suggests that Nigeria 
should have a higher level of necessity driven entrepreneurship given its lower GDP when 
compared to other countries. However, GEM reports indicate that it has a higher opportunity 
entrepreneurship rate than developed countries with significantly greater GDPs. This disparity 
between theory and current data serves as further motivation for this analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.9 IMPLICATIONS FOR SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
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Given the evidence from the GEM, Doing Business, ILO, UN and World Bank reports, there seems 
to be a good reason to argue that both types of self-employment (push and pulled) are likely to co-
exist in Nigeria. High poverty and unemployment rates could serve as push factors forcing people 
into self-employment; while perceived opportunities, like deficiencies in the infrastructure that can 
be exploited and the high economic growth rates, could serve as a catalyst for pulling individuals 
into self-employment, especially since the government and other economic agencies seem to extol 
the virtues of entrepreneurship in the country and there are not many barriers to starting a business.  
 
Furthermore, institutional and structural barriers, such as the high cost of doing business and the 
problems associated with start-up in the country, could discourage all but a few individuals who 
choose to be self-employed to survive and thrive in such an environment; typically those endowed 
with finances, social capital, entrepreneurial skill, dexterity, patience and a real desire to see the 
process through. Hence Nigeria serves as the perfect context to study the effects of occupational 
status especially as it reports such high rates of self-employment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.10 FINAL DATA SAMPLE 
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As stated previously in Section 4.1, the data used for the empirical analysis originates from the 
Nigerian Living Standards Survey (NLSS) otherwise known as the Living Standards Measurement 
Survey (LSMS), from the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and for the years 2004 and 2009. 
The data obtained from the NBS covers both rural and urban areas of all the 36 states of Nigeria 
and the Federal Capital Territory. It is an extensive nationwide survey and randomly sampled 
100,685 individuals in the 2004 survey, and 533,838 individuals in the 2009 survey. As stated in 
the conceptual model shown in Chapter 1 and once again shown below, this investigation aims to 
understand where the differences in labour wages and household consumption levels come from, 
as far as they depend on any of the employment statuses that have been labelled “labour force 
participation” in the conceptual model below. 
 
 
Figure 9: Conceptual Model (as Figure 2) 
 
In order to assist in the empirical investigations, the entire data collected for both years are filtered 
for the following: 
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1. Individuals not between the ages of 16 and 65: This is done because these reflect the 
legal ages to enter the labour force and retire respectively in Nigeria. This is  as 
recommended by the self-employment and occupational status literature (Demirgüc-Kunt 
et al., 2009, Maloney, 2004, Cunningham and Maloney, 2001, Mandelman and Montes-
Rojas, 2009, Kijima, 2006).  
 
2. Everyone employed by the agricultural sector: The literature suggests that farmers 
should be excluded for a variety of reasons but chiefly because the agricultural profession 
is largely a self-employed one by definition, and developing countries are especially 
characterized by a large number of self-employed individuals in subsistence agriculture 
(Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2009, Parker, 2009, Maloney, 2004, Cunningham and Maloney, 
2001, House et al., 1993)37.  
 
3. Any individual who reported being retired or a full-time student despite being between 
the ages of 16 and 65.  
 
4. Finally, the top and bottom two and half (2.5) percentile earners are removed from the 
entire sample to avoid “superstar” influences (Rosen, 1981). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 There were 3,764 individuals from the 2004 and 131,492 individuals from the 2009 surveys 
respectively in this category. 
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The remaining individuals are then sorted into the following occupational statuses labelled 
“labour force participation “in the conceptual model. The occupational distribution of individuals 
from the final sample of the survey is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Occupational Statuses Reported 
Labour Force 
Participation 
Category 2004 2009 
  Male Female Male Female 
Employers Individuals who are self-employed with employees 
 
453 152 2,169 717 
Paid Workers Individuals who work and earn salary income 
 
2,624 1,045 18,741 9,050 
Self-Employed 
(Own Account) 
Individuals who are self-employed with no 
employees 
4,197 2,361 23,209 21,434 
Unemployed Individuals who are eligible for employment and not 
employed but sought for work in the past 12 months 
2,067 3,403 8,671 8,955 
Not in Labour 
Force  
Individuals who are eligible for employment and not 
employed but have not sought for work in the past 
12 months 
865 1,230 6,206 6,541 
Gender Sum  10,206 8,191 58,996 46,697 
Survey Total  18,397   105,693 
 
The survey reveals that the majority of individuals in employment (i.e. the employed labour force, 
consisting of the “employer”, “paid workers” and “self-employed” categories) for both men and 
women are in self-employment; this is followed by the paid workers, and the smallest category is 
the employers. This is line with other official reports from the NBS, SLOAN (2014) who report 
that the civilian employed labour force reported being about 70% self-employed between 2004 
and 2010.  
 
In terms of gender, females represent a higher proportion of the unemployed and individuals not 
in the labour force for both periods surveyed (even though this gap narrowed in the later 2009 
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survey). This is also in line with labour market expectations and the gender literature in developing 
countries, where men are traditionally viewed as the main “breadwinners” of the family and 
women to be engaged in full time household activities (Maloney, 2004, Bosch and Maloney, 
2010). Men are found in higher proportions in any employment activity for both years surveyed38. 
 
                                                          
38 Women however seem to be well represented in self-employment.  
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3.11 REGIONAL DIFFRENCES 
 
As highlighted in official reports and in section 4.5.1, Nigeria has substantial regional differences 
in terms of poverty, culture, demographics and economic activity (NBS, 2014, World Bank, 2013). 
To explore this regional heterogeneity in our empirical analysis, the country is divided into four 
regions in line with the classifications of the World Bank and the NBS, comprising regional, 
economic and cultural distinctions. A map of the entire country, showing all the 36 states that make 
up the country with the Federal Capital, appears below in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10: Full Map of Nigeria Showing the 36 States of the Country and the Federal Capital (FC) 
 
As pointed out in the poverty reports by the NBS, the Northern part of the country is substantially 
poorer than the South, in addition to having some ethnic differences in the make-up of the 
population. In terms of religion, the South of the country is predominantly Christian while the 
North is predominantly Muslim. In addition, the South-West of the country, especially Lagos, is 
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known as the commercial hub; and Abuja, located in the middle of the country, became the official 
capital of Nigeria in 1991 and has been designated as the official Federal Capital since then.  
 
Crude oil, which makes up a huge proportion of the country’s exports, is found in the South-South 
of the country; and agricultural products predominantly come from the South-West part of the 
country (though the South-East also is increasingly agricultural). In terms of literacy, the North of 
the country has a substantially lower literacy rate (39.7%) than the South (81%) which has led 
scholars to speculate whether the combined low literacy rates and high poverty rates have led to 
the rise of religious extremism and violence in the North39.  
 
In terms of ethnic groups, the Yoruba and Edo are mostly found in the South-West, the Ibos, the 
Ibibios, Ijaws and Tivs are found in the South-East, the Nupe, Igala and Idoma are found in the 
Mid-Belt; while the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri are found in the North, with some overlaps in certain 
instances. In reality, the country has reportedly over 580 ethnic groups and over 370 recognized 
tribes (NBS, 2014). 
 
These regional disparities will have to be taken into account during the derivation of estimates in 
order to draw any meaningful conclusions and also as robustness checks. To account for these 
regional differences, the researcher divided the sample of data into four regions based on the 
classifications of the World Bank and the NBS, which include regional, economic and cultural 
distinctions.  
 
Thus, the Northern part of the country has been reported as the poorest region with also the lowest 
levels of economic activities and literacy rates. The Middle (Mid-belt) region serves as the base 
category against which other regions are measured, as it is the region with moderate economic 
indicators in terms of economic activity, literacy rates and government investment. The South-
                                                          
39 Through the Boko-Haram sect. 
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West of the country is the economic hub while the South-East is known for its small business spirit, 
along with considerable agricultural and industrial production. The regional classifications used in 
this thesis are presented below in Figure 11, and the statistics of occupational distribution by 
regions is thus shown in Table 7. 
 
Figure 11: Regional Differences and Classifications 
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Table 7 below presents the statistical distribution from the surveys according to the regional 
classifications used. 
Table 7: Survey Distribution of Final Data Sample by Regions 
State 2004 Data 2009 Data 
 Employment Status Observations Employment Status Observations 
North Employer 189 Employer 491 
 Self-Employment 891 Self-Employment 4,297 
 Paid Worker  758 Paid Worker  5,340 
 Unemployed 1,740   Unemployed 3,015 
 Not in Labour Force 559 Not in Labour Force 3,655 
Mid-belt Employer 157 Employer 268 
 Self-Employment 1,016 Self-Employment 6,355 
 Paid Worker  660 Paid Worker  5,735 
 Unemployed 1,152 Unemployed 2,023 
 Not in Labour Force 424 Not in Labour Force 2,575 
South-West Employer 126 Employer 1,541 
 Self-Employment 1,991 Self-Employment 20,339 
 Paid Worker  1,150 Paid Worker  9,474 
 Unemployed 820 Unemployed 7,817 
 Not in Labour Force 478 Not in Labour Force 3,442 
South-East Employer 133 Employer 586 
 Self-Employment 2,660 Self-Employment 13,652 
 Paid Worker  1,101 Paid Worker  7,242 
 Unemployed 1,758 Unemployed 4,771 
 Not in Labour Force 634 Not in Labour Force 3,075 
Total  18,397  105,693 
 
 
The final sample specified in Tables 6, 7 and again in Table 8 is used throughout this thesis for all 
empirical estimates. To provide clarity as to the distribution of the data and show that is a fairly 
balanced sample, reflective of the whole labour market of the country, the data  is further sorted 
into all the states in the country as they are expressed by the regional classifications given above 
in Figure 11. Table 8 below thus shows the distribution of the final sample by regions and states: 
Table 8: Survey Distribution of the Final Survey Data by Regions and States 
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 State Region 2004 Data 2009 Data 
   Frequency % Frequency  % 
1 Abia South-East 834 4.53 3,748 3.55 
2 Adamawa North 341 1.85 1,644 1.56 
3 Akwa Ibom South-East 488 2.65 533 0.50 
4 Anambra South-East 959 5.21 6,347 6.01 
5 Bauchi North 376 2.04 995 0.94 
6 Bayelsa South-East 1,027 5.58 1,774 1.68 
7 Benue Mid-belt 177 0.96 983 0.93 
8 Borno North 373 2.03 1,167 1.10 
9 Cross_Rivers South-East 593 3.22 2,138 2.02 
10 Delta South-East 377 2.05 5,376 5.09 
11 Ebonyi South-East 400 2.17 863 0.82 
12 Edo Mid-belt 742 4.03 4,187 3.96 
13 Ekiti South-West 398 2.16 3,710 3.51 
14 Enugu South-East 568 3.09 2,837 2.68 
15 Gombe North 469 2.55 593 0.56 
16 Imo South-East 543 2.95 5,465 5.17 
17 Jigawa North 161 0.88 921 0.87 
18 Kaduna North 521 2.83 2,895 2.74 
19 Kano North 419 2.28 3,346 3.17 
20 Katsina North 331 1.80 822 0.78 
21 Kebbi North 177 0.96 765 0.72 
22 Kogi Mid-belt 749 4.07 4,187 3.96 
23 Kwara South-West 647 3.52 3,695 3.50 
24 Lagos South-West 1,012 5.50 10,785 10.20 
25 Nassarawa Mid-belt 589 3.20 1,391 1.32 
26 Niger Mid-belt 440 2.39 3,267 3.09 
27 Ogun South-West 752 4.09 5,586 5.29 
28 Ondo South-West 556 3.02 2,163 2.05 
29 Osun South-West 647 3.52 8,018 7.59 
30 Oyo South-West 553 3.01 8,656 8.19 
31 Plateau North 251 1.36 1,475 1.40 
32 Rivers South-East 497 2.70 245 0.23 
33 Sokoto North 161 0.88 921 0.87 
34 Taraba Mid-belt 342 1.86 871 0.82 
35 Yobe North 232 1.26 934 0.88 
36 Zamfara North 325 1.77 320 0.30 
37 Fct Mid-belt 370 2.01 2,070 1.96 
 Total  18,397 100.00 105,693 100.00 
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3.12 CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Control Variables in Conceptual Model  
 
The influences that the control variables can exert on labour force participation status have been 
discussed in the Overview, Section 2.1. We have also seen from Table 6 that the data sample 
available for the estimations encompasses all employment options available for the employable 
labour force marked “Labour Force Participation” in the conceptual model.  The control variables 
must however be included if the thesis is to provide meaningful results (the reader is once again 
advised to be careful to understand the caveats when interpreting the results as a full range of 
observed and unobserved variables are not included in the conceptual model). The measurement 
of the control variables that will be used in the regression analysis and how they are operationalised 
are highlighted below in Table 9.  
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Table 9: Variables Used in Empirical Estimates – Descriptive Statistics in Table 11 
Variable Name What it Measures 2004 LSS Data  2009 LSS Data 
Labour Force 
Participation 
Employment Status 
 
Employer = 1 
Self-Employed =2 
Wage Earner = 3 
Unemployed = 4 
Not in Labour Force = 5 
Identical 
Employed Being in Employment Dummy (1/0) 
[Employed = 1] 
[NonWorker = 0] 
Identical 
Sex Male or Female Dummy (1/0) 
[Male = 1] 
[Female = 0] 
Identical 
Ageyears 
Agesquare 
Age in years 
Age Squared 
Age in Years 
Age Squared 
Identical 
Sector Urban or Rural 
Residence 
Dummy (1/0) 
[Urban = 1] 
[Rural = 0] 
Identical 
Martstat Marital Status Dummy (1/0) 
[Married] 
[Not Married = 0] 
Identical 
Religion Religion Dummy (1/0) for 4 religions: 
[Christian, Muslim, Traditional 
and Agnostic] 
Identical 
Edlev* Educational Level 
 
Dummy (1/0) for 5 categories: 
[NoEd – No Education] 
[LoEd – Low Education] 
[MidEd – Medium Education] 
[HighEd – High Education] 
VeryHighEd – Very High 
Education] 
Identical 
 
 
Region Region of the country Dummy (1/0) for 4 regions:  
[Southeast – South East] 
[Midbelt – Middle Belt] 
[Southwest – South West] 
[North - North]  
Identical 
House or Land A Proxy for source of 
collateral for Bank Loan 
Dummy (1/0) If the Individual 
owns a Plot of Land or House: 
[Owns = 1] 
[Does not own = 0] 
Identical  
LocalLanguage Ability to Speak or/and 
Write a Nigerian 
Language 
Dummy (1/0) If the Individual can 
speak/write a Nigerian Language: 
[Can Speak/Write = 1] 
[Cannot Speak/Write = 0] 
Identical 
Public Employer 
Public/Government 
Sector or Private Sector 
Not Available Dummy (1/0) for 2 groups 
[Public = 1] 
[Private = 0] 
Economic Sector Industry Classification Not Available Dummy (1/0) for 3 groups 
[Real/Manufacturing] 
[Trade]& [Service] 
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Table 9 Cont’d    
Variable Name What it Measures 2004 LSS Data  2009 LSS Data 
Lamtrent Log Annual Income Log of Annual Income Not Available 
TTHHCONSPTN 
 
Total Consumption by 
Household 
Not Available Sum of Household 
Cosnsmption 
 
Table 9 shows how the various variables of concern are utilised in this thesis. It is important to 
note that the Annual Income variable is only available from the 2004 survey data, thus the 
empirical analysis concerning labour wage will be done using only the 2004 survey data. In the 
same manner, the Total Household Consumption variable is only available from the 2009 survey 
data, thus the empirical analysis concerning household consumption will be done using only the 
2009 survey data.  
 
Of major concern to our first empirical analysis is how educational attainments affect the labour 
force participation category of individuals. The literature recognizes two ways of measuring 
educational levels/attainments. The first method is by number of years in education, a method used 
by several researchers ((Mandelman and Montes-Rojas, 2009), (Van der Sluis et al., 2005) and 
(Pietrobelli et al., 2004)). The other method is by using dummy variables to capture different levels 
of education: a technique also used by a considerable number of researchers  ((Cunningham and 
Maloney, 2001), (Tamvada, 2010), (Kijima, 2006), (Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2009) and (Günther 
and Launov, 2012)).  
 
This thesis uses the latter method for two reasons. First because this is how the information is 
readily available and second because there could be threshold levels of education that are not 
captured by specifications involving years of education (Kijima, 2006). Table 10 reports the 
educational levels/attainments of individuals surveyed in the samples and denoted by “Edlev”. The 
“Edlev” variable measures educational attainments and is further broken down into dummies that 
have the subsequent numbers of observations for each year surveyed. 
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Table 10: Survey Distribution of Educational Attainments Reported 
Educational Category 
(Dummy [1/0]) 
Educational Attainments Year 
 
  2004 2009 
No ed  Denotes individuals with no education at all. 819 5,170 
Low ed  Denotes individuals with a little degree of education.  
 
[These range from primary school to junior secondary 
certificate holders.] 
5,800 32,518 
Mid ed  Denotes individuals with a moderate degree of 
education.  
 
[These range from Senior Secondary Certificate 
holders to O level degree holders and Nursing School 
Graduates.] 
5,969 53,075 
High ed  Denotes individuals with a high degree of education.  
 
[These range from Bsc/First degree University holders 
to individuals with degrees equivalent to University 
certificates.] 
1,262 12,592 
Very high ed  Denotes individuals with very high educational 
attainments. 
 [These range from Master’s degree holders and the 
equivalents to Doctorate degree holders.] 
270 2,338 
Unspecified Denotes individuals who do not report any educational 
attainments. 
4,277 - 
N  18,397 105,693 
 
As is standard practice and for a much clearer insight into the data and how they can assist this 
investigation,  the descriptive/summary statistics for the data sample used are presented below in 
Table 11: 
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Table 11: Summary/Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Table 9 (Both Years) 
   
VARIABLES  
Whole Sample Mean   
(Std Dev) 
Male Sample Mean       
(Std Dev) 
Female Sample  Mean 
(Std Dev) 
2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009 
Employment       
Employer .0558 .0273 .0622 .037 .043 .015 
 (0. 2296)  (.1629) (.2416)  (.1882) (.2023)  (.123) 
Self-Employed .3564 .4223 .4112 .393 .2882 .459 
 (.4789) (.4939) (.4921) (.4885) (.4529)  (.4983) 
Paid Worker  .3387 .2629 .3607 .318 .294 .194 
 (.4733) (.4402) (.4802) (.4656) (.4555)  (.3953) 
Unemployed .2973 .1667 .2025 .147 .415 .192 
 (.4571) (.3727) (.4019) (.3541) (.4928)  (.3937) 
Non Labour Force .1139 .1206 .0848 .105 .150 .140 
 (.3176) (.3256) (.2785) (.3068) (.3573)  (.3471) 
Education       
No ed .044 .049 .038 0.040 0.052 .06 
 (.2062)  (.2156)  (.1921)  (.1958) (.2223)  (.238) 
Low ed .315 .308 .335 0.271 .291 .354 
 (.4646)  (.4615)  (.4718)  (.4444) (.4543)  (.4783) 
Mid ed .324 .502 .375 0.518 .260 .482 
 (.4682)  (.4999)  (.4843)  (.4997) (.4388)  (.4997) 
High ed .068 .119 .086 0.142 .047 .09 
 (.2528)  (.3239)  (.2804)  (.3489) (.2114)  (.2867) 
Very high ed .01467 .022 .0204 0.030 .007 .013 
 (.1203)  (.1471)  (.1416)  (.1695) (.0860)  (.1119) 
Unspecified .232  0.145  .342  
 (.4224)  (.3516)  (.4744)   
Demographic       
Age in years 34.32 33.81 35.14 34.6 33.3 32.81 
 (13.165)  (12.064)  (13.114) (12.085)  (13.159)  (11.963)  
Married .552 .769 .501 .79 .618 .743 
 (.4972)  (.4213)  (.5) (.4072)  (.4860)  (.4371)  
Christian .634 .693 .658 .684 .604 .704 
 (.481) (.461) (.474) (.461) (.488) (.456) 
Muslim .353 .298 .329 .306 .383 .288 
 (.478) (.457) (.470) (.462) (.486) (.452) 
Geographic       
Sect1(Urban) .428 .615 .453 .615 .397 .616 
 (.4948)  (.4865)  (.4978) (.4866) (.4893) (.4864) 
Sect2(Rural) .572 .384 .547 .385 .603 .384 
 (.4948)  (.4865) (.4978) (.4866) (.4893) (.4864) 
South-East .342 .277 .350 .281 .332 .273 
 (.4743) (.4477)  (.4768) (.4495) (.4709) (.4454) 
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Table 12 Cont’d -Table 11 (Continued)   
VARIABLES 
Overall Sample Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Male Sample Mean       
(Std Dev) 
Female Sample  Mean 
(Std Dev) 
2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009 
South-West .248 .403 .259 .388 .234 .423 
 (.4319) (.4905)  (.4384) (.4872) (.4234) (.4940) 
Mid-belt .185 .16 .186 .167 .184 .152 
 (.3885) (.367) (.389) (.3728) (.3874) (.3594) 
North .224 .158 .205 .164 .25 .152 
 (.4175) (.3656)  (.403) (.3707)  (4331) (.359)  
Further Controls       
House or Land .101 .045 .089 .044 .118 .048 
 (.3022)  (.2085)  (0.2846)  (.2043)  (. 3221)  (.2137)  
LocalLanguage .675 .908 .745 .939 .590 .871 
 (.468) (.2878)  (.0.435) (.2393)  (.4919) (.3355) 
Public  .708  .689  .747 
  (.4548)  (.4628)   (.435) 
Real Sector  .087  .108  .060 
  (.2817)   (.3108)   (.2375) 
Trade Sector  .238  .164  .333 
  (.4263)  (.3706)   (.4713) 
Services Sector  .1401  .176  .095 
  (.3471)   (.3807)   (.2931) 
Lamtrent(Income) 6.973  8.511  5.057  
 (5.8607)  (5.4462)  (5.7944)  
TtConsptnHH(𝐶 ℎ)  71,496.92  50,320.64  94,743.68 
  (16,776.48)  (14,547.49)  (31,307.99) 
N  18,397   105,693 10,206 58,996 8,191 46,697 
 
Table 10 reported the educational levels/attainments of individuals surveyed. As can be seen, there 
are 4,277 individuals in 2004 with missing education values but none in 2009. The 4,277 
individuals with missing education values were included in the educational regression estimations 
with their educational status denoted as “Unspecified” to add clarity to the results. However, these 
individuals were not included in the income estimations as the Mincer regression estimation works 
better with education values. Therefore the income estimations involved a restricted data sample 
of the total respondents without the individuals who did not provide education values. This left a 
sample size of 14,120 individuals remaining from the 2004 survey.  
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Furthermore, individuals not active in the labour force (i.e. the unemployed and individuals not in 
the labour force) were removed from the sample for the income estimations as they did not (and 
indeed should not) report any incomes. Thus the income estimations (in Section 4.5) made use of 
the 10,832 individuals that were residual in employment after using the Heckman (1979) procedure 
to select the employed individuals from the entire 14,120 sample. 
 
Table 11 and its continuation on Table 12 present the summary/descriptive statistics for both years 
of the variables presented in Table 9. It shows that the nature of the sample is in line with the self-
employment literature in developing countries (Gindling and Newhouse, 2012, Fields, 2013, 
Maloney, 2003). From Table 6 we have already observed that for the working labour force, that 
the self-employed (own account) category is the biggest category of workers; this group is 
followed by the paid worker category, and finally the employer category. For individuals not in 
employment, the unemployed category is bigger than the not in labour force category.  
 
From the educational attainment dummies, it is seen that a majority of individuals reported having 
a medium degree of education. This is followed by individuals who reported having low 
educational attainments, followed in turn by individuals reporting high educational attainments. 
Those with no education at all come next, and the smallest group is those with very high 
educational attainments; the 2004 data additionally has individuals who did not specify any 
educational attainment and a dummy is also made to capture such individuals.  
 
The demographic variables indicate that the mean age of individuals in the sample is between 33 
and 34; a significant majority of the sample is also married. The geographical variables indicate 
that in the 2004 survey a majority of individuals sampled resided in rural regions/areas, while a 
majority of those sampled in the 2009 survey resided in the urban regions. These rural-urban 
differences between surveys also account for the differences in marriage rates as highlighted in the 
national statistics (NBS, 2014). 
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We can also infer that the sample is well distributed across the four regions, and see that only a 
small proportion of the sample reported being owners of houses or landed property while quite a 
significant majority report being able to speak/write in a Nigerian language. In terms of religion, 
a significant majority of individuals sampled are Christians (other reports indicate that the country 
is more or less evenly split between Christians and Muslims), followed by Muslims; agnostics and 
traditional worshippers make up about 3% of the entire sample and form the base category when 
appropriate. 
 
Finally, we observe that the 2009 sample contains a significant proportion of public 
sector/government employees; the majority of the rest of the employed workforce are in the 
trade/retail sector, followed by individuals in the services sector; and the real/manufacturing sector 
appears to be the smallest group.  As expected, there are gender differences in the summary 
statistics, and the annual income variable indicates that on average women earn slightly less than 
men, showing that a differentiation of the empirical analysis by gender would be particularly 
insightful and beneficial. 
 
The Annual Income variable “lamtrent” was calculated as follows. Some individuals reported how 
much their annual income was and this was the figure used in the estimations. Others reported 
their incomes per day, week, month, or quarter. Such individuals had their labour wages converted 
into annual incomes by multipying based on the number of days, weeks, months or quarters 
worked. Thus the annual income variable is not adjusted for hours so we don’t know whether 
women are indeed earning less than men per hour, or in productivity terms. On average, women 
appear to be in households that consume more, even though estimations later show that female 
headed households consume less than male headed households.  
 
As previously highlighted, It is important to note that the Annual Income variable “lamtrent” is 
only available from the 2004 survey data, thus the empirical analysis concerning labour wage will 
be done using only the 2004 survey data. In the same manner, the Total Household Consumption 
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variable is only available from the 2009 survey data, thus the empirical analysis concerning 
household consumption will be done using only the 2009 survey data. The 2009 survey data will 
be converted into household variables and the summary statistic presented in Table 25, section 5.8.  
 
The total household consumption amount for each household in the analysis TtConsptnHH(𝐶 ℎ) 
was derived by adding together the naira (monetary) value of total household food purchases, total 
household food produced, total sundries, and total capital expenditure by households within the 
year. As recent studies suggest that a better measure of household consumption would be the adult 
equivalent scaled consumption40 instead of the indiscriminate per-capita consumption, the thesis 
made use of both household consumption per capita and household consumption after adjusting 
for adult equivalents (Demoussis and Mihalopoulos, 2001).  
                                                          
40 Adult Equivalent Scales are measures that show how much an individual household member of a 
given sex and age contributes to the household expenditures relative to a standard household member: 
TEDFORD, J. R., CAPPS, O. & HAVLICEK, J. 1986. Adult equivalent scales once more—A 
developmental approach. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 68, 322-333.  
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3.13 VARIANCE INFLATION FACTOR (VIF) TEST 
 
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test for multicollinearity proved satisfactory by yielding 
absolute values of 2.56 and 2.32 for 2004 and 2009 respectively; the rule of thumb is that the vif 
test should yield absolute values below 10 to be satisfactory for empirical use. The results of the 
VIF test are presented below. A correlation matrix for the data is also presented in the Appendix 
section of this thesis. 
Table 13: Results of VIF Test 
Variable 
2004 2009 
VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
Unspecified 5.06 0.197733   
Mided 5.99 0.16707 
6.25 0.159904 
Lowed 5.8 0.172347 
5.24 0.190704 
Highed 2.49 0.40139 
3.3 0.302857 
Veryhighed 1.35 0.739374 
1.48 0.677347 
Southwest 2 0.498769 
2.16 0.463524 
Southeast 1.99 0.501702 
2.03 0.493797 
North 1.83 0.546927 
1.7 0.587319 
Local language 1.69 0.593254 
1.17 0.8554 
Urban 1.39 0.719644 
1.15 0.867066 
Age in years 1.35 0.738476 
1.16 0.85982 
Married 1.31 0.762277 
1.14 0.878618 
HouseorLand 1.07 0.9339 
1.02 0.983795 
Mean VIF 2.56  2.32  
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3.14 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
The summary statistics we have analysed thus crucially indicate that the data are in line with the 
self-employment literature on developing countries and also show labour market characteristics 
typical in developing countries. This chapter has also helped make clear how this thesis will use 
various variables in the data and thus interpret the results observed; it has consequently ensured 
that we can link our findings to our research aims and objectives. The VIF test and correlation 
matrix presented in the Appendix section have also ensured that our data are suitable for the 
enquiry.  
 
It will be recalled that this thesis aims to understand where the differences in labour wages and 
household consumption levels come from as they relate to employment status in developing 
countries: in other words how employment statuses (employer, paid worker or self-employed 
“own account”)  affect labour wages and household consumption. By this means, the thesis will 
also be able to infer if holding a particular employment status is disadvantageous or beneficial 
compared to another employment option. The assessments that will be engaged in are presented 
next, in the assessments section.
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CHAPTER 4: ASSESSMENTS 
 
4.1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
In this chapter the researcher will review the three assessments that will be used to fulfil the 
research objective(s) of using  one human capital indicator, education; and two welfare proxies, 
labour wage and household consumption, to understand where the differences in labour wages and 
household consumption levels come from as they relate to employment status in developing 
countries.  This chapter will thus focus on the econometric aspects of the methodologies used and 
their appropriateness for this study. The chapter is of great importance as it explains exactly how 
the researcher has conducted this investigation and come to the conclusions included. 
 
 
Figure 13: Conceptual Model (as Figure 2) 
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It will be recalled from the conceptual model that the interest of this thesis is driven by a desire 
to comprehend where in developing countries differences come from in labour wage and 
consumption vis-à-vis educational abilities, and by extension occupational statuses, . This thesis 
will explore and answer this question in three ways: 
 
1. Education: Are there patterns in educational attainment and occupational status 
probabilities? If there are indeed patterns then we might find that individuals with certain 
educational attainments are likely to be in a particular occupational group. The empirical 
analysis at this stage will thus aim to answer the question: “How does educational 
attainment affect the probability of being in any of the employment categories (employer, 
paid-employee, own account worker, unemployed or not in the labour force) in a 
developing country?” The literature on developing countries (reviewed in section 3.3.1) 
also seems to suggest that the self-employed should have lower educational attainments 
compared to paid workers. Thus this thesis focuses on education as a proxy for privilege 
in terms of skill/human capital and examines how education attainments are linked with 
occupational status.  
 
Expected Prediction: From the literature that has been surveyed in section 2.3.1, it is 
expected that as individuals become more educated in developing countries, they will opt 
for self-employment over wage work. This means that the expected pattern for the data is 
that more educated individuals will be engaged in paid work while less educated 
individuals are expected to be in self-employment. Thus hypothesis 1 seeks to address this 
inquiry.  
 
i. “Hypothesis 1”𝐻1: Educational attainments will affect the probability of belonging to an 
employment status in a developing country. 
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This way hypothesis 1 addresses the portion of the conceptual model labelled “I” which 
seeks to answer the question: “How do educational attainments affect the probability of 
belonging to any of the employment/occupational states in a developing country?”  By 
performing this analysis, the thesis aims to discover if there are patterns in educational 
attainments as they affect the occupational statuses. Precisely, the thesis aims to investigate 
if more educated individuals are to be found in self-employment or paid-employment/wage 
work.  
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2. Labour Wage: Does belonging to an occupational status influence labour wage? If it does, 
then individuals can report differing wages/incomes/earnings even if they possess the same 
characteristics and skills as their colleagues in a different occupational class.  In addition, 
the literature on developing countries (reviewed in section 2.4.1) seems to suggest that self-
employed individuals in developing countries will earn a lower labour wage compared to 
individuals in paid work, even if they have similar characteristics. To test the proposition 
that occupational status influences labour wage, and the implications this has for push or 
pulled self-employment, this thesis examines the employer, paid employment and self 
employment premiums/penalties conditional on individual characteristics. 
 
Expected Prediction: From the literature that has been surveyed in section 2.4.1, it is 
expected that self-employed individuals in developing countries will experience a labour 
wage penalty when compared to wage earners. This means that the expected pattern is that 
individuals in self-employment in the data should experience a labour wage penalty 
compared to wage earners. Thus the hypothesis 2 seeks to address this inquiry.  
 
ii. “Hypothesis 2”𝐻2: Workers experience a labour wage penalty or premium depending on 
their occupational status in a developing country. 
 
Hypothesis 2 addresses the portion of the conceptual model labelled “IIIA” which seeks to 
empirically analyse how labour wage is determined by labour force participation. By 
performing this analysis, the thesis aims to discover if there are patterns in occupational 
statuses as they affect labour wage. Precisely, the thesis aims to investigate if paid/wage 
workers typically earn more or less than self-employed individuals conditional on 
observable characteristics.  
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3. Household Consumption: Does belonging to an occupational status group have any 
implications for household consumption? If it does, then having a proportion of individuals 
belonging to an occupational group will influence the level of household consumption. 
Furthermore, the literature on developing countries (reviewed in section 2.4.3) seems to 
suggest that self-employed individuals in developing countries will be a disadvantaged 
group who consume less than those in paid employment. If the self-employed are indeed a 
disadvantaged group, they should report lower household consumption than those in paid 
employment. To test the proposition that self-employment leads to lower consumption, this 
thesis examines household consumption conditional on occupational distribution in the 
household by looking at household consumption dependent on the proportion of 
individuals in households in either paid employment/wage work or in self-employment. 
 
Expected Prediction: From the literature that has been surveyed in section 2.4.3, it is 
expected that self-employed individuals in developing countries are disadvantaged across 
a number of welfare indicators when compared to wage earners. This means that the 
expected pattern is that individuals in self-employment in the data should be worse-off in 
terms of household consumption when compared to wage earners. This also means that 
having a higher proportion of self-employed individuals in the household workforce should 
have a negative relationship with total household consumption and having a higher 
proportion of wage earning household workforce should have a positive relationship with 
total household consumption. Thus hypothesis 3 seeks to address this inquiry.  
 
 
iv. “Hypothesis 3”𝐻3: Total household consumption expenditure will depend on the 
employment status composition of employable household adults in a developing country. 
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Hypothesis 3 addresses the portion of the conceptual model labelled “IIIB” which seeks to 
determine how total household consumption41 is determined by the proportion of 
household individuals in each occupational category. By performing this analysis, the 
thesis aims to discover if having a higher proportion of a particular occupational category 
is beneficial or detrimental to household consumption.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 Household consumption in this case refers to a proxy for household welfare based on consumption and 
is measured by total household consumption per capita and adult equivalised household consumption per 
capita. 
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4.2: MODELLING 
 
It has been identified in the literature that motivations for individuals opting for occupations are 
complex and multilayered (Parker, 2004, Yamada, 1996, Reynolds, 1997, Meager, 1992, Maloney, 
2004, Maloney, 2003, Loayza, 1996, Günther and Launov, 2012, Gollin, 2008, Cunningham and 
Maloney, 2001). For example, individuals can decide to be engaged in their “hobbies” regardless 
of the returns in terms of labour wage or personal incomes, or even go through a duration of 
employment when their labour wages do not reflect their actual employment value. This thesis will 
therefore be based on the neoclassical economic principles of maximization of utility by labour 
wage/income-constrained individuals and by rational choice theory, in order to enable empirical 
inferences to be drawn. In particular, these have the following implications: 
 
1) It is assumed throughout this thesis that individuals have a rational, continuous and locally 
non-satiated preference relation, and we can take 𝑢(𝑥) to be a continuous utility function 
representing these preferences. The consumption bundle 𝑥 ∈  𝑅+
𝐿  is affordable if its total 
cost does not exceed the individual’s wealth level, i.e. if 𝑝. 𝑥 =  𝑝1𝑥1 +  … +   𝑝𝐿𝑥𝐿  ≤ 𝑤. 
Hence there is an economic-affordability constraint and the requirement that 𝑥 lies in the 
consumption set 𝑅+
𝐿 , implying the Walrasian/competitive budget set i.e. that the set of 
feasible consumption bundles consists of the elements of the set {𝑥 ∈  𝑅+
𝐿 : 𝑝. 𝑥 ≤ 𝑤}. 
(Mas-Collel et al., 1995). 
 
2) Based on these principles, the thesis observes the budget set that is available through 
income/wealth 𝑤. Hence leisure and other ‘utility’ generating activities not measurable 
through income are discarded and are not observable during these assessments. The utility 
maximization problem (UMP) can now be stated as: 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑥≥0 𝑢(𝑥) 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑝. 𝑥 ≤ 𝑤. 
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Hence the individual chooses a consumption bundle that maximises utility from income 𝑤. 
In this thesis, it is considered that individuals seek to maximise income 𝑤 (𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑤) and 
obtain the highest possible income stream so as to qualify for the dominant budget set that 
they can get. Therefore, individuals will seek to maximise income because any 
utility/satisfaction they can derive is subject to this.  
 
Also, given the von Neumann and Morgenstern (VNM) utility function, any rational 
individual should try to avoid a loss, and always prefer actions that maximise expected 
utility. Therefore in a “lottery”, where the choices are made up of labour force participation 
options, individuals should make a selection of the alternative that provides the highest 
untility. 
 
Consequently, in line with Johnson and Darnell (1976) and a much other literature, since 
utility is innately unobserved (latent) and depends on income the thesis proposes that: 
 
“Given a choice of employment options, an individual will choose the employment option 
that yields the highest monetary income.”  
 
The role of monetary rewards in influencing the choice of employment is a common 
element in the literature (Hamilton, 2000, Yun, 2000, Turnham and Jaeger, 1971, Taylor, 
1996, Smith et al., 2002, Rosen, 1981, Reize, 2004, Mandelman and Montes-Rojas, 2009, 
Le, 2002, Tamvada, 2010). 
 
 
3) From these principles, this thesis can make inferences based on income 𝑤 for individuals 
and consumption 𝐶 for households, as long as the concepts of rationality and utility 
maximization are followed in both cases. 
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4.3: EDUCATION 
 
 
Figure 14: Conceptual Model (Education and Labour Force Participation) 
 
As previously highlighted in 2.3.1, the main contribution of the first empirical estimation section 
of this thesis is that the researcher uses an emphasis on human capital, in particular educational 
attainment and its association with labour force participation. 
 
4.3.1: METHODOLOGY 1.1: EDUCATION – MULTINOMIAL PROBIT 
 
To test the proposition that there are patterns in educational attainment and occupational status, 
thereby focusing on education as a proxy for privilege in terms of skill/human capital; this thesis 
distinguishes between various occupational statuses i.e. employers, paid workers, self-employed 
(own account) individuals, the unemployed and those employable individuals who are not in the 
labour force, following  the literature (Earle and Sakova, 1999, Tamvada, 2010, Mandelman and 
Montes-Rojas, 2009)). Consequently, it makes use of a multinomial probit equation [5.1] as 
follows: 
Pr(𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 = 0,1,2,3 | 𝑋) =  𝜙 (𝑋′𝛽)                                           
   𝑃(𝑂𝑖 = 0, 1,2,3 |𝑋) = 𝑃(𝑥′𝑖𝐸 + 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑋 + 𝑒𝑖 > 0|𝑥)   [5.1] 
 
Labour Force Participation 
• Paid Work  
• Employer/Firm owner 
• Self-employed 
• Unemployed 
• Not in labour force  
Educational 
Attainment 
 I 
154 
 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜙 is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, 𝑋′ is a vector 
of explanatory/control variables already discussed in section 4.12 and 𝛽 is a vector of parameters. 
In this analysis, Oi is the employment status of individual i. 
O  { “Non Active” =  0 For individuals unemployed or not in the labour force, 
“Paid Worker” = 1 For paid workers, 
“Ordinary Self-Employed” = 2 For self-employed “own account” workers,  
 and  
“Employer” = 3 For employers}. 
 
Also, the explanatory variable E is a vector that includes the different levels of education, X  is 
once again a vector of control variables already discussed in section 4.12, and e is the error term.  
Specifically, variable E includes dummies for the categories of people based on their 
educational attainments.  
“Noed” = 1 If the individual has no education at all. 
“Lowed” = 1 For individuals with a low degree of education. These range from primary 
school to Junior Secondary Certificate holders.  
“Mided” = 1 For individuals with a moderate degree of education. These range from Senior 
Secondary Certificate holders to Nursing School graduates. 
“Highed” = 1 For individuals with a high degree of education. These range from B.Sc 
holders/First Degree University holders to professional certificate holders. 
“Veryhighed” = 1 For individuals with very high educational attainments. These range 
from Master’s degree holders and the equivalents to Doctorate degree holders. 
“Unspecified” = 1 For individuals who do not report any educational attainments. 
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Variable X includes variables that are common determinants of choices for occupational status 
according to the literature. They are: age, marital status, sector (urban or rural), credit constraints 
(a proxy dummy equal to 1 if the individual owns a house or land – common collateral asked for 
by banks and other lending institutions), being able to speak the local language (which might be 
useful for transactions and is a sign of social capital) and region of country.  
 
How exactly will this help to answer the first research question; “Are there patterns in educational 
attainments and occupational status?” Because if such patterns exist, then research might find that 
individuals with certain educational attainments are more likely to be in a particular occupational 
group.  
 
If employers are indeed highly successful individuals with opportunity sets that are very different 
from the other self-employed “own account” individuals (or indeed even those in wage 
employment), theory should expect employer status to be associated with higher educational 
attainments, indicating pull self-employment. This is especially so if the likelihood of being an 
ordinary self-employed (own account) individual is higher for individuals with lower levels of 
education. 
 
Empirically, the multinomial probit model is mathematically and functionally similar to a 
multinomial logit model except that like the simple probit model the multinomial probit uses the 
CDF of the standard normal distribution, while the multinomial logit uses the cdf of the logistic 
distribution in line with the simple logit model. Though the multinomial logit model is simpler, it 
also makes the often erroneous assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The 
multinomial probit is computationally more intensive, but does not assume IIA. For our purpose 
therefore, the multinomial probit model is better, as highlighted and used by Klapper et al. (2010), 
not only because it does not assume IIA but also because it reports the same marginal effects as 
the multinomial logit model; and the coefficients are different to the multinomial logit only by a 
scale factor.  
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Thus the empirical analysis and use of the multinomial probit model [5.1] at this stage will answer 
the question; “How does educational attainment affect the probability of being in any of the 
employment states (not in the labour force, paid-employee, own account worker or employer) in a 
developing country?  
 
The first empirical model was adapted from Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2009) and is standard in the 
self-employment probability literature.  As for econometric issues, tests for multicollinearity 
proved satisfactory. For robustness checks, the regression was run on different samples by gender 
and region, with satisfactory results that will be presented later in the “results” section. 
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4.3.2: METHODOLOGY 1.2: EDUCATION – SIMPLE PROBIT 
 
An element of this thesis is to observe if individuals in self-employment are to be associated with 
higher or lower levels of human capital, and by implication infer if they are advantaged or not 
compared to those in paid work. Following Rees and Shah (1986) and Demirgüc-Kunt et al (2009), 
this thesis proposes that the likelihood of being self-employed depends on education attainment 
and the control variables already defined, compared to individuals in paid work. It thus makes use 
of a probit analysis regression specification given by: 
 
𝑃(𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 1 |𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑥′𝑖𝐸 + 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑋 + 𝑒𝑖 > 0|𝑥)      [5.2] 
 
 
Where Selfemp is a binary indicator of employment status that takes the value one (1) for self 
employed individuals (whether employer or “own account workers”) and zero (0) for individuals 
in paid work/wage employment. (Note that in this estimation, persons who are non-active i.e the 
unemployed and individuals not in the labour force are by implication not included in this 
analysis).  
 
E is the vector that includes the different levels of education, X is a vector of control variables, and 
e is the error term. We estimate Equation [5.1] using a probit model Pr(𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 1 | 𝑋) =
 𝜙 (𝑋′𝛽) . If self-employment in Nigeria is largely characterized by push self-employment, then it 
would be reasonable to expect that the likelihood of being self-employed would be higher for 
people with low levels of education (and hence fewer choices or opportunities) and lower for those 
with high levels of education.  
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4.3.3: METHODOLOGY 1.2: EDUCATIONAL GENDER DIFFERENCES – BLINDER-OAXACA 
MULTIVARIATE DECOMPOSITION 
 
Finally, as suggested already, educational attainments and occupational statuses could have 
distinguishable patterns, and gender could affect such patterns, it would be of assistance to 
empirically investigate what would happen to the probability of being self-employed if men and 
women had the same endowments and coefficients in education. The final method applied here 
thus compares the incidence of self-employment using gender as a means of evaluation, making 
use of a Blinder-Oaxaca Multivariate decomposition for binary models proposed by Yun (2000) 
and expanded by Powers et al. (2011).  
 
This thesis thus makes use of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analysis to estimate the difference 
in self-employment incidence dependent on endowment differences between men and women; the 
foundation of the Blinder-Oaxaca specification occurs where the dependent variable is a function 
of a linear combination of predictors and the regression coefficients: 
 
𝑌 = 𝐹(𝑋𝛽) 
 
Where 𝑌 denotes the  𝑁 × 1 dependent variable vector (occupational status), 𝑋 is an 𝑁 × 𝐾 
matrix of independent variables (the same ones used in our previous estimations), and 𝛽 is a 𝐾 ×
1 vector of coefficients. 𝐹(. ) is any once-differentiable function mapping a linear combination of 
𝑋 (𝑋𝛽) to 𝑌.  
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The mean difference in  𝑌 between groups A and B (in our case based on gender) for binary choice 
models such as the probit model used in this case can be decomposed as: 
 
      𝑌𝐴 −  𝑌𝐵 = ɸ(𝑋𝐴𝛽𝐴) −  ɸ(𝑋𝐵𝛽𝐵)                                            
= [ɸ(𝑋𝐴𝛽𝐴) − ɸ(𝑋𝐵𝛽𝐴)]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + [ɸ(𝑋𝐵𝛽𝐴) − ɸ(𝑋𝐵𝛽𝐵)]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
 Endowments/Characteristics      Coefficients 
= ∑ 𝑊∆𝑋
𝑘𝐾
𝑘=1  [ɸ(𝑋𝐴𝛽𝐴) − ɸ(𝑋𝐵𝛽𝐴)]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + ∑ 𝑊∆𝛽
𝑘𝐾
𝑘=1  [ɸ(𝑋𝐵𝛽𝐴) − ɸ(𝑋𝐵𝛽𝐵)]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  [5.3] 
 
This is done for both years and completes the educational assessments that this thesis will engage 
in; and as a result the first econometric assessment is made up of three parts: 
 
(a) Multinomial Probit Model to show the probability for the various occupational statuses i.e 
non-active, paid worker, self-employed (own account worker) and employer, based on 
observed characteristics, particularly educational attainments - Eqn [5.1]. 
(b) Simple Probit Model to show the probability of being self-employed, based on observed 
characteristics, particularly on educational attainments (the same variables in the 
multinomial probit model) - Eqn [5.2]. 
(c) Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analysis, subjecting both male and female means to the 
same conditions to find out how much of the self-employment incidence disparity between 
genders is due to differences in educational endowments - Eqn [5.3]
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4.4: RESULTS OF ASSESSMENT 1 - EDUCATION 
 
In the first assessment the thesis aims to explore how human capital, in terms of educational 
attainment, is linked with labour force participation. The bar charts below show the educational 
endowments for employers and paid workers from both years surveyed: 
 
Figure 15: Educational Attainment for 2004 and 2009; Employers and Paid Workers 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: 0= Unspecified. 1 = No ed. 2 = Low ed. 3= Mid ed. 4 = High ed.  5=Very high ed. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 above is a graphical representation of the educational attainments for employers and 
paid workers from the 2004 and 2009 surveys. As the figures indicate, there is clearly a discernible 
trend for both years, as a majority of both employers and paid workers are located at the ‘higher 
education (High ed)’ and ‘very high education’ (Very high ed) ends of the educational distribution 
i.e. the right hand side of the graphs. As can also be inferred from the bar charts in Figure 15, 
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employers and paid workers have similar educational distributions which are quite substantial; 
these are individuals typically with at least a university degree. 
 
Clearly there is an observable trend in both surveys. Figure 15 indicates that employers tend to be 
educated on average to high levels, as are paid workers. This seems to be rational and supports 
economic theory especially as the literature suggests that wage/paid workers would need such 
educational qualifications as a signal to their prospective employers to prove that they are suitable 
for employment. As for employers, the current literature seems to imply that they too would need 
some degree of expertise in their business to facilitate success, but this may be less closely related 
to educational input.  
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Figure 16 below is a graphical representation of the educational atainments for self employed (own 
account), unemployed and  non-labour force individuals from the 2004 and 2009 surveys: 
 
Figure 16: Educational Attainments for 2004 and 2009; Self-Employed, Unemployed & Non-
Labour Force 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: 0= Unspecified. 1 = No ed. 2 = Low ed. 3= Mid ed. 4 = High ed.  5=Very high ed. 
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Figure 16 shows the educational endowments for self-employed (own account), unemployed and 
non-labour force individuals for both 2004 and 2009. Once again there is clearly a discernible 
trend, as a majority of individuals holding these occupational statuses are located at the 
‘unspecified’, ‘no education’, ‘low education’ and ‘medium education’ ends of the educational 
distribution i.e. the left hand side of the graphs. Although the thesis finds that some individuals 
who can be classed as non-labour force in 2009 do have high educational attainments, these are a 
minority. 
 
As can also be inferred from the bar charts in Figure 16, self-employed (own account), unemployed 
and non-labour force individuals have different patterns in educational attainments when compared 
to employers and paid workers. Conspicuously, there is once again an observable trend in both 
surveys. Information from the surveys indicates that employers and paid workers tend to be 
educated on average to high levels (with a positively skewed graph) unlike self-employed “own 
account”, unemployed and non-labour force individuals, who tend to be educated on average to 
low levels (with a negatively skewed graph).  
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4.4.1: RESULTS 1.1: EDUCATION – MULTINOMIAL PROBIT 
 
As discussed in section 5.3.1, to test the proposition that there are patterns in educational 
attainments and occupational status, thereby focusing on education as a proxy of privilege in terms 
of skill/human capital, this thesis distinguishes between various occupational statuses i.e. 
employers, paid workers, self - employed (own account) individuals, the unemployed and 
employable individuals who are not in the labour force. It makes use of a multinomial probit 
equation [5.1] to distinguish these groups as follows: 
 
Pr(𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 = 0,1,2,3 | 𝑋) =  𝜙 (𝑋′𝛽)                                           
   𝑃(𝑂𝑖 = 0, 1,2,3 |𝑋) = 𝑃(𝑥′𝑖𝐸 + 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑋 + 𝑒𝑖 > 0|𝑥)   [5.1] 
 
Where 𝜙 is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, 𝑋′ is a vector 
of explanatory/control variables already discussed in section 4.12, and 𝛽 is a vector of parameters. 
 
In this analysis Oi is the employment status of individual i,  
O  {  “Non Active” =  0  For individuals unemployed or not in the labour force, 
“Paid Worker” = 1  For paid workers, 
“Ordinary Self-Employed” = 2  For self-employed “own account” workers,  
 and  
“Employer” = 3  For employers}. 
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The base outcome for this multinomial probit regression was the paid worker sample; the category 
of educational attainment that was left out of this estimation is the ‘no education’ category, for 
marriage it is ‘unmarried’, for region it is the ‘middle-belt’ of the country, for language it is those 
who do not speak a Nigerian language and for sector it is the rural sector. 
 
All standard errors in regressions were clustered by households, and the population weights 
supplied in the survey were applied. 
 
The results of estimation [5.1] on the 2004 survey are presented next:  
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Table 14: Results of Multinomial Probit Analysis [5.1] [Marginal Effects] - 2004 Survey 
 Male Female 
Independent 
Variables: 
Non Active 
1 
Paid Work 
2 
Self-Employed 
3 
Employer 
4 
Non Active 
5 
Paid Work 
6 
Self-Employed 
7 
Employer 
8 
Age in years -0.157*** 0.0712*** 0.0719*** 0.0139*** -0.120*** 0.0415*** 0.0741*** 0.00453*** 
 (0.00802) (0.00718) (0.00722) (0.00214) (0.00770) (0.00313) (0.00676) (0.000713) 
Age (squared) 0.00173*** -0.00076*** -0.000818*** -0.00015*** 0.00127*** -0.0005*** -0.000765*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.000102) (-0.00008) (-0.00008) (-0.00002) (0.000101) (-0.00004) (-0.00008) (-0.00009) 
Urban -0.0246 0.0351 0.00232 -0.0129 -0.0477 -0.000887 0.0486* -0.00006 
 (0.0383) (0.0296) (0.0262) (0.00855) (0.0291) (0.0120) (0.0261) (0.00281) 
Unspecified 0.0961 -0.0720 -0.00167 -0.0224*** 0.112* -0.0177 -0.0994** 0.00524 
 (0.0908) (0.0642) (0.0767) (0.00807) (0.0600) (0.0288) (0.0489) (0.0113) 
Low ed -0.00260 0.158** -0.148** -0.00761 -0.0479 0.0598 -0.0503 0.0384 
 (0.0639) (0.0726) (0.0597) (0.0143) (0.0677) (0.0436) (0.0475) (0.0262) 
Mid ed 0.0776 0.230*** -0.306*** -0.00122 -0.135* 0.225*** -0.135*** 0.0455** 
 (0.0634) (0.0673) (0.0604) (0.0160) (0.0745) (0.0654) (0.0415) (0.0680) 
High ed 0.129 0.319*** -0.449*** 0.000642 -0.308*** 0.456*** -0.222*** 0.0735* 
 (0.0863) (0.0822) (0.0276) (0.0176) (0.107) (0.107) (0.0217) (0.0549) 
Very high ed -0.0621 0.443*** -0.409*** 0.0282 -0.512*** 0.634*** -0.245*** 0.123 
 (0.0919) (0.0867) (0.0233) (0.0370) (0.121) (0.141) (0.0166) (0.111) 
Married -0.361*** 0.0992*** 0.244*** 0.0183** -0.119*** 0.00823 0.114*** -0.00305 
 (0.0304) (0.0329) (0.0345) (0.00715) (0.0300) (0.0139) (0.0238) (0.00395) 
House or land 0.0572 -0.0701*** 0.00257 0.0104 0.0229 -0.00127 -0.0156 -0.00605** 
 (0.0393) (0.0263) (0.0315) (0.0103) (0.0291) (0.0150) (0.0254) (0.00257) 
Locallanguage 0.00439 -0.0230 0.0158 0.00279 -0.0622 0.0208 0.0352 0.00615 
 (0.0359) (0.0337) (0.0376) (0.00709) (0.0381) (0.0166) (0.0324) (0.00424) 
South-East 0.0391 -0.0865*** 0.0729* -0.0255*** -0.229*** 0.0385* 0.198*** -0.00755** 
 (0.0429) (0.0327) (0.0381) (0.00776) (0.0392) (0.0218) (0.0419) (0.00323) 
South-West 0.00503 -0.0720*** 0.0817** -0.0147 -0.269*** 0.0400* 0.232*** -0.00390 
 (0.0377) (0.0275) (0.0348) (0.00898) (0.0329) (0.0232) (0.0342) (0.00464) 
North 0.0118 0.0167 -0.0504 0.0218 0.274*** -0.0228 -0.246*** -0.00519 
 (0.0364) (0.0306) (0.0361) (0.0158) (0.0280) (0.0193) (0.0228) (0.00416) 
N 10,206 10,206 10,206 10,206 8,191 8,191 8,191 8,191 
Log-pseudo 
likelihood 
-56425771 -54282972 -54081612 -54081132 -45092930 -43684483 -43624372 -43623821 
Frequency 2,932 2,624 4,197 453 4,633 1,045 2,361 152 
Wald (Prob > 
chi2) 
7281.91*** 7281.91*** 7281.91*** 7281.91*** 3108.79*** 3108.79*** 3108.79*** 3108.79*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1: Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
 
Table 14 reveals that the Prob (chi2) (which is the probability of obtaining the chi-square statistic 
given that the null hypothesis is true) is statistically significant; and the log-pseudo likelihoods for 
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all the samples are comparable. Specifically, the Wald chi-square statistics, which are all 
significant at the 1 percent level, indicate that the regression specification is meaningful.  
 
The regression results indicate the following across genders: age and educational attainment are 
consistently significant factors that influence the probability of being in an occupational status. 
Most relevant for this thesis, the educational variables are highly significant in predicting the 
probability of being in any of the employment states. The probability of being self-employed tends 
to fall as educational attainment increases and conversely, the probability of being in paid work 
tends to increase as educational attainments increase. This is consistent with a plethora of literature 
on self-employment and educational attainments (Maloney, 2004, Van der Sluis et al., 2008, 
Casson, 2005, Le, 2002).  
 
Column 2 shows that compared to male individuals in 2004 who have no education at all, males 
in the same year who possess a low degree of education are 15.8% more likely to be paid workers, 
and those who have a medium level of education are 30.8% more likely to be in paid work. For 
the highly educated, the probability of being in paid work compared to the non-educated increases 
by 31.9%; and for the very highly educated it is higher by 44%. This confirms our findings from 
Figure 15 and shows that as educational attainments increase, individuals are more likely to be in 
paid work. 
 
Compared to paid workers, Column 3 indicates that males in 2004 who are in self-employment are 
14.8% less likely have a low degree of education (by our definitions), and those who have a 
medium level of education are 30.6% less likely to be in self-employment. For the highly educated, 
the probability of being self-employed drops by 44% and for the very highly educated it is lower 
by 40.9%, meaning that the more educational attainments individuals possess, the less  likely they 
are to be self-employed.  
 
Column 1, which represents those individuals non-active in the labour force, has educational 
marginal effects that are mostly insignificant, while Column 4 shows that for male employers in 
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2004; most of the educational variables are insignificant except that individuals who did not 
specify an education are significantly unlikely to be employers. 
  
Column 5 shows that for females in the 2004 survey compared to paid female workers, the 
probability of being part of the non active workforce decreases as educational attainments increase. 
Females in 2004 who possess a medium degree of education are 13.5%  less likely to be non active 
members of the labour force and those who have a high degree of education are 30.8% less likely 
to be non active workers. The probability of being a non-active female workers drops by 51.2% 
for the very highly educated, confirming that the lower the educational attainments of females in 
the survey, the more likely they are to be non-active members of the workforce.  
 
Column 6 shows that compared to female individuals in 2004 who have no education at all, females 
in the same year who possess a medium degree of education are 22.5% more likely to be paid 
workers and those who have a high level of education are 45.6% more likely to be in paid work. 
For the very highly educated females in 2004, the probability of being in paid work compared to 
the non-educated increases by 63.4%, and confirms that as educational attainments increase, 
female individuals in the 2004 survey are more likely to be in paid work. 
 
 Column 7 indicates that females in 2004 who are in self-employment, compared to paid workers, 
are 13.5% less likely have a medium degree of education, those who have a high level of education 
are 22.2% less likely to be in self-employment, and for the very highly educated the probability of 
being self-employed compared to being in the paid group drops by 24.5%. This means that the 
more educational attainments female individuals possess, the less likely they are to be self-
employed.  
 
Column 8 shows that for female employers in 2004, only the medium (4.5%) and highly educated 
(7.3%) variables are significant at the 5 and 10 percent levels respectively; this implies that female 
employers in 2004 have a sizeable probability of having significant educational attainments. 
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The control variables used do not reveal any distinctive patterns. As a whole, the regression 
estimates from this assessment seem to indicate that the higher the educational attainment of 
individuals, the lower the probability of being in self-employment. Estimates show that more 
educated individuals are either in wage employment or are employers; this implies that some 
measure of education might be needed to move to these occupational statuses. This is especially 
true for females, and would seem to highlight that the kind of “own account self-employment” 
found in this survey in line with literature is mostly pushed self-employment. Individuals with high 
educational skills are opting away from the self-employment category.  
 
Next, the thesis will perform the same assessment [5.1] on the 2009 survey data in Table 15. 
 
As before, the base outcome for this multinomial probit regression was the paid worker sample. 
The category of educational attainment that was left out of this estimation is the ‘no education’ 
'category (an estimation leaving out the ‘high education’ category is provided in the appendix 
section as a robustness check), for marriage it is ‘unmarried’, for region it is the mid-belt of the 
country, for language it is those who do not speak a Nigerian language and for sector it is the rural 
sector. 
  
The results of estimation [5.1] on the 2009 survey are presented next:  
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Table 15: Results of Multinomial Probit Analysis [5.1] [Marginal Effects] -2009 Survey 
 Male Female 
Independent 
Variables: 
Non Active 
1 
Paid Work 
2 
Self-Employed 
3 
Employer 
4 
Non Active 
5 
Paid Work 
6 
Self-Employed 
7 
Employer 
8 
Age in years -0.0846*** 0.0403*** 0.0431*** 0.00132 -0.0901*** 0.0364*** 0.0523*** 0.00146*** 
 (0.00164) (0.00191) (0.00210) (0.000873) (0.00200) (0.00150) (0.00216) (0.000489) 
Age (squared) 0.000936*** -0.00042*** -0.00051*** -0.00009 0.00094*** -0.0004*** -0.000533*** -0.00009 
 (-0.00002) (-0.00002) (-0.00002) (-0.00001) (-0.00002) (-0.00001) (-0.00002) (-0.00005) 
Urban 0.0181*** -0.0474*** 0.0352*** -0.00596** 0.0492*** -0.00813 -0.0468*** 0.00570*** 
 (0.00556) (0.00670) (0.00722) (0.00262) (0.00735) (0.00597) (0.00802) (0.00184) 
Low ed -0.0587*** -0.0415** 0.0916*** 0.00858 -0.0446*** -0.0274** 0.0658*** 0.00621 
 (0.0137) (0.0169) (0.0171) (0.00850) (0.0149) (0.0134) (0.0161) (0.00605) 
Mid ed -0.0263* 0.127*** -0.117*** 0.0161** -0.0319** 0.164*** -0.139*** 0.00645 
 (0.0150) (0.0167) (0.0168) (0.00744) (0.0153) (0.0133) (0.0160) (0.00527) 
High ed 0.0709*** 0.331*** -0.412*** 0.00950 0.0262 0.474*** -0.516*** 0.0160* 
 (0.0190) (0.0209) (0.0115) (0.00875) (0.0209) (0.0230) (0.00845) (0.00975) 
Very high ed 0.0203 0.335*** -0.367*** 0.0116 -0.0353 0.539*** -0.485*** 0.0193*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0256) (0.0150) (0.0116) (0.0308) (0.0328) (0.0113) (0.00140) 
Married -0.275*** 0.0434*** 0.189*** 0.0426*** -0.221*** -0.0004 0.208*** 0.0135*** 
 (0.00912) (0.00970) (0.0102) (0.00210) (0.00944) (0.00803) (0.00954) (0.00146) 
House or land 0.0761*** -0.0285* -0.0408** -0.00682 0.0693*** -0.0163 -0.0441** -0.0088*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0149) (0.0173) (0.00531) (0.0178) (0.0124) (0.0178) (0.00219) 
Locallanguage -0.0342*** 0.0485*** -0.0194 0.00510 0.00427 0.132*** -0.150*** 0.0139*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0138) (0.00449) (0.0116) (0.00604) (0.0116) (0.00185) 
South-East 0.00645 -0.109*** 0.0861*** 0.0162*** 0.0173 -0.0116 0.00855 -0.0142*** 
 (0.00827) (0.00934) (0.0107) (0.00454) (0.0115) (0.00840) (0.0119) (0.00244) 
South-West -0.00796 -0.122*** 0.0624*** 0.0675*** -0.0276** -0.0824*** 0.118*** -0.00769** 
 (0.00757) (0.00961) (0.0104) (0.00464) (0.0109) (0.00770) (0.0113) (0.00363) 
North -0.00745 -0.00893 -0.0611*** 0.0775*** 0.289*** -0.0177** -0.257*** -0.0152*** 
 (0.00902) (0.0103) (0.0116) (0.00815) (0.0144) (0.00857) (0.0128) (0.00168) 
N 58,996 58,996 58,996 58,996 46,697 46,697 46,697 46,697 
Log-pseudo 
likelihood 
-35236664 -34885114 -34857172 -34857005 -24498432 -24727632 -24690906 -24648901 
Frequency 14,877 18,741 23,209 2,169 15,496 9,050 21,434 717 
Wald (Prob > 
chi2) 
12206.1*** 12206.1*** 12206.1*** 12206.1*** 10089*** 10089*** 10089*** 10089*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1: Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
 
Once again, Table 15 reveals that the Prob (chi2)  is statistically significant; and the log-pseudo 
likelihoods for all the samples are comparable. This applies particularly to the Wald chi-square 
statistics, which are all significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that the regression specification 
is meaningful.  
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The regression results indicate the following. Once more, across genders, age and educational 
attainment are consistently significant factors that influence the probability of being in an 
occupational status. Particularly, as proposed in the research objectives, the educational variables 
are highly significant in predicting the probability of holding any of the employment statuses. The 
probability of being self-employed tends to fall as educational attainment increases and conversely, 
the probability of being in paid work tends to increase as educational attainments increase. This is 
consistent with the results from the 2004 survey and a large body of literature on self-employment 
and educational attainments. 
 
Column 2 shows that compared to male individuals in 2009 who have no education at all, males 
in the same year who have a medium level of education are 12.7% more likely to be in paid work. 
For the highly educated, the probability of being in paid work, compared to the non-educated, 
increases by 33.1%; and for the very highly educated it is higher by 33.5%. This confirms our 
findings from Table 14 and the 2004 survey thereby showing that as educational attainments 
increase, individuals are more likely to be in paid work. 
 
Column 3 indicates that males in 2009 who are in self-employment compared to paid workers,  are 
9% more likely have a low degree of education (by our definitions), and  those who have a medium 
level of education are 11.7% less likely to be in self-employment. For the highly educated, the 
probability of being self-employed, compared to the paid non-educated group, drops by 41.2% 
;and for the very highly educated it is lower by 36.7%. This  means that once again, the more 
educational attainments individuals possess, the less likely they are to be self-employed.  
 
Column 4 also shows that for male employers in 2009, most of the educational variables are non-
significant/insignificant, except for the medium education variable that is significant at the 5% 
level;and  with a positive value, indicating 1.6% additional probability for male employers in this 
survey to have a medium level of education. 
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Column 5 shows that for females in the 2009 survey, compared to paid female workers, the 
probability of being part of the non-active workforce decreases as educational attainments 
increase. Females in 2009 who possess a low degree of education are 4.5%  less likely to be non- 
active members of the labour force; and those who have a medium degree of education are 3.2% 
less likely to be non-active workers. 
 
Column 6 shows that compared to female individuals in 2009 who have no education at all, females 
in 2009 who possess a medium degree of education are 16.4%  more likely to be paid workers and 
those who have a high level of education are 47.4% more likely to be in paid work. For the very 
highly educated females in 2009, the probability of being in paid work compared to the non-
educated increases by 53.9%, and confirms that as educational attainments increase, female 
individuals in the 2009 survey are more likely to be in paid work. 
 
Compared to paid workers, Column 7 indicates that females in 2009 who are in self-employment 
are 13.9% less likely have a medium degree of education (by our definitions), those who have a 
high level of education are 51.6% less likely to be in self-employment; and for the very highly 
educated, the probability of being self-employed compared to being in the paid group drops by 
48.5%. This means that the more educational attainments female individuals possess, the less 
likely they are to be self-employed.  
 
Column 8 shows that for female employers in 2009, only the highly educated (1.6%) and very 
highly educated (1.93%) variables are significant at the 5 and 1 percent levels respectively; this 
implies that female employers in 2009 have a considerable probability of having significant 
educational attainments. 
 
The control variables used do not reveal any distinctive patterns except that self-employed 
individuals tend to be married, and the ability to speak a local language does not seem to have a 
positive relationship with self-employment status. On the contrary, paid workers appear to have a 
significantly higher probability of being speakers of the local language. 
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To summarise, the regression estimates from this assessment seem to indicate that the higher the 
educational attainment of individuals, the lower the probability of being in self-employment. More 
educated individuals are either in wage employment or are employers implying that some measure 
of education might be needed to move to these occupational statuses. This is especially true for 
females, and would seem to highlight that the kind of “own account self-employment” found in 
this survey consistent with literature is mostly pushed self-employment, as individuals with high 
educational skills are opting away from the self-employment category.  
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4.4.2: RESULTS 1.2: EDUCATION – SIMPLE PROBIT 
 
As discussed in section 2.3.1, since an intention of this thesis is to observe if individuals in self-
employment are to be associated with higher or lower levels of human capital, and by implication 
infer if they are advantaged or not compared to those in paid work, this thesis thus makes use of a 
probit analysis regression specification given by: 
 
𝑃(𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 1 |𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑥′𝑖𝐸 + 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑋 + 𝑒𝑖 > 0|𝑥)      [5.2] 
 
 
Where Selfemp is a binary indicator of employment status that takes the value one (1) for self 
employed individuals (whether employer or “own account workers”) and zero (0) for individuals 
in paid work/wage employment (Note that here those who are non-active i.e the unemployed and 
those not in the labour force are by implication not included in this analysis).  
 
E is the vector that includes the different levels of education, X is a vector of control variables, and 
e is the error term. All regressions were clustered by households and population weights supplied 
in the survey were used. 
 
The Wald chi-square statistics, which are significant at the 1 percent level, indicate that the 
regression specification is meaningful. The Pseudo R-squared shows that both samples give a good 
fit. The R-squared in this case and especially for both years of the female samples at 22 % are 
better than the R-squared of Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2009); and those of the male sample at 15 % 
and 11 % are quite reasonable. This is further supported by the significance of the regression 
estimates, in particular for the education variables, which are all almost significant at the 1 percent 
level. The results of estimation [5.2] on both the 2004 and 2009 surveys are presented below; 
 
Table 16: Results of Simple Probit Analysis [Marginal Effects] 
175 
 
Independent 
Variable 
 
Male Sample 
2004 
1 
Female Sample 
2004 
2 
Male Sample 
2009 
3 
Female Sample 
2009 
4 
Age in years -0.0324*** -0.0439*** -0.0115 -0.00780 
 (0.0122) (0.0130) (0.00718) (0.00640) 
Age (squared) 0.000313** 0.000496*** 0.00009 0.00009 
 (0.000141) (0.000162) (0.00008) (0.00008) 
Urban -0.0187 0.0375 0.0549** -0.0341* 
 (0.0287) (0.0395) (0.0236) (0.0205) 
Unspecified 0.0897 -0.0332   
 (0.0783) (0.0956)   
Low ed -0.190** -0.206** 0.0713 0.0536 
 (0.0807) (0.104) (0.0471) (0.0373) 
Mid ed -0.348*** -0.512*** -0.155*** -0.212*** 
 (0.0772) (0.0908) (0.0437) (0.0421) 
High ed -0.546*** -0.682*** -0.461*** -0.684*** 
 (0.0356) (0.0490) (0.0406) (0.0313) 
Very high ed -0.524*** -0.706*** -0.423*** -0.661*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0193) (0.0560) (0.0355) 
Married 0.0494 0.0863** 0.0123 0.0730** 
 (0.0476) (0.0399) (0.0397) (0.0337) 
House or land 0.0377 -0.0127 0.00542 0.0101 
 (0.0341) (0.0476) (0.0166) (0.0226) 
LocalLanguage 0.0206 -0.0114 -0.0397 -0.191*** 
 (0.0413) (0.0531) (0.0412) (0.0190) 
South-East 0.135*** 0.0442 0.120*** 0.0161 
 (0.0445) (0.0551) (0.0418) (0.0310) 
South-West 0.120*** 0.0671 0.0777** 0.126*** 
 (0.0376) (0.0598) (0.0396) (0.0336) 
North -0.0766* -0.183** -0.0508 -0.0913** 
 (0.0444) (0.0929) (0.0419) (0.0416) 
N 7,274 3,558 44,119 31,201 
Log-pseudo 
likelihood 
-28860396 -14908950 -17654502 -9935626.1 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.22 0.11 0.22 
Wald x2 440.47*** 306.24*** 377.77*** 798.18*** 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01: Standard Errors in Parentheses.  
 
 
Table 16 above shows the results of estimation [5.2] on both the 2004 and 2009 surveys. The 
category of educational attainment that was left out of this estimation is ‘no education’, for 
marriage it is ‘unmarried’, for region it is the mid-belt of the country and for sector, it is the rural 
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sector. The results indicate that the probability of being in self-employment falls as educational 
attainment increases, especially for women. These regression estimates and standard errors are 
robust and consistent with different variations of the estimation.   
 
The regression results indicate the following. First, in both years and across genders, age and 
educational attainment are the most consistently significant factors that influence the probability 
of being either self-employed or an employer. The educational variables are highly significant in 
predicting the probability of being in any of the employment states. The probability of being self-
employed tends to fall as educational attainment increases. This agrees with (Maloney, 2004, Van 
der Sluis et al., 2008, Casson, 2005, Le, 2002).  
 
Column 1 indicates that males in 2004 who possess a low degree of education are 19% less likely 
to be in self-employment, compared to those who are not educated, and those who have a medium 
level of education are 34.8% less likely to be in self-employment. For the highly educated, the 
probability of being self-employed compared to the non-educated drops to 54.6% and for the very 
highly educated it is lower by 52.4%.  
 
Column 3 shows that for males in 2009, the same pattern is observed generally, apart from the low 
education variable, which becomes positive but insignificant in this survey. However, men who 
have a medium amount of education are 15.5% less likely to be in self-employment compared to 
those with no education. For the highly educated and very highly educated, the figures are 46.1% 
and 42.3% respectively, highlighting the negative relationship in general between self-
employment and education for males.  
 
For females in both years surveyed the same pattern is repeated. Column 2 indicates that compared 
to females who have no education, those with low, medium, high and very high educational 
attainments are 20.6%, 51.2%, 68.2% and 70.6 % less likely to be in self-employment respectively. 
Column 4 repeats that pattern for 2009, with female medium, highly and very highly educated 
individuals being 21.2%, 68.4% and 66.1 % respectively less likely than the non-educated to be in 
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self-employment.  
 
Second, Mid ed (Medium Educational Level) is crucial across genders in both surveys and seems 
to be the traditional turning point where self-employment becomes negatively correlated with 
education, indicating that individuals need at least some basic form of education to move into paid 
employment.  
 
Also for women the effects of education are more pronounced especially as educational levels 
increase. Women who are highly and very highly educated are the most probable not to be self-
employed for both years. For men the educational influences on employment choice are smoother 
and more uniform, whereas for women these effects are jerkier. Education is thus very significant 
in determining employment statuses. 
 
The control variables are as expected in the literature, with marriage being significant for women 
in the survey; the literature review has already revealed the findings of Maloney (2004) in Latin 
America that married women seemed to move more into self-employment so as to enable them 
to be able to perform household- related tasks at their own time/leisure. 
 
Regional Location controls also indicate in some cases that the south west and east of the country 
(which are the economic hubs) have a greater probability of self-employment movement rate 
compared to the mid-belt and northern regions which is to be expected, as the north of the 
country is substantially poorer than other regions.  
 
The regression estimates from these education-related analyses so far seem to indicate that the 
higher the educational attainment of individuals, the lower the probability of being in self-
employment. More educated individuals are to found in wage employment according to this 
analysis; and this is especially true for women. It would seem to highlight once again that the kind 
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of self-employment found according to this survey is mostly pushed self-employment, as 
individuals with high educational skills are opting away from this employment category.  
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4.4.3: RESULTS 1.3: EDUCATIONAL GENDER DIFFERENCES – BLINDER-OAXACA 
MULTIVARIATE DECOMPOSITION 
 
The final education methodology compares the incidence of self-employment between the two 
years of the survey (2004 and 2009), using gender as a means of evaluation, making use of a 
Blinder-Oaxaca Multivariate decomposition for binary models proposed by Yun (2000) and 
expanded by Powers et al. (2011). The foundation of the Blinder-Oaxaca specification occurs 
where the dependent variable is a function of a linear combination of predictors and the regression 
coefficients: 
𝑌 = 𝐹(𝑋𝛽) 
 
Where 𝑌 denotes the  𝑁 × 1 dependent variable vector, 𝑋 is an 𝑁 × 𝐾 matrix of independent 
variables (the same ones used in our previous estimations), and 𝛽 is a 𝐾 × 1 vector of coefficients. 
𝐹(. ) is any once-differentiable function mapping a linear combination of 𝑋 (𝑋𝛽) to 𝑌. The mean 
difference in  𝑌 between groups A and B for binary choice models such as the probit model used 
in this case can be decomposed as: 
 
      𝑌𝐴 −  𝑌𝐵 = ɸ(𝑋𝐴𝛽𝐴) −  ɸ(𝑋𝐵𝛽𝐵)                                            
= [ɸ(𝑋𝐴𝛽𝐴) − ɸ(𝑋𝐵𝛽𝐴)]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + [ɸ(𝑋𝐵𝛽𝐴) − ɸ(𝑋𝐵𝛽𝐵)]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
 Endowments/Characteristics      Coefficients 
= ∑ 𝑊∆𝑋
𝑘𝐾
𝑘=1  [ɸ(𝑋𝐴𝛽𝐴) − ɸ(𝑋𝐵𝛽𝐴)]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + ∑ 𝑊∆𝛽
𝑘𝐾
𝑘=1  [ɸ(𝑋𝐵𝛽𝐴) − ɸ(𝑋𝐵𝛽𝐵)]̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅     [5.3] 
 
The results of estimation [5.3] are presented next; 
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Table 17: Results of Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition – Endowment/Characteristic Differences 
Endowment/Characteristic 
Differences 
 Male/Female 
2004 
Male/Female 
2009 
 Independent Variables 1 2 
 Unspecified -0.004  
  (0.003)  
 Low ed 0.001*** -0.006*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) 
 Mid ed 0.020*** -0.004*** 
  (0.002) (0.000) 
 High ed 0.017*** -0.025*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
 Very high ed 0.009*** -0.011*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) 
 Age in years 0.001*** -0.018*** 
  (0.000) (0.002) 
 Age (squared) 0.003*** 0.010*** 
  (0.000) (0.002) 
 Urban -0.001 -0.000*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) 
 Married -0.001** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.001) 
 House or land -0.001** -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
 LocalLanguage -0.001 -0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
 South - East 0.004** 0.001*** 
  (0.002) (0.000) 
 South - West 0.007*** -0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) 
 North 0.018*** -0.005*** 
  (0.004) (0.000) 
N  10,832 75,320 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1: Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
 
Table 17 reports the endowment/characteristic results of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
estimation [5.3]; these results explain the sources of difference in the likelihood of being self-
employed between the male and female samples. Note that the endowments/characteristics effect 
tells us the explained variation in self-employment incidence due to endowments, while the 
coefficient effects (presented next) tell us the unexplained variation which might be due to 
discrimination or other unknown reasons.  
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The results indicate that for both 2004 and 2009, the endowment/characteristic differences in 
education between males and females explain the dissimilarity in the likelihood of being self-
employed to a large extent – as can be seen by the constant significance of the educational 
endowment/characteristic independent variables at the one percent level. 
 
For the sake of clarity, the estimates will be expressed as percentages: overall, educational 
characteristics/endowments account for about 4.3% of the difference in self-employment 
probability between men and women in 2004. Specifically, if men and women had the same 
endowments in low, medium, high and very high education in that year; the dissimilarity in 
employment status would fall by about 0.01 % ,  0.2%, 1.7%, and 0.09% respectively.  
 
In 2009, if men and women had the same endowments in education the dissimilarity in 
employment status would rise by about 4.4%. Specifically, if men and women had the same 
endowments in low, medium, high and very high education in that year; the dissimilarity in 
employment status would rise by about 0.06 % ,  0.04%, 2.5%, and 0.11% respectively.  
  
The results so far bear out that indeed there are patterns in the incidence of occupational status - 
in this particular case self-employment; and educational attainments. The next Table presented 
shows the coefficient results of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition estimation [5.3]; 
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Table 18: Results of Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition – Coefficient Differences 
 
Coefficient Differences 
 Male/Female 
2004 
Male/Female 
2009 
 Independent Variables 1 2 
 Unspecified -0.030***  
  (0.011)  
 Low ed -0.028* 0.002 
  (0.015) (0.005) 
 Mid ed -0.074*** 0.041*** 
  (0.022) (0.007) 
 High ed -0.019*** 0.015*** 
  (0.007) (0.002) 
 Very high ed -0.011** 0.002*** 
  (0.004) (0.000) 
 Age in years -0.830*** -0.046 
  (0.267) (0.065) 
 Age (squared) 0.479*** -0.012 
  (0.147) (0.032) 
 Urban 0.002 0.031*** 
  (0.008) (0.004) 
 Married 0.002 -0.031*** 
  (0.012) (0.008) 
 House or land -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.003) (0.001) 
 LocalLanguage 0.018 0.092*** 
  (0.016) (0.010) 
 South - East -0.018* 0.016*** 
  (0.010) (0.002) 
 South - West 0.001 -0.021*** 
  (0.007) (0.004) 
 North -0.008 0.001 
  (0.007) (0.001) 
Summary Endowments 0.075*** -0.069*** 
  (0.004) (0.001) 
 Coefficients 0.011 -0.091*** 
  (0.010) (0.003) 
N  10,832 75,320 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1: Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
 
Table 18 above shows the coefficient results of the gender-based Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
estimation [5.3]. As with educational coefficients, they are once again very significant (the signs 
are interpreted in the opposite of the endowments section). Column 1 shows that for 2004, 
educational coefficients account for as high as 0.3%, 0.28%, 0.74 %, 0.19 % and 0.11 % of the 
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gender disparity from unspecified, low medium, high and very high educational attainments 
respectively; while Column 2 shows that the gender coefficient effect would in this case be reduced 
by 0.41%, 0.15%, 0.02% for the medium, high and very high education attainment individuals 
respectively.  
 
These results from Table 18 highlight the importance of education in the probability of self-
employment. Once again, the results so far bear out that indeed there are patterns in the distribution 
of occupational status - in this case self-employment and educational attainments. We have found 
that educational differences are significant, and that educational coefficients dominate the 
contribution to the overall effect. As pointed out in previous estimations, in this thesis, by using 
the multinomial probit and simple probit estimations, we also confirmed that there exists a 
significant link between all labour force participation statuses and educational attainments.  
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4.4.4: SUMMARY OF RESULTS - LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND EDUCATION 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Conceptual Model (Education and Labour Force Participation) 
 
In this section, this thesis analyses the distribution of labour force participation/occupational 
statuses based on educational attainments. It finds that higher educational levels reduce the 
probability of individuals being in self-employment. It also finds that paid workers and employers 
have substantial educational endowments relative to other individuals in the survey; the effects it 
finds are very significant and are more pronounced for women. It also finds that self-employed 
individuals are not very different from the non-active members of the workforce, and reducing the 
gender educational gap would reduce the employment status differential significantly between men 
and women.  
 
This study crucially finds that education makes women more probable to be employers of labour. 
Earlier empirical studies have not been quite so clear on this issue, probably due to the lack of 
adequate micro-level data from developing countries on these gender differences. To the best of 
this researcher’s knowledge, a link between higher educational attainments and employer 
probability status for women in developing countries has not been adequately documented. 
Labour Force Participation 
• Paid Work  
• Employer/Firm owner 
• Self-employed 
• Unemployed 
• Not in labour force  
Educational 
Attainment 
 I 
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4.5: LABOUR WAGE 
 
 
Figure 18: Conceptual Model (Labour Force Participation and Labour Wage) 
 
Since individuals should seek to maximise individual utility by opting for the employment option 
that gives the highest possible labour wage stream, the second assessment seeks to understand if 
belonging to an occupational category can influence labour wage in the form of income premiums 
or penalties. 
 
If it does i.e. there is a discernible relationship between labour and occupational status after we 
have conditioned for other observable factors, then individuals can report differing 
incomes/earnings even if they possess the same characteristics and skills as their colleagues in a 
different occupational class.  
 
In addition, the literature on developing countries (reviewed in section 2.4.1) seems to suggest that 
self-employed individuals in developing countries will earn less than those in paid-employment 
even if they have similar characteristics. To test the proposition that occupational status influences 
labour wage, and the implications this has for push or pulled self-employment, this thesis examines 
the premiums/penalties conditional on individual characteristics for paid-employment, self-
employment and employers, restricted to individuals who have entered the working labour force.  
Labour Wage Labour Force Participation 
• Paid Work  
• Employer/Firm owner 
• Self-employed 
• Unemployed 
• Not in labour force  
 IIIA 
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4.5.1: METHODOLOGY 2.1: SELF-EMPLOYMENT & EMPLOYER PREMIUMS/PENALTIES – 
HECKMAN MODEL 
 
  
i. The Heckman model deals with a continuous outcome that is observed only when 
another equation determines that the observation is selected and the errors of the two 
equations are allowed to be correlated. In this case, individuals can earn a labour wage 
only if they are first in employment, and thus labour wage for an occupational status 
might be correlated with the decision to participate in and be employed by the labour 
market initially (Heckman, 1979). Heckman won the Economics Nobel Prize in 2000 
for this work. 
 
This thesis makes use of the Heckman model because since we aim to estimate the 
conditional annual labour wage/income amongst occupations, we must note that people 
who work are selected non-randomly from the population, thus meaning we have 
access to annual income observations only for those who work; and estimating the 
determinants of wages from the subpopulation who work may thus introduce a 
selection bias.  
 
Selection bias refers to the selection of individuals, groups or data for analysis such 
that proper randomisation is not achieved, thereby ensuring that the sample obtained is 
not representative of the population intended to be analysed, with implications for the 
results. In this case, we might have a sampling bias expressing itself as a self-selection 
bias that theoretically arises in any situation in which individuals select themselves into 
a group (specifically being employed as opposed to being non-active in the labour 
force), causing some members of the population to be less likely to be included than 
others. 
 
187 
 
The Heckman correction solves this potential selection bias and takes place in two 
stages. 
 
1.  In the first stage, the thesis formulates a model, based on economic theory, for the 
probability of working as opposed to belonging to the “non- active” labour force. The 
canonical specification for this relationship is the initial probit equation: 
 
Pr(𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 = 1 | 𝑊) =  𝜙 (𝑊′𝛽)  
 𝑃(𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 = 1 |𝑊) = 𝑃(𝑥′𝑖𝐸 + 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑋 + 𝑒𝑖 > 0|𝑊)   [5.4] 
 
 
Where 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 indicates employment (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 = 1 if the respondent is employed, 
i.e. the individual has an employment status of “employer, self-employed or paid 
worker” and  𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 = 0 otherwise, i.e. the individual has the employment status of 
“unemployed or not in labour force”), Thus the variable W implies selection but not 
income, E is the vector that includes the different levels of education, X is a vector of 
control variables, and e is the error term, all identical to our previous estimations [5.1] 
and [5.2]. 
 
As before, 𝑋′is a vector of explanatory variables, 𝛽 is a vector of parameters, and 𝜙 is 
the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The estimates 
from this model yield results that can be used to predict the employment probability for 
each individual given each individual’s observable characteristic. 
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2.  In the second stage, the Heckman procedure corrects for self-selection by incorporating 
a transformation of these predicted individual probabilities as an additional explanatory 
variable. The wage equation is now specified, 
 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 +  𝛿𝑆𝑒𝑖 + 𝜂𝐸𝑚𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖                                                         [5.5] 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖 denotes logged annual income (labour wage) of workers
42, Explanatory 
variables 𝑥𝑖 comprise standard human capital formation literature variables (age, age 
squared, sector, sex, marital status, educational attainment – the same as in the first 
assessment, being able to speak the local language, credit constraint, region as well as 
dummies for religion); these are essentially the same control variables as in [5.2] with 
the addition of the religion variable – this is because certain occupations could be 
potentially encouraged or frowned upon by one’s religious peers/network.  
 
 
The dummies 𝑆𝑒𝑖 and 𝐸𝑚𝑖 take the value of one (1) if person i is a self-employed “own 
account” worker or employer respectively. The estimated coefficients 𝛿 and ?̂? are 
interpreted as a measure of the Heckman corrected conditional earnings 
premium/penalty experienced by the self-employed and employers respectively, 
compared to formal wage earners or paid workers. 
 
 
We can thus denote 𝑌𝑖
∗ as the underlying wage offer, which is not observed if the 
respondent does not work. The conditional expectation of wages given the person 
works is then: 
                                                          
42 The basic wage equation can be traced back to the 1974 Jacob Mincer model (also called “the human 
capital accumulation model”) of earnings and is one of the cornerstones of empirical economics. The 
equation predicts income based on measures of schooling and post school investment. The basic Mincer 
equation is estimated: 
ln[Y(s, x)] = 𝛼𝜊 + 𝑟𝑠𝑠 + 𝑟𝑗𝑥 + 𝑟𝑗𝑥
2 + 𝜀 
Where ln[Y(s, 𝑥) ] is log of wage w at schooling level 𝑠 and work experience 𝑥. 
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Ε[𝑌𝑖|𝑥𝑖, 𝑊 = 1] =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 +  𝛿𝑆𝑒𝑖 + 𝜂𝐸𝑚𝑖 +  Ε[𝜇𝑖|𝑥𝑖, 𝑊 = 1] 
Under the assumption that the error terms are jointly normal, we thus have: 
 
Ε[Yi|xi, W = 1] =  xiβ +  δSei + ηEmi + ρσμλ(W
'β)    [5.6] 
 
Where ρ is the correlation between unobserved determinants of propensity to 
work Ε  and unobserved determinants of wage offers 𝜇𝑖, the variable W implies 
selection but not income, σ u is the standard deviation of 𝜇𝑖, and 𝜆 is the inverse Mills 
ratio evaluated at 𝑊 ′𝛽 . This equation thus solves the sample selection that can be 
viewed as a form of omitted-variables bias, as conditional on 𝑥𝑖 , 𝛿, 𝜂  and on 𝜆 as if the 
sample is randomly selected.  
 
In the estimations conducted by the thesis, 𝑌𝑖 will denote logged annual labour wage of 
workers43, explanatory variables 𝑥𝑖 comprise standard human capital formation 
literature variables (age, age squared, sector, sex, marital status, educational attainment 
– the same as in the first assessment, credit constraints, ability to speak a Nigerian 
language, region, as well as dummies for religion). The dummies 𝑆𝑒𝑖 and 𝐸𝑚𝑖  take the 
value of one (1) if person i is a self-employed worker or employer respectively. The 
estimated coefficients 𝛿 and  ?̂? are thus interpreted as a measure of the conditional 
earnings premium/penalty experienced by the self-employed and employers 
respectively compared to formal paid work/wage earners. 
                                                          
43 This thesis makes use of “annual labour wages of individuals in the logged form”; the reason for this is 
explained in section 4.6. 
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4.5.2: METHODOLOGY 2.3: SELF-EMPLOYMENT & EMPLOYER PREMIUMS/PENALTIES – 
QUANTILE REGRESSIONS 
 
 
The econometric literature notes that Heckman corrected Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) model estimates might not give a full picture of the entire income spectrum, and 
could be influenced by a few “superstars” or fail to reflect the general distribution in 
labour wages. Hence this thesis makes use of quantile regressions in addition to the 
Heckman estimates to calculate the self-employment and employer premiums or 
penalties conditional on observable individual characteristics.  
 
In addition, while the OLS regression curve gives a grand summary for the averages of 
the distribution, quantile regressions are more advantageous as they compute several 
different regression curves corresponding to the various percentage points specified, 
thus giving a more complete picture of the set. Thus this thesis sorted the self-employed 
“own account” workers, employers and paid workers into percentiles at the 
.01,.05,.10,.20,.30,.40, .50,.60.70,.80,.90,.95 and .99 positions on the income 
distribution and compared them to each other for more insight into the investigation 
and to account for heterogeneity in occupational status labour wages.  
 
4.5.2.1: Reason for Quantile Regressions 
 
 
For testing the hypothesis of heterogeneous returns to occupational status across the 
distribution, this thesis will make use of quantile regressions. The reason for this is that 
quantile regressions as introduced in Koenker and Hallock (2001) may be viewed as a 
natural extension of the classical least squares estimation on conditional mean models 
to the estimation of an ensemble of models for conditional quantile functions. While 
the regression curve gives a grand summary for the averages of the distribution 
corresponding to the set of x’s, quantile regressions compute several different 
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regression curves thus giving a more complete picture of the set (Koenker and Hallock, 
2001). 
 
Ordinarily, as specified by the superstar model of Rosen (1981), normal OLS 
regressions could be influenced by the earnings of a few ‘superstars’ or 
‘underperformers’ and as with  the mean indicator would give an incomplete picture of 
a single distribution. It is a well-known fact in the economic literature that mean(s) 
welfare indicators might not really characterise a majority of the sample analysed. The 
greatest advantage of quantile regressions is their capacity to illustrate depictions of the 
relevant relationships across different quantiles of the distribution and not solely at the 
mean. 
 
Therefore to provide a complete view of the division(s) across percentage points on the 
income distribution, quantile regressions will be used for this thesis.  The quantile 
expression for any worker i at the τth quantile of the 𝑌 distribution conditional on 
observables is expressed as: 
 
 𝐹𝑦𝑖
−1(𝜏|𝑥𝑖) =  𝑥𝑖𝛽(𝜏) + 𝛿(𝜏)𝑆𝑒𝑖 + 𝜂(𝜏)𝐸𝑚𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,   ∀𝜏 ∈ [0,1].                               [5.7] 
 
The percentage points that are observed in the estimations in this thesis are: 
. 01, .05, .10, .20, .30, .40, .50, .60. , .70, .80, .90, .95 𝑎𝑛𝑑 .99. 
 
The insight from this is to determine if individuals in any of the employment states are 
bound to experience a labour wage premium or penalty relative to another employment 
option at any particular point on the welfare distribution. Note that this model also allows 
this thesis to account for heterogeneity in both sectors, an analysis that provides very 
insightful results, as proposed by recent authors and researchers in the field (Günther and 
Launov, 2012). This model was adapted from Bargain and Kwenda (2011) and extended 
to fit this study. 
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The effects of the covariates hence depend on the quantiles examined, and in particular for 
the purposes of this thesis that the self-employment “own account” or employer 
premium/penalties compared to paid workers are of chief importance. This means the 
second econometric assessment is made up of two parts: 
 
(a) Heckman corrected OLS estimations on conditional labour wage to see the extent of the 
earnings gap – if any – between paid-workers, self-employed “own account” workers and 
employers: Eqn [5.6]44. 
 
(b) Quantile regressions to show the labour wage penalty or premiums conditional on 
individual characteristics reflecting the earnings gap – if any – between paid-workers, self-
employed “own account” workers and employers: Eqn [5.7]. 
 
                                                          
44 The results of the first stage of the Heckman (1979) procedure, estimation [5.4] i.e. selection into 
employment (employer, paid work or self-employed  “own account” labour status) are presented in the 
appendix section. 
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4.5.3: Potential Econometric Issues (2nd Empirical Assessment) 
 
The most apparent potential issue is one of endogeneity. In the light of the earlier estimation, the 
decision to hold an occupational status could depend on observed educational attainment, 
especially with a high educational attainment having a negative impact on the probability of self-
employment. This relationship could give rise to endogeneity, which would lead to biased 
estimates from the equation, since two independent variables (in this case educational attainment 
and labour wages) influence the dependent variable and could be correlated with the error term.  
 
The regular practice in this case would be to look for suitable instrumental variables, which are 
variables that are correlated with the “problem variable”, in this case educational attainment, but 
uncorrelated with the error term in order to replace the variable in question45. In the absence of 
suitable instrumental variables in the data for either of the years surveyed, the estimation was 
performed twice. The first estimation includes the “problem variable” (educational attainments), 
while the second estimation does not include educational attainments and serves as a robustness 
test.  
 
This was done because the econometrics literature acknowledges that finding such instrumental 
variables might be difficult; hence an acceptable practice is to exclude the variable with 
perceived endogeneity altogether and compare the results from this estimation with results from 
an estimation where the “problem variable” is included (Bargain and Kwenda, 2011, Van der 
Sluis et al., 2005, Bhaumik et al., 2013). Other tests for multicollinearity and robustness proved 
satisfactory. Other forms of robustness checks were conducted on different samples by gender 
and regions and also by dropping educational variables.
                                                          
45 Using either the 2SLS or GMM technique.  
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4.6: RESULTS OF ASSESSMENTS 2 - LABOUR WAGE 
 
In the second assessment, the thesis aims to understand if holding an occupational status can 
influence labour wage. If it does and there is a discernible relationship between labour wage and 
occupational status after we have allowed for other observable factors, then individuals can report 
differing wages/incomes even if they possess the same characteristics and skills as other 
individuals, given that those other individuals belong in a different occupational class. As the key 
issue in this assessment is therefore the labour wage generated from the various employment 
categories, only employers, paid workers and self-employed “own account” workers are needed. 
 
As highlighted in section 3.12, there were 4,277 individuals in 2004 with missing education values 
but none in 2009. The 4,277 individuals with missing education values were included in the 
education regression estimations with their educational status denoted as “Unspecified” to add 
clarity to the results. However, these individuals were not included in the income estimations 
because the Mincer regression estimation requires educational values to properly link the labour 
returns to available characteristics. Thus the income estimations involved a restricted data sample 
of the total respondents without the individuals who did not provide education values. This left a 
sample size of 14,120 individuals remaining from the 2004 survey.  
 
Furthermore, individuals not active in the labour force (i.e. the unemployed and individuals not in 
the labour force) were removed from the sample for the income estimations as they did not (and 
indeed should not) report any incomes. Thus the income estimations (in Section 4.5) made use of 
the 10,832 individuals that were residual in employment after using the Heckman (1979) procedure 
to select these individuals from the entire 14,120 sample. In addition, due to inconsistencies in the 
way that the income variable was reported in the 2009 survey, this thesis could only use the annual 
labour wages/personal incomes variable from the 2004 survey. Table 19a reports the means and 
standard errors of the real value of annual labour wages for individuals in the 2004 survey.  
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Table 19a: Mean Annual Labour Wage by Employment Type, Gender and Region – 2004 Survey 
  Male  Female  
  Mean Wage N46  Mean Wage N  
  (Std Err) N (Std Err) N 
North      
 Self-Employed47 185,965.8 
(9,644.5) 
751 219,091 *   
(24,881.5) 
140 
 Paid Worker 281,630.5 
(13,692.16) 
621 191,768.2 
(10,059.76) 
137 
 Employer 311,048.9 
(28,595.95) 
165 412,033.3 * 
(78,699.14) 
24 
Midbelt      
 Self-Employed 206,539 
(10,299.61) 
703 140,146.8 
(12,662.84) 
313 
 Paid Worker 238,019.9 
(10,548.42) 
507 195,603.8 
(9,299.89) 
153 
 Employer 266,039.3 
(24,226.71) 
125 293,468.8 *  
(52,992.66) 
32 
South-East      
 Self-Employed 208,569.5 
(5,471.77) 
1,650 133,462.6 
(5,250.546) 
1,010 
 Paid Worker 260,804.9 
(12,123.49) 
712 222,930.6   
(10,861.79) 
389 
 Employer 343,745.2 
(29,518.05) 
86 171,220 
(12,743.83) 
47 
South-West      
 Self-Employed 184,967.1 
(6,752.93) 
1093 129,438.1 
(6,706.68) 
898 
 Paid Worker 225,743.8 
(7,332.42) 
784 205,809.8 
(10,436.51) 
366 
 Employer 213,274.6 
(16,228.51) 
77 358,962.9 *   
(57,584.58) 
49 
Entire Sample      
 Self-Employed 198,038.1 
(3,700.58) 
4,197 137,895.5 
(4,086.32) 
2,361 
 Paid Worker 250,855.5 
(5,515.434) 
2,624 208,847.8 
(5,776.33) 
1,045 
 Employer 288,216.8 
(13,973.58) 
453 295,502.1 * 
(26,074.22) 
152 
 Entire Gender 222,707.3 7,274 165,467.6 3,558 
  (3,065.33)  (3,458.49)  
 N 10,832 7,274  3,558 
 
                                                          
46 Conversion rate was about 133 N ≈ $1 during the period under review. 
47 “Own Account” workers represent the Self-Employed sample throughout this analysis. 
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Table 19a reports the means and standard errors of the real value of annual labour wages for 
individuals in the 2004 survey, and shows that on average, employers have the highest annual 
labour wages, followed by paid-employees and then by self-employed “own account” workers. 
This is in line with the literature that makes these distinctions among employment categories, 
notably Tamvada (2010) and Earle and Sakova (2000).  
 
Also from the mean annual labour wages reported in Table 19, males appear to always earn more 
than females except in the cases highlighted by italics and asterisk*; and the common occurrence 
is mostly for employer females/women in the survey seem to earn more than males/men. These 
wage and employment figures are also in agreement with the macro indicators given by the World 
Bank and NBS, in terms of regional and gender differences in employment statistics within the 
country.  
 
This thesis makes use of “annual labour wages of individuals” in the logged form. The annual 
labour wages of individuals in employment in 2004 were converted to the logged form for this 
thesis because this is the preferred data transformation method applied in the 
economics/econometrics field when a value of interest ranges over several orders of magnitude. In 
this case, the annual labour wages were logged so as to introduce symmetry in the data. The 
logarithm(log) is often favoured because it is easy to interpret its result in terms of ’fold change’; 
i.e. a unit increase in the independent variable should be associated with an average of 100% 
coefficient increase of the dependent variable. 
 
Figure 19 shows the histogram and kdensity plots of the logged annual labour wage distribution 
for each employment category given in the 2004 NBS LSS survey.  
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Figure 19: Histogram and Kdensity for Logged Annual Labour Wages/Incomes by Employment 
Category   
 
 
It is easy to observe from Figure 19 that the self-employed “own account” distribution is more 
rugged/uneven compared to other employment categories: this could imply that individuals in this 
category are more unequal in terms of wages i.e the income disparities in this group could be very 
substantial. The kdensity plots for paid workers and employers also appears to be close to the 
normal fit, while the kdensity plot for self-employed “own account” workers appears to be 
negatively skewed. The employers’ kdensity distribution however seems to have more individuals 
at the right hand side of the distribution. Once again this confirms Table 19 in showing that 
employers appear to be the highest earners in the distribution, followed by paid workers and then 
by self-employed “own account” individuals. 
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4.6.1: RESULTS 2: LABOUR WAGE – HECKMAN (MINCER) ESTIMATION AND QUANTILE 
REGRESSIONS 
 
As pointed out in the methodology section 4.5.1, the Heckman model deals with a continuous 
outcome that is observed only when another equation determines that the observation is selected 
and the errors of the two equations are allowed to be correlated. In this case, individuals can earn 
a labour wage only if they are first in employment, and thus labour wage for an occupational status 
might be correlated with the decision to participate in and be employed in the labour market 
initially We thus have: 
 
Ε[Yi|xi, W = 1] =  xiβ +  δSei + ηEmi + ρσμλ(W
'β)    [5.6] 
 
Where ρ is the correlation between unobserved determinants of propensity to 
work W and unobserved determinants of wage offers 𝜇𝑖 ( i.e the conditional expectation 
of wages given the individuals works), σ u is the standard deviation of 𝜇𝑖, and 𝜆 is 
the inverse Mills ratio evaluated at 𝑋′𝛽 . This equation thus solves the sample selection 
that can be viewed as a form of omitted-variables bias, conditional on first being 
employed and not belonging to the “unemployed” or “not in labour force” categories.  
 
 
In our results, 𝑌𝑖 will denote logged annual labour wage of workers, Explanatory 
variables 𝑥𝑖 comprise standard human capital formation literature variables (age, age 
squared, sector, sex, marital status, educational attainment – the same as in the first 
assessment, credit constraints, ability to speak a Nigerian language, region as well, as 
dummies for religion). The dummies 𝑆𝑒𝑖 and 𝐸𝑚𝑖  take the value of one (1) if person i 
is a self-employed worker or employer respectively. The estimated coefficients 𝛿 and 
 ?̂? are thus interpreted as a measure of the Heckman corrected conditional earnings 
premium/penalty experienced by the self-employed and employers respectively, 
compared to formal wage earners. 
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In addition, to enable us view the income distribution across different percentage 
points, “Quantile Regressions” were used.  The quantile regression for any worker i at 
the τth quantile of the 𝑌 distribution conditional on observables is written as: 
 
 𝐹𝑦𝑖
−1(𝜏|𝑥𝑖) =  𝑥𝑖𝛽(𝜏) + 𝛿(𝜏)𝑆𝑒𝑖 + 𝜂(𝜏)𝐸𝑚𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,   ∀𝜏 ∈ [0,1].                               [5.7] 
 
And the percentage points that are observed in this estimation are: 
. 01, .05, .10, .20, .30, .40, .50, .60. , .70, .80, .90, .95 𝑎𝑛𝑑 .99. 
 
The insight from analysing this is to determine if individuals in any of the employment 
states are bound to enjoy or suffer labour wage premiums or penalties respectively, relative 
to another employment option at any particular point on the annual labour wage 
distribution. The results of the first stage of the Heckman (1979) procedure, estimation 
[5.4] i.e. selection into employment (employer, paid work or self-employed “own account” 
labour status) are presented in the appendix section. The results of the Heckman corrected 
conditional earnings premium/penalty estimation [5.6] and the quantile regression 
estimation [5.7] on the 2004 survey are presented next.  
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Variables Heckman 
Estimation 
Table 19b: Labour Wage Premiums and Penalties - Estimations [5.6] & [5.7]  
Q(.01) Q(.05) Q(.10) Q(.20)  Q(.30) Q(.40) Q(.50) Q(.60) Q(.70) Q(.80) Q(.90) Q(.95) Q(.99) 
Age in years 0.033*** 0.000 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 0.022** -0.028** 0.001 -0.038 
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.018) (0.031) 
Agesquared -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urban 0.123*** -0.000 0.113*** 0.100*** 0.129*** 0.151*** 0.098*** 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.109*** 0.101*** 0.148*** 0.033 0.091 
 (0.017) (0.000) (0.018) (0.027) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.040) (0.070) (0.112) 
Unspecified 0.014 0.000 0.041 -0.002 -0.102** -0.054 -0.111** -0.096** -0.117** -0.004 -0.034 0.284*** 0.791*** 0.353 
 (0.041) (0.000) (0.047) (0.063) (0.052) (0.057) (0.055) (0.045) (0.053) (0.067) (0.074) (0.100) (0.100) (0.332) 
Low ed 0.207*** 0.000 0.157*** 0.214*** 0.212*** 0.247*** 0.176*** 0.146*** 0.109* 0.194*** 0.084 0.325*** 0.754*** -0.041 
 (0.039) (0.000) (0.046) (0.063) (0.042) (0.048) (0.049) (0.046) (0.056) (0.060) (0.064) (0.053) (0.101) (0.426) 
Mid ed 0.344*** 0.000 0.256*** 0.324*** 0.355*** 0.392*** 0.300*** 0.316*** 0.310*** 0.356*** 0.242*** 0.453*** 0.744*** 0.003 
 (0.040) (0.000) (0.041) (0.063) (0.040) (0.050) (0.054) (0.051) (0.054) (0.059) (0.060) (0.072) (0.086) (0.432) 
High ed 0.783*** 0.405*** 0.806*** 0.945*** 0.899*** 0.922*** 0.834*** 0.780*** 0.696*** 0.728*** 0.633*** 0.793*** 0.988*** -0.226 
 (0.046) (0.083) (0.085) (0.077) (0.046) (0.038) (0.051) (0.043) (0.052) (0.064) (0.063) (0.089) (0.101) (0.420) 
Very highed 0.999*** 0.000 0.286 1.105*** 1.116*** 1.213*** 1.082*** 0.980*** 1.036*** 1.215*** 1.115*** 1.370*** 1.311*** 0.178 
 (0.062) (0.000) (0.233) (0.378) (0.060) (0.067) (0.056) (0.062) (0.106) (0.078) (0.059) (0.108) (0.084) (0.455) 
Male 0.251*** -0.000 0.131*** 0.150*** 0.200*** 0.233*** 0.255*** 0.238*** 0.250*** 0.240*** 0.226*** 0.272*** 0.275*** 0.405*** 
 (0.023) (0.000) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.047) (0.038) (0.065) 
Married -0.002 0.000 0.013 -0.008 0.007 -0.020 -0.017 0.013 -0.018 0.016 0.049** 0.053 -0.028 -0.184* 
 (0.017) (0.000) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.021) (0.022) (0.039) (0.048) (0.110) 
Christian 0.053 0.000 0.010 -0.028 0.031 -0.019 0.017 0.049 -0.018 0.031 0.056 0.297** 0.277 -0.393 
 (0.069) (0.018) (0.076) (0.090) (0.091) (0.064) (0.055) (0.108) (0.113) (0.115) (0.047) (0.126) (0.466) (0.496) 
Muslim 0.032 0.000 0.063 -0.004 0.029 -0.018 -0.001 -0.001 -0.049 -0.009 0.005 0.267* 0.228 -0.515 
 (0.070) (0.018) (0.074) (0.096) (0.095) (0.068) (0.053) (0.111) (0.109) (0.106) (0.044) (0.138) (0.480) (0.498) 
Houseland -0.087*** -0.000 -0.015 -0.059*** -0.099*** -0.117*** -0.102*** -0.069*** -0.068** -0.059 -0.050 -0.019 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.027) (0.000) (0.020) (0.016) (0.028) (0.031) (0.036) (0.026) (0.033) (0.041) (0.041) (0.064) (0.069) (0.102) 
Locallang -0.033 -0.000 -0.006 -0.036 -0.102*** -0.098*** -0.046** -0.034 0.003 0.029 0.028 -0.024 -0.045 0.087 
 (0.021) (0.000) (0.033) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.049) (0.041) (0.119) 
South-East 0.092*** -0.000 0.139*** 0.104*** 0.140*** 0.117*** 0.070*** 0.081*** 0.097*** 0.054* 0.047 0.137** 0.093 0.109 
 (0.023) (0.000) (0.031) (0.035) (0.030) (0.025) (0.024) (0.018) (0.022) (0.033) (0.033) (0.062) (0.121) (0.128) 
South-West -0.099*** -0.000 -0.058** -0.095*** -0.013 -0.047** -0.083*** -0.110*** -0.082** -0.130*** -0.131*** -0.196*** -0.210* -0.180* 
 (0.024) (0.000) (0.028) (0.031) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.032) (0.033) (0.028) (0.046) (0.057) (0.114) (0.096) 
North 0.039 0.000 0.009 -0.025 0.075** 0.021 -0.025 -0.024 0.017 -0.023 -0.034 0.150 0.519*** 0.156 
 (0.026) (0.000) (0.025) (0.032) (0.031) (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.036) (0.031) (0.041) (0.094) (0.094) (0.126) 
Employer 0.126*** 0.000 0.007 0.065 0.089** 0.100*** 0.048 0.109** 0.135*** 0.070** 0.067 0.286*** 0.316** 0.057 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.093) (0.082) (0.036) (0.031) (0.032) (0.055) (0.033) (0.028) (0.043) (0.071) (0.146) (0.148) 
S.Employed -0.160*** 0.000** -0.156*** -0.273*** -0.298*** -0.242*** -0.244*** -0.206*** -0.163*** -0.095*** -0.061*** 0.076 0.076 0.182 
 (0.017) (0.000) (0.037) (0.029) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.051) (0.053) (0.108) 
Cons 10.602*** 10.491*** 9.696*** 9.971*** 10.028*** 10.202*** 10.444*** 10.679*** 10.956*** 10.833*** 11.348*** 12.246*** 11.756*** 14.949*** 
 (0.254) (0.018) (0.145) (0.148) (0.147) (0.121) (0.110) (0.147) (0.136) (0.126) (0.186) (0.358) (0.564) (0.999) 
Lambda/R2 0.046 0.0159 0.0796 0.1080 0.1491 0.1545 0.1442 0.1348 0.1232 0.1071 0.0879 0.0627 0.0537 0.0348 
  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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The results of estimations [5.6] and [5.7] on the entire 2004 earning population show the 
following: 
1. The Heckman corrected conditional earnings premium/penalty estimates indicate that on 
average, self-employed own account individuals earn about 16% less than their 
counterparts in paid work, while employers earn about 12.6% more.  
2. From the conditional quantile estimates (and at the median), self-employed own account 
workers still consistently earn less than paid employees, but then catch up around the 90th 
and 95th quantiles. At the topmost quantile, the differences in earnings are not significant 
between groups.  
3. At the conditional quantile estimates and at the median, employers are the highest earning 
in the sample. Though these premiums are insignificant at lower quantiles; the positive 
significant effect begins from the 20th quantile. 
4. All other variable coefficients are as expected from the literature (note that males seem to 
earn more and earnings also significantly increase with more educational attainments). 
These results can be better highlighted in the graph (Figure 20) below: 
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Figure 20: Heckman and Quantile Labour Wage Premiums and Penalties - Estimations [5.6] and [5.7] 
 
 
Figure 20 plots a graph of the log labour wage gap conditional on observable characteristics. The 
horizontal y-axis represents the earnings/incomes of paid workers, while the dotted and thick black 
lines show the conditional income premiums/penalties of employers and self-employed “own 
account” individuals respectively.   
 
The results from Figure 20 indicate that several recent authors have been right in requesting 
researchers to recognize that self-employment might be a heterogeneous employment option, with 
some individuals advantaged and others disadvantaged (Fields, 2004, Günther and Launov, 2012). 
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Although this thesis could not make a distinction between the formal and informal sectors, it could 
distinguish employers from self-employed “own account” workers, and the results and contrasts 
between the two are both striking and interesting.     
 
Employers in general seem to experience earnings premiums and continue to do better than paid 
workers and self-employed “own account” workers until the upper quantiles; and hence can be 
described as being mostly in pulled self-employment, since they are in a preferable employment 
option as regards labour wage. Self-employed “own account” workers on the other hand are worse 
off in terms of labour wage until the 80th quantile when they begin to experience premiums. Those 
below this belt can be described as being in pushed self-employment while those above can be 
described as pulled according to the literature. 
 
However, as the researcher has previously highlighted in Section 3.11, there are significant 
regional differences in Nigeria and thus a need to examine different sections of the data in the 
form of robustness checks. Consequently the estimation is run for all regions to ensure that the 
results are robust for different data samples. These results for Estimations [5.6] and [5.7] for each 
region are shown below in Table 20 and the graphs expressing the results come afterwards in 
Figures 21, 22, 23 and 2448:
                                                          
48 The results of the first stage of the Heckman (1979) procedure, estimation [5.4] i.e. selection into 
employment (employer, paid work or self-employed “own account” labour status) are presented in the 
appendix section. 
204 
 
Table 20: Labour Wage Premiums and Penalties for Each Region - Estimations [5.6] & [5.7] for Each Region
REGION Heckman Quantile Estimation 
 Estimation Q(.01) Q(.05) Q(.10) Q(.20)  Q(.30) Q(.40) Q(.50) Q(.60) Q(.70) Q(.80) Q(.90) Q(.95) Q(.99) 
North               
               
Employer 0.123* -0.052 -0.084 0.043 0.061 0.064 0.184*** 0.175** 0.207*** 0.079 0.040 0.247 0.059 0.215 
 (0.067) (0.163) (0.189) (0.153) (0.060) (0.054) (0.048) (0.069) (0.050) (0.072) (0.100) (0.324) (0.441) (0.214) 
Self-Employ -0.166*** 0.043 -0.245*** -0.348*** -0.318*** -0.314*** -0.144*** -0.112* -0.046 -0.177** -0.003 0.108 -0.101 0.217 
 (0.048) (0.040) (0.080) (0.081) (0.074) (0.071) (0.055) (0.067) (0.065) (0.080) (0.104) (0.193) (0.251) (0.179) 
N 4,137              
Sigma/R2 0.8223 0.0743 0.1463 0.1799 0.2242 0.2175 0.1923 0.1681 0.1382 0.1215 0.0959 0.0692 0.0527 0.0820 
Mid-Belt               
               
Employer 0.001 0.116 -0.446*** -0.101 -0.107 -0.123 -0.181*** -0.129 -0.014 -0.082 -0.062 -0.051 0.482** 0.392 
 (0.069) (0.157) (0.145) (0.150) (0.078) (0.081) (0.069) (0.091) (0.102) (0.084) (0.076) (0.146) (0.242) (0.299) 
Self-Employ -0.158*** -0.044 -0.468*** -0.490*** -0.494*** -0.411*** -0.282*** -0.242*** -0.088 0.013 0.014 0.141 0.354** 0.291 
 (0.044) (0.057) (0.075) (0.069) (0.068) (0.056) (0.049) (0.057) (0.068) (0.063) (0.049) (0.096) (0.144) (0.209) 
N 3,409              
Sigma/R2 0.7499 0.0550 0.1370 0.1583 0.1624 0.1540 0.1497 0.1426 0.1242 0.1106   0.1045 0.1081 0.1251 0.1285 
South-
East 
              
               
Employer 0.197*** -0.000 0.029 0.214 0.161 0.315*** 0.233*** 0.229** 0.274** 0.286*** 0.414*** 0.116 -0.012 -0.470* 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.151) (0.136) (0.143) (0.088) (0.089) (0.094) (0.121) (0.086) (0.115) (0.148) (0.169) (0.282) 
Self-Employ -0.116*** -0.000 -0.091*** -0.105*** -0.156*** -0.100*** -0.144*** -0.162*** -0.148*** -0.121*** -0.029 -0.141* -0.152 -0.366** 
 (0.028) (0.013) (0.035) (0.038) (0.034) (0.024) (0.034) (0.036) (0.043) (0.041) (0.045) (0.082) (0.107) (0.164) 
N 6,286              
Sigma/R2 0.7546 0.0170 0.0837 0.1010 0.1317 0.1418 0.1258 0.1221 0.1125 0.1002 0.0827 0.0873 0.0754 0.1031 
South-
West 
              
               
Employer 0.183*** 0.000 0.022 0.110 0.000 0.065 0.073 0.024 0.056 0.244* 0.265*** 0.858*** 0.481*** 0.208 
 (0.067) (0.116) (0.153) (0.129) (0.124) (0.074) (0.051) (0.054) (0.072) (0.144) (0.096) (0.299) (0.154) (0.262) 
Self-Employ -0.228*** 0.000 -0.098** -0.240*** -0.392*** -0.368*** -0.313*** -0.308*** -0.265*** -0.192*** -0.143*** -0.121*** -0.017 -0.220 
 (0.030) (0.010) (0.044) (0.049) (0.045) (0.036) (0.042) (0.041) (0.054) (0.058) (0.052) (0.041) (0.084) (0.143) 
N 4,565              
Sigma/R2 0.7128 0.0152 0.0956 0.1174 0.1538 0.1806 0.1727 0.1569 0.1504 0.1362 0.1252 0.1007 0.0958 0.0907 
205 
 
Figure 21: Heckman and Quantile Labour Wage Premiums and Penalties for Northern Region – 
Estimations [5.6] & [5.7]; Northern Region  
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Figure 22: Heckman and Quantile Labour Wage Premiums and Penalties for Mid-belt Region – 
Estimations [5.6] & [5.7]; Mid-belt Region  
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Figure 23: Heckman and Quantile Labour Wage Premiums and Penalties for South-East Region – 
Estimations [5.6] & [5.7]; South-East Region  
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Figure 24: Heckman and Quantile Labour Wage Premiums and Penalties for South-West Region – 
Estimations [5.6] & [5.7]; South-West Region  
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Table 20 and Figures 21, 22, 23 and 24 indicate that employers typically are better-off in terms of 
conditional earnings compared to other employment options in all regions of the country. 
Furthermore, this thesis consistently finds that self-employed “own account” workers in general 
are worse off in terms of labour wages regardless of the region of the country they operate in. 
 
This penalty for the self-employed “own account” workers is especially found towards the lower 
ends of the distribution (at the left hand side of the graphs and tables), where paid workers should 
enjoy some sort of minimum wage guarantee; this amount has been reviewed several times but is 
currently N18, 000, although there are rumours that some states do not implement the minimum 
wage. As the self-employed “own account” workers are not guaranteed such minimum wage 
levels, they seem to be substantially worse off towards the lower ends of the distribution but 
improve later as such effects wear off. This labour wage penalty seems to occur to a certain point 
on the distribution (usually around the 10th and 20th percentiles) and then starts to improve.  
 
Furthermore, the shape of the distribution is the same in all regions apart from that in the South-
East region, where the employers and own account workers are substantially worse-off compared 
to paid workers. For now, this thesis can only speculate that since that region has the highest 
number of self-employed individuals, the competition in that sector might erode potential benefits 
in terms of labour wages. 
 
Overall, this would seem to indicate that employers can mostly be classed as pulled into this 
employment option as they are advantaged in terms of labour wages compared to being in paid 
work. “Own account” self-employed workers consistently seem to be disadvantaged in terms of 
income in all regions, even though as in the Mid-belt and Northern regions, they enjoy premiums 
at the upper end of the distribution. So while a majority of self-employed “own account” workers 
can be classed as being in pushed self-employment - especially those in the lower end, some at the 
upper end, albeit a very small minority, can be classed as pulled.  
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Given the gender disparities already discussed in section 2.4.1.11, and since there is also a need to 
examine the personal labour wage participation experience from a gender perspective, this thesis 
estimates the regressions [5.6] and [5.7] separately for men and women. This is also to ensure that 
the results are robust for different data samples and because the thesis aims to contribute to the 
gender labour force literature as regards developing countries. The results are presented below in 
Table 2149: 
                                                          
49 The results of the first stage of the Heckman (1979) procedure, estimation [5.4] i.e. selection into 
employment (employer, paid work or self-employed “own account” labour status) are presented in the 
appendix section. 
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Variables Heckman 
Estimation 
Table 21: Male Labour Wage Premiums and Penalties - Estimations [5.6] & [5.7] for Male Sample 
Q(.01) Q(.05) Q(.10) Q(.20)  Q(.30) Q(.40) Q(.50) Q(.60) Q(.70) Q(.80) Q(.90) Q(.95) Q(.99) 
Age in years -0.015 -0.000 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.040*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.012* 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.013 -0.039*** -0.012 -0.092** 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.015) (0.025) (0.038) 
Age(square) 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Urban 0.199*** 0.000 0.191*** 0.231*** 0.229*** 0.179*** 0.156*** 0.189*** 0.214*** 0.198*** 0.170*** 0.192*** 0.235*** 0.153 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.030) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021) (0.031) (0.036) (0.037) (0.067) (0.104) 
Unspecified -0.111** -0.000 -0.105* -0.136* -0.198*** -0.254*** -0.209*** -0.176*** -0.192* -0.222** -0.182*** 0.222** 0.741*** -0.029 
 (0.053) (0.025) (0.056) (0.081) (0.067) (0.066) (0.061) (0.063) (0.106) (0.113) (0.053) (0.087) (0.192) (0.540) 
Low ed 0.097* -0.000 0.067 0.110 0.177*** 0.086 0.061 0.063 0.029 0.019 -0.011 0.243** 0.628*** -0.150 
 (0.050) (0.017) (0.068) (0.076) (0.050) (0.075) (0.063) (0.060) (0.101) (0.110) (0.045) (0.094) (0.175) (0.511) 
Mid ed 0.231*** -0.000 0.137 0.222*** 0.322*** 0.229*** 0.185*** 0.212*** 0.174* 0.199* 0.149*** 0.338*** 0.583*** -0.095 
 (0.050) (0.023) (0.087) (0.072) (0.057) (0.071) (0.060) (0.058) (0.099) (0.104) (0.036) (0.056) (0.166) (0.473) 
High ed 0.717*** 0.405*** 0.934*** 0.859*** 0.864*** 0.740*** 0.701*** 0.659*** 0.580*** 0.577*** 0.607*** 0.698*** 0.816*** -0.398 
 (0.057) (0.155) (0.120) (0.066) (0.055) (0.084) (0.062) (0.059) (0.102) (0.119) (0.069) (0.077) (0.151) (0.520) 
Very highed 0.850*** -0.000 0.151 0.074 0.997*** 0.903*** 0.887*** 0.911*** 0.831*** 0.989*** 0.862*** 1.412*** 1.438*** 0.090 
 (0.075) (0.031) (0.183) (0.525) (0.120) (0.095) (0.124) (0.085) (0.113) (0.137) (0.082) (0.153) (0.181) (0.479) 
Married -0.005 0.000 -0.004 0.007 0.055** 0.028 0.018 0.039 0.038 0.045 0.087*** 0.101* -0.014 0.087 
 (0.025) (0.011) (0.045) (0.026) (0.025) (0.032) (0.019) (0.024) (0.028) (0.033) (0.034) (0.057) (0.071) (0.161) 
Christian 0.014 0.000 -0.161*** -0.050 0.033 0.045 0.078 0.060 0.055 0.047 0.026 0.314 -0.040 -0.369 
 (0.088) (0.121) (0.052) (0.086) (0.114) (0.119) (0.108) (0.104) (0.099) (0.158) (0.094) (0.282) (0.576) (0.272) 
Muslim 0.014 0.000 -0.093 0.008 0.063 0.085 0.097 0.057 0.018 -0.005 -0.025 0.256 -0.182 -0.623** 
 (0.090) (0.122) (0.062) (0.117) (0.126) (0.128) (0.112) (0.106) (0.103) (0.162) (0.098) (0.255) (0.560) (0.245) 
Houseland -0.050 0.000 -0.033 -0.036 -0.095*** -0.102*** -0.071* -0.051* -0.048 -0.030 -0.039 -0.000 0.069 0.025 
 (0.033) (0.006) (0.028) (0.030) (0.025) (0.039) (0.039) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.060) (0.080) (0.113) (0.136) 
Locallang 0.002 -0.000 -0.038 -0.030 -0.079** -0.068*** 0.024 0.048* 0.053 -0.007 0.019 0.017 -0.029 -0.029 
 (0.026) (0.011) (0.058) (0.031) (0.031) (0.025) (0.020) (0.025) (0.033) (0.034) (0.038) (0.059) (0.061) (0.227) 
South-East 0.139*** -0.000 0.156*** 0.157*** 0.208*** 0.185*** 0.158*** 0.179*** 0.116*** 0.063** 0.085 0.136** -0.024 0.116 
 (0.028) (0.007) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.029) (0.031) (0.038) (0.027) (0.056) (0.064) (0.105) (0.127) 
South-West -0.137*** -0.000 -0.067 -0.095** -0.077*** -0.041 -0.094*** -0.114*** -0.128*** -0.109*** -0.105* -0.197*** -0.466*** -0.087 
 (0.028) (0.010) (0.057) (0.042) (0.029) (0.038) (0.024) (0.039) (0.037) (0.029) (0.055) (0.048) (0.134) (0.099) 
North 0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.052 0.028 -0.001 -0.068* -0.037 -0.059 -0.025 -0.037 0.136* 0.311*** 0.389** 
 (0.030) (0.006) (0.042) (0.047) (0.043) (0.041) (0.038) (0.034) (0.040) (0.041) (0.049) (0.071) (0.089) (0.191) 
Employer 0.115*** 0.000 0.056 0.144* 0.140*** 0.099*** 0.052 0.130* 0.191*** 0.131*** 0.075 0.155** 0.148 0.199 
 (0.038) (0.025) (0.051) (0.086) (0.033) (0.027) (0.035) (0.072) (0.036) (0.036) (0.058) (0.064) (0.147) (0.192) 
S.Employed -0.086*** -0.000 -0.101** -0.198*** -0.183*** -0.164*** -0.154*** -0.121*** -0.075*** 0.029 0.018 0.108** 0.143 0.183 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.045) (0.038) (0.038) (0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.027) (0.019) (0.031) (0.046) (0.091) (0.106) 
Cons 12.001*** 10.491*** 9.835*** 9.948*** 10.145*** 10.642*** 10.753*** 11.233*** 11.242*** 11.349*** 0.013 12.796*** 12.862*** 16.641*** 
 (0.277) (0.140) (0.164) (0.264) (0.289) (0.224) (0.196) (0.150) (0.169) (0.261) (0.011) (0.369) (0.857) (0.859) 
Sigma/R2 0.7515 0.0179 0.0936 0.1173 0.1398 0.1295 0.1139 0.1119 0.1007 0.0931 0.0753   0.0574 0.0447 0.0397 
  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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The results of estimations [5.6] and [5.7] on the male 2004 earning population highlight the 
following: 
1. The Heckman corrected conditional earnings premium/penalty estimates indicate that on 
average, self-employed own account male individuals earn about 8.6% less than their 
counterparts in paid work, while male employers earn about 11.5% more.  
2. At the conditional quantile estimates (and at the median), self-employed own account 
male workers still consistently earn less than paid male employees but seem to do better 
around the upper quantiles – even though these premiums are mostly insignificant. 
3. At the conditional quantile estimates and at the median, male employers are the highest 
earning in the sample; these premiums are significant in many instances. 
4. All other variable coefficients are as would be expected from the literature (note that 
living in the urban area/sector is associated with higher labour wages and increased 
education has a significant and positive relationship with earnings as well). 
These results can also be highlighted in the graph (Figure 25) below: 
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Figure 25: Heckman and Quantile Labour Wage Premiums and Penalties for Males – Estimations [5.6] 
& [5.7]; Male Respondents  
 
 
Figure 25 indicates that male employers in the general have earnings premiums and continue to do 
better than paid workers and self-employed “own account” workers until the upper quantiles and 
hence can be described as being mostly in pulled self-employment, since they are in a preferable 
employment option as regards labour wage. 
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Self-employed “own account” male workers on the other hand are mostly worse off in terms of 
labour wage until the 70th quantile, when they begin to experience premiums (though note from 
Table 21 that this effect is sometimes insignificant). Those experiencing penalties and premiums 
respectively can be classed as being in pushed and pulled self-employment according to the 
literature, as they are better and worse off respectively compared to paid workers as regards labour 
wage. 
 
The estimations [5.6] and [5.7] are run for female respondents only in order to scrutinize the 
differences (if any) among the genders; the results are shown below in Table 2250:
                                                          
50 The results of the first stage of the Heckman (1979) procedure, estimation [5.4] i.e. selection into 
employment (employer, paid work or self-employed “own account” labour status) are presented in the 
appendix section. 
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Variables Heckman 
Estimation 
Table 22: Female Labour Wage Premiums and Penalties - Estimations [5.6] & [5.7] for Female Sample 
Q(.01) Q(.05) Q(.10) Q(.20)  Q(.30) Q(.40) Q(.50) Q(.60) Q(.70) Q(.80) Q(.90) Q(.95) Q(.99) 
Age in years 0.079*** -0.000 0.013 0.024*** 0.034*** 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.023* 0.001 -0.028 0.032 
 (0.020) (0.000) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.025) (0.030) (0.067) 
Age(square) -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Urban -0.016 0.000* -0.007 -0.024 -0.020 0.021 0.053** 0.009 -0.049 -0.022 -0.028 -0.135 -0.192** -0.147 
 (0.032) (0.000) (0.031) (0.027) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026) (0.033) (0.040) (0.054) (0.043) (0.086) (0.075) (0.229) 
Unspecified 0.143** -0.000 0.067** 0.090 0.100 0.058 0.048 0.020 0.051 0.208** 0.369*** 0.515*** 0.765*** 1.098 
 (0.066) (0.000) (0.029) (0.059) (0.067) (0.074) (0.086) (0.090) (0.092) (0.096) (0.107) (0.120) (0.222) (0.713) 
Low ed 0.369*** -0.000 0.218*** 0.303*** 0.327*** 0.309*** 0.274*** 0.238*** 0.266*** 0.309*** 0.417*** 0.452*** 0.790*** 0.827 
 (0.063) (0.000) (0.057) (0.074) (0.062) (0.077) (0.078) (0.084) (0.085) (0.082) (0.109) (0.119) (0.157) (0.660) 
Mid ed 0.534*** -0.000 0.289*** 0.433*** 0.430*** 0.470*** 0.512*** 0.500*** 0.456*** 0.482*** 0.488*** 0.562*** 0.750*** 0.873 
 (0.069) (0.000) (0.058) (0.056) (0.059) (0.081) (0.093) (0.087) (0.084) (0.083) (0.106) (0.143) (0.158) (0.676) 
High ed 0.962*** 0.328** 0.707*** 0.723*** 1.055*** 1.063*** 1.033*** 0.963*** 0.850*** 0.884*** 0.909*** 1.064*** 1.227*** 1.127 
 (0.081) (0.134) (0.067) (0.110) (0.135) (0.090) (0.091) (0.089) (0.085) (0.072) (0.120) (0.151) (0.143) (0.730) 
Very highed 1.393*** -0.000 0.216 1.690*** 1.403*** 1.382*** 1.249*** 1.544*** 1.570*** 1.440*** 1.415*** 1.238*** 1.310*** 0.882 
 (0.122) (0.603) (0.735) (0.224) (0.068) (0.129) (0.227) (0.247) (0.173) (0.107) (0.111) (0.159) (0.196) (0.737) 
Married 0.022 -0.000 0.021 0.033 0.002 -0.016 0.007 -0.013 0.017 0.003 0.081** 0.159*** 0.122 -0.055 
 (0.028) (0.000) (0.036) (0.038) (0.033) (0.034) (0.041) (0.039) (0.038) (0.033) (0.035) (0.050) (0.095) (0.220) 
Christian 0.083 0.000 0.057 0.205** 0.259 -0.069 -0.012 -0.061 -0.187** -0.059 0.152 0.331 -0.264 0.784** 
 (0.108) (0.000) (0.055) (0.101) (0.275) (0.198) (0.156) (0.178) (0.092) (0.114) (0.157) (0.434) (0.480) (0.330) 
Muslim -0.028 0.000 0.077 0.158* 0.184 -0.129 -0.133 -0.170 -0.257** -0.145 0.087 0.197 -0.109 0.828** 
 (0.113) (0.000) (0.055) (0.091) (0.278) (0.210) (0.150) (0.177) (0.103) (0.107) (0.169) (0.454) (0.494) (0.324) 
Houseland -0.135*** 0.000 -0.007 -0.038 -0.114* -0.077* -0.100** -0.082* -0.051 -0.099* -0.000 -0.179* -0.129 -0.410 
 (0.048) (0.000) (0.048) (0.042) (0.059) (0.045) (0.043) (0.049) (0.055) (0.059) (0.064) (0.099) (0.178) (0.253) 
Locallang -0.092*** -0.000 -0.064 -0.082** -0.096** -0.167*** -0.164*** -0.151*** -0.077 -0.056 -0.046 0.026 -0.027 -0.136 
 (0.034) (0.000) (0.039) (0.041) (0.042) (0.036) (0.036) (0.050) (0.047) (0.043) (0.052) (0.088) (0.100) (0.160) 
South-East 0.081* 0.000 0.091** 0.004 0.042 -0.003 -0.091*** -0.092** -0.056 -0.073* -0.012 0.259*** 0.319*** -0.141 
 (0.048) (0.000) (0.036) (0.047) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.039) (0.049) (0.042) (0.041) (0.087) (0.117) (0.283) 
South-West 0.068 0.000 -0.027 -0.081** -0.002 -0.041 -0.125*** -0.080 -0.084** -0.087* -0.131* 0.044 0.221 -0.135 
 (0.055) (0.000) (0.043) (0.040) (0.041) (0.046) (0.036) (0.051) (0.039) (0.046) (0.067) (0.091) (0.175) (0.286) 
North 0.082 -0.000 0.132*** 0.118** 0.158*** 0.167*** 0.065 0.100** 0.068 0.073 0.054 0.397* 0.944*** 0.119 
 (0.068) (0.018) (0.046) (0.055) (0.059) (0.063) (0.053) (0.043) (0.061) (0.050) (0.058) (0.241) (0.288) (0.390) 
Employer 0.172*** 0.000 0.000 0.041 -0.027 -0.001 -0.026 0.044 0.094 0.056 0.188 0.998*** 0.636*** 0.026 
 (0.062) (0.118) (0.144) (0.103) (0.101) (0.057) (0.065) (0.106) (0.074) (0.084) (0.271) (0.215) (0.185) (0.229) 
S.Employed -0.326*** -0.000** -0.227*** -0.326*** -0.444*** -0.452*** -0.403*** -0.382*** -0.342*** -0.303*** -0.231*** -0.180** -0.079 0.016 
 (0.031) (0.000) (0.049) (0.031) (0.035) (0.029) (0.035) (0.035) (0.029) (0.060) (0.046) (0.078) (0.084) (0.175) 
Cons 9.381*** 10.491*** 10.230*** 10.034*** 10.059*** 10.456*** 10.623*** 10.787*** 11.026*** 11.065*** 11.146*** 11.430*** 12.571*** 11.455*** 
 (0.530) (0.000) (0.170) (0.199) (0.328) (0.315) (0.213) (0.291) (0.265) (0.295) (0.433) (0.568) (0.465) (1.772) 
Sigma/R2 0.7369 0.0115 0.0705 0.1013 0.1284 0.1578 0.1681 0.1634 0.1552 0.1331 0.1073 0.0929 0.0885 0.0644 
  * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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The results of estimations [5.6] and [5.7] on the female 2004 earning population underscore the 
following: 
1. The Heckman corrected conditional earnings premium/penalty estimates indicate that on 
average, self-employed own account female individuals earn about 32.6% less than their 
counterparts in paid work, while female employers earn about 17.2% more.  
2. At the conditional quantile estimates (and at the median), self-employed own account 
female workers still consistently earn less than paid female employees. 
3. At the conditional quantile estimates and at the median, female employers are typically 
the highest earning in the female sample. Although the thesis finds penalties in some 
cases, these are few and are found towards the lower/left and middle ends of the income 
distribution. Premiums are found towards the right side of the income distribution and are 
also significant in a few instances. 
4. All other variable coefficients are as expected from the literature. (Note that in this case, 
living in the urban area/sector is sometimes associated with lower labour wages but 
increased education still has a significant and positive relationship with earnings, as 
found in the male results). 
These results can also be highlighted in the graph (Figure 26) below: 
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Figure 26: Heckman and Quantile Labour Wage Premiums and Penalties for Females – Estimations 
[5.6] & [5.7]; Female Respondents  
 
 
Figure 26 indicates that female employers in general experience earnings premiums, while female 
self-employed “own account” workers generally experience penalties in labour wages compared 
to paid workers. According to the literature, female workers with premiums in labour wage can be 
described as being in pulled self-employment since they are in a preferable employment option as 
regards labour wage, while those with penalties can be classed as being in pushed self-
employment. 
 
218 
 
4.6.2: Potential Econometric Issues – Endogeneity Robustness Checks 
 
As robustness checks to address the endogeneity issue discussed in Section [5.4.3], this thesis 
once again runs estimations [5.6] and [5.7] on the survey, but this time without the educational 
variables; this is due to a lack of suitable instruments correlated with the educational variables 
but uncorrelated with the error terms in the data – we are thus eliminating the “potential 
endogenous problem variable”, although the results are valid as they are. 
 
The literature however allows for the exclusion of the potential endogenous term completely 
and performing the estimation (Parker, 2009, Bargain and Kwenda, 2011). In line with this 
and as a form of robustness check, this thesis thus performs that analysis next to allow a 
comparison of results with and without the educational variable estimates, and the outcome is 
presented next51:
                                                          
51 The results of the first stage of the Heckman (1979) procedure, estimation [5.4] i.e. selection into 
employment (employer, paid work or self-employed “own account” labour status) are presented in the 
appendix section. 
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* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Table 23: Robustness Checks; Labour Wage Premiums and Penalties - Estimations [5.6] & [5.7] With & Without Educational Variables 
Employment Heckman Whole Sample With Education Variables 
 Estimation Q(.01) Q(.05) Q(.10) Q(.20)  Q(.30) Q(.40) Q(.50) Q(.60) Q(.70) Q(.80) Q(.90) Q(.95) Q(.99) 
Employer 0.126*** 0.000 0.007 0.065 0.089** 0.100*** 0.048 0.109** 0.135*** 0.070** 0.067 0.286*** 0.316** 0.057 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.093) (0.082) (0.036) (0.031) (0.032) (0.055) (0.033) (0.028) (0.043) (0.071) (0.146) (0.148) 
SE OwnAcct -0.160*** 0.000** -0.156*** -0.273*** -0.298*** -0.242*** -0.244*** -0.206*** -0.163*** -0.095*** -0.061*** 0.076 0.076 0.182 
 (0.017) (0.000) (0.037) (0.029) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.051) (0.053) (0.108) 
  Whole Sample Without Education Variables 
Employer 0.124*** 0.000 -0.022 0.085 0.042 (0.030) 0.026 0.095*** 0.104*** 0.111 0.229*** 0.230*** 0.303*** 0.007 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.073) (0.096) (0.037) -0.007 (0.041) (0.031) (0.027) (0.068) (0.086) (0.139) (0.102) (0.144) 
SE OwnAcct -0.331*** 0.000 -0.255*** -0.382*** -0.486*** (0.036) -0.436*** -0.409*** -0.349*** -0.299*** -0.261*** -0.103** -0.049 -0.291*** 
 (0.017) (0.000) (0.034) (0.028) (0.022) -0.500*** (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.033) (0.046) (0.064) (0.112) 
  Female Sample With Educational Variables 
Employer 0.172*** 0.000 0.000 0.041 -0.027 -0.001 -0.026 0.044 0.094 0.056 0.188 0.998*** 0.636*** 0.026 
 (0.062) (0.118) (0.144) (0.103) (0.101) (0.057) (0.065) (0.106) (0.074) (0.084) (0.271) (0.215) (0.185) (0.229) 
SE OwnAcct -0.326*** -0.000** -0.227*** -0.326*** -0.444*** -0.452*** -0.403*** -0.382*** -0.342*** -0.303*** -0.231*** -0.180** -0.079 0.016 
 (0.031) (0.000) (0.049) (0.031) (0.035) (0.029) (0.035) (0.035) (0.029) (0.060) (0.046) (0.078) (0.084) (0.175) 
  Female Sample  Without Educational Variables 
Employer 0.152** 0.000 -0.022 0.013 -0.014 -0.076 -0.008 0.171** 0.120** 0.039 0.076 0.640*** 0.528** 0.051 
 (0.064) (0.145) (0.085) (0.101) (0.109) (0.093) (0.103) (0.068) (0.056) (0.048) (0.258) (0.173) (0.222) (0.254) 
SE OwnAcct -0.511*** 0.000 -0.286*** -0.369*** -0.536*** -0.656*** -0.673*** -0.635*** -0.623*** -0.570*** -0.455*** -0.416*** -0.318*** 0.001 
 (0.029) (0.002) (0.033) (0.041) (0.039) (0.045) (0.053) (0.063) (0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.110) (0.120) (0.183) 
  Male Sample With Educational Variables 
Employer 0.115*** 0.000 0.056 0.144* 0.140*** 0.099*** 0.052 0.130* 0.191*** 0.131*** 0.075 0.155** 0.148 0.199 
 (0.038) (0.025) (0.051) (0.086) (0.033) (0.027) (0.035) (0.072) (0.036) (0.036) (0.058) (0.064) (0.147) (0.192) 
SE OwnAcct -0.086*** -0.000 -0.101** -0.198*** -0.183*** -0.164*** -0.154*** -0.121*** -0.075*** 0.029 0.018 0.108** 0.143 0.183 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.045) (0.038) (0.038) (0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.027) (0.019) (0.031) (0.046) (0.091) (0.106) 
  Male Sample  Without Educational Variables 
Employer 0.119*** 0.000 -0.091 0.157* 0.062 0.015 0.071 0.118* 0.083** 0.186*** 0.207*** 0.313*** 0.177 0.138 
 (0.039) (0.000) (0.108) (0.090) (0.041) (0.034) (0.052) (0.062) (0.036) (0.056) (0.067) (0.120) (0.135) (0.122) 
SE OwnAcct -0.231*** 0.000 -0.238*** -0.314*** -0.354*** -0.358*** -0.306*** -0.277*** -0.261*** -0.179*** -0.178*** -0.019 0.071 0.126 
 (0.020) (0.000) (0.060) (0.046) (0.027) (0.022) (0.018) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.040) (0.090) (0.093) 
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From the robustness checks excluding the educational variables, the estimates in Table 23 
indicate that the initial results are robust and consistent to different specifications of the 
estimation. Employers generally experience an earnings premium while most self-employed 
“own account” workers in the main experience earnings penalties; although a few self-
employed “own account” workers, especially individuals at the higher quantiles, experience 
earnings premiums as well.  
 
These findings in totality indicate that a majority of the employers and a minority of own 
account self-employed workers, specifically those at the top ranges of the distribution, might 
be described as pulled into self-employment, since their conditional earnings reveal a premium 
in this employment option compared to paid work. However at the lower ends of the 
distribution, a majority of self-employed “own account” workers experience labour wage 
penalties compared to paid-employees; this might be indicative of pushed self-employment as 
described in the literature. 
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4.6.3: SUMMARY OF RESULTS - LABOUR FORCE PATICIPATION AND LABOUR WAGE 
 
 
Figure 27 : Conceptual Model (Labour Force Participation and Labour Wage) 
 
In this section, this thesis has analysed the heterogeneous labour wage returns to different labour 
force statuses conditional on observable differences. The starting point of this analysis has been 
highlighted in section 2.4.1, where this thesis discussed the notion that it is a conventional fact in 
the economics literature that individuals must receive some income from economic activities in 
other to survive. This may take several forms and is expressed as a simple identity by Standing 
(2000) as: 
𝑆𝐼 = 𝑊 + 𝐶𝐵 + 𝐸𝐵 + 𝑆𝐵 + 𝑃𝐵 
Where 𝑆𝐼 is the individual’s total social income, 𝑊 is the money wage or income received from 
work (labour wage, the variable used in this thesis), 𝐶𝐵 is the value of benefits or support 
provided by the family, kin or the local community, EB is the amount of benefits provided by the 
enterprise in which the person might be working, 𝑆𝐵 is the value of state benefits provided; in 
terms of insurance benefits or other transfers and 𝑃𝐵 is private income benefits, gained through 
investment, including private social protection.  
 
For the purposes of the investigations performed by this thesis, 𝐶𝐵 and 𝐸𝐵 were not included due 
to data limitations but also because they should not affect the results significantly. It is also a 
Labour Wage Labour Force Participation 
• Paid Work  
• Employer/Firm owner 
• Self-employed 
• Unemployed 
• Not in labour force  
 IIIA 
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conventional fact in the literature that  𝑆𝐵 and 𝑃𝐵 are negligible in developing countries; most 
developing countries including the one under investigation do not provide unemployment benefits 
or any form of support to individuals directly or indirectly. Thus we were left with 𝑊 which 
represents the labour wage of individuals. Also since the unemployed and those individuals “not 
in the labour force” do not report or earn any labour wages, their part in this analysis was limited, 
and they were left out. (They did not report any labour wages, as expected by the literature.)  
 
According to the empirical investigations carried out by this thesis by distinguishing employers, 
paid workers and self-employed “own account” workers and running estimations [5.6] and [5.7], 
results show that a majority of employers experience labour wage premiums throughout the 
income distribution, while a majority of self-employed “own account” individuals only experience 
labour wage premiums at the upper quantiles but suffer labour wage penalties at the lower 
quantiles, compared to paid workers. On closer examination, the own account workers who 
experience such premiums are most likely to be engaged in more rewarding/highly skilled 
activities and are more educated than typical own account workers (They are engaged in activities 
like accounting, spinning, retail, the use/sale of technological products and writing materials; 
perhaps these individuals might move to employer status later as opposed to those who experience 
penalties that are engaged in mundane activities like car repairs, gardening and petty trade). 
 
Furthermore, it is the finding of this thesis that a labour wage penalty for the self-employed “own 
account” workers is mainly found towards the lower ends of the distribution (at the left hand side 
of the graphs and tables), where paid workers should enjoy some sort of minimum wage guarantee 
(currently N18,000 in Nigeria). As self-employed “own account” workers are not guaranteed such 
minimum wages, they seem to be substantially worse off towards the lower ends of the distribution, 
but improve later as such effects wear off. 
 
Importantly, the thesis finds that there is indeed an ordering of earnings/incomes into low-income 
self-employment (which seems to be found mainly in the self-employment own account 
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occupational category), medium-income paid employment, and high-income self-employment 
(which seems to be found mainly in the employer occupational category), that corresponds to a 
similar ordering of low human capital, medium human capital and high human capital among the 
labour market participants. It is important to note that annual income variable is not adjusted for 
hours so we don’t know if the results will hold in productivity terms.  
 
From the perspective of rationality in terms of labour wage discussed in section 4.2, a majority of 
employers can be classed as pulled into this employment option, as they are advantaged in terms 
of labour wages; while a significant proportion of the self-employed “own account” individuals 
surveyed can be classed as pushed into this employment option, as they are disadvantaged in terms 
of labour wages. To the best of this researcher’s knowledge, this distinction, analysis and its 
resultant finding is a new approach in the debate on occupational status within developing 
countries Two major caveats are that the thesis cannot tell if employers moved from paid work or 
self-employment into employer status (or even if this is the first occupational status of these 
individuals), and that the thesis cannot test for non-pecuniary factors in occupational statuses, as 
pointed out in section 4.2.  
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4.7: HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 
 
 
Figure 28: Conceptual Model (Labour Force Participation and Household Consumption) 
 
So far, authors have overlooked the fact that decisions are often made at a household level, because 
household units might seek to maximise their joint/combined consumption as a household unit. 
 
Consider two examples. The first involves a household of 5 individuals who are eligible for work; 
the household could decide to send two individuals into paid work and three individuals into self-
employment. The second involves a two adult household made up of a husband and wife; the 
husband could go into full time paid work to bring home a steady income while the wife could be 
selected to go into self-employment, since the income from that sector is characterised by more 
variation, and being in self-employment could free the wife up for domestic duties like child 
rearing.  
 
Having individuals in paid work could be a sort of buffer for the household, as paid-jobs are 
associated with a steady income/wage specified in the employment contract. Other individuals in 
self-employment could have months of higher earnings and months when things are not so 
positive; but the household could apportion such individuals into self-employment hoping that 
these individuals could achieve high income streams and achieve success in self-employment. 
Household 
Consumption 
Labour Force Participation 
• Paid Work  
• Employer/Firm owner 
• Self-employed 
• Unemployed 
• Not in labour force  
 IIIB 
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Thus the proportion of individuals in each occupational category could have implications for total 
household consumption. Also since labour wages (less savings, transfers and investments) should 
directly influence consumption positively, it will be beneficial to our overall inquiry to see if the 
relationship between occupational status and labour wages holds true for the proportions of 
occupational status and household consumption as well.  
 
This thesis takes the relationship between occupational statuses and household consumption into 
account, and thus postulates that households could be strategic in deciding how many individuals 
they will allocate into each occupational category, as households jointly seek to maximise the total 
consumption of the combined household. The third assessment thus aims to examine the 
heterogeneous returns in terms of household consumption in relation to the household proportion 
of employment statuses. 
 
According to the economics literature, the maximum level of utility for households is 
mathematically expressed as: 
Max U = max U(x1, x2),  s.t. I = p1x1 + p2x2,  (x1, x2) price and goods. 
Where U(x1, x2) is the utility function representing household preferences, I (Income) depends on 
total labour in the household and Utility (U) implying welfare is directly linked to Consumption 
Ct  (Household leisure and other non-pecuniary goods are not taken into consideration as already 
specified above).  
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4.7.1: METHODOLOGY 3.1: HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION– OLS REGRESSION ESTIMATION 
 
The thesis denotes the adult equivalent consumption expenditure per household Ch as the 
dependent variable. Various employment states of the adult members of each household enter the 
regression as independent variables as shown in equation [5.8], and a series of controls that 
influence household consumption in the literature is also introduced into the estimation via xh. The 
OLS estimation can be written simply as:  
 
𝐶 ℎ =  𝑥ℎ𝛽 +  𝑆𝐸ℎ  +  𝐸𝑚𝑝ℎ  +  𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑚ℎ  +  𝜇ℎ                                                  [5.8] 
 
Estimated coefficients 𝑆𝐸ℎ  , 𝐸𝑚𝑝ℎand 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑚ℎ represent the proportions of household members 
in the self-employment, employer and non-employment categories respectively.  
 
The total household consumption amount for each household in the analysis 𝐶 ℎis derived by 
adding together the naira (monetary) value of total household food purchases, total household food 
produced, total sundries, and total capital expenditure by households within the year, and then 
adjusting for adult equivalents. Recent studies suggest that a better measure of household 
consumption would be the adult equivalent scaled consumption52 instead of the indiscriminate per-
capita consumption (Demoussis and Mihalopoulos, 2001).  
 
𝑥ℎ𝛽 consists of standard controls that are found in the literature to influence household 
consumption. They include the household head characteristics (the occupational industry of the 
                                                          
52 Adult Equivalent Scales are measures that show how much an individual household member of a 
given sex and age contributes to the household expenditures relative to a standard household member: 
TEDFORD, J. R., CAPPS, O. & HAVLICEK, J. 1986. Adult equivalent scales once more—A 
developmental approach. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 68, 322-333.  
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household head, dummies to indicate if the household head works in the private or public sector 
and gender of household head), the demographics of the household, location in terms of urbanity 
or region, dummies for household wealth, the size of the employable household and the 
educational attainment of household members.  
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4.7.2: METHODOLOGY 3.2: HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION– QUANTILE REGRESSION 
ESTIMATION 
 
In the case of quantile regressions, the thesis can express for any household h on the τth quantile 
in the Ct distribution:  
FCh
‐1 (τ|xh) =  xhβ(τ) + SE(τ)h +  Emp(τ)h + NonEm(τ)h, ∀τϵ[0,1]                  [5.9] 
 
To gain a proper insight from this investigation, the quantile percentage points that are observed 
in this estimation are:. 10, .25, .50, .75, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 .90 
 
Therefore the effects of the covariates reflect the quantiles of interest, in particular household 
consumption depending on the proportion of household members in each employment category. 
The thesis also uses CDF plots and other forms of descriptive statistics standard in the literature. 
The third empirical assessment thus involves:  
 
(a) A household level welfare analysis involving OLS modified quantile regressions - Eqn 
[5.9]. 
(b)  CDF plots showing the per capita consumption of households adjusted for adult 
equivalents dependent on the proportion of household members in each employment 
category. 
(c) Other forms of descriptive statistics.  
 
The insight generated from this is to determine if households with a greater proportion of any of 
the employment states are bound to suffer, relative to having a higher proportion of another other 
employment option. The econometric issues in this assessment are the same as in the previous one 
and the same measures were taken. Tests for multicollinearity and robustness proved satisfactory. 
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4.8: RESULTS OF ASSESSMENTS 3 - HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 
 
Concerning the third assessment, the thesis approaches the investigation into labour force 
participation from a different angle, by considering that households could be strategic in terms of 
how they participate in the labour force. 
 
In the literature, most models and studies make use of individual variables - where the employment 
choice depends on the relative earning power of being either in self-employment or finding paid 
work. However in reality, decisions on occupational choice could be made on a household level 
as households try to make the most of their joint utility by ensuring that the household achieves a 
maximum expenditure stream. 
 
This thesis takes this into account and postulates that households decide how many individuals 
will go into each occupational category as household members jointly seek to maximise the total 
consumption of the household. Consider a household of 5 individuals, who are all eligible for 
work: the household could decide to send 2 individuals into paid work and 3 individuals into self-
employment, and the ratio of this decision could have implications for the total consumption 
available for the household.  
 
On a practical note, however, having individuals in paid work could be a sort of buffer for the 
household, as paid-jobs are generally associated with less variation in labour wages. Individuals 
in self-employment could have months of higher earnings and months when things are “not so 
rosy”; but the household could send these individuals into self-employment status hoping that they 
could achieve the highest income streams available from employer status or upper quantile 
wage/income earning own account self-employment or maybe just out of necessity. 
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Thus the proportion of individuals in each occupational category could have implications for total 
household consumption. Also since labour wage (less savings, transfers and investments) should 
directly influence consumption positively, it will be beneficial to our overall inquiry to see if the 
relationship between occupational status and labour wages holds for the proportions of 
occupational statuses and household consumption as well. 
 
This thesis makes thus makes a further contribution to the developing country debate by 
proportioning each household into employers, wage-earners and paid workers, and examining the 
relationship between occupational status proportion and total household consumption: a concept 
pioneered by Tamvada (2010) in the Indian context.  
 
Therefore for the third assessment the 2009 survey is converted into household variables (due to 
data limitations, only the 2009 survey was used for this estimation; the 2004 survey did not include 
the household consumption variables). The sample used is restricted to employable individuals for 
whom household consumption is also reported, and this greatly reduces the data, to a total of 
40,294 individuals from 6,919 households. The variables used and what they capture are presented 
in Table 24. 
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Table 24: Variables Used and What They Capture; 2009 LSMS Survey 
Variable What It Measures How  
Consumption    
FoodHH Annual Total of  Food 
Purchased by 
Household  
Naira Value of Sum for Four Quarters 
in the Year; Food Purchased by 
Household. 
OwnfoodHH Annual Total of  Food 
Produced by 
Household 
Naira Value of Sum for Four Quarters 
in the Year; Food Produced by 
Household. 
TtlSundryHH Annual Total of 
Household Sundry 
Expenses 
Total Naira Value of Sundry 
Household Expenditure.  
TtlCapitalHH Annual Total of 
Household Capital 
Expenses 
Total Naira Value of Capital 
Household Expenditure. 
TtConsptnHH [Dependent 
Variable] 
 
Total Household 
Consumption in Naira  
Sum of FoodHH, OwnfoodHH, 
TtlSundryHH and TtlCapitalHH.  
[Controls/Independent 
Variables] 
  
Labour Force Proportion   
PropSE Proportion of Self-
Employed Household 
Number of Household Members in 
Self Employment / Number of 
Household Adults. 
PropPaidWorker Proportion of Paid 
Worker Household 
Number of Household Members in 
Paid Employment / Number of 
Household Adults. 
   
PropEmployer Proportion of 
Employer Household 
Number of Household Members who 
are Employers / Number of 
Household Adults. 
   
PropUnemployed Proportion of 
Unemployed 
Household 
Number of Household Members in 
Unemployment / Number of 
Household Adults. 
PropNonLabourForce Proportion of Non 
Labour Force 
Household 
Number of Household Members not 
in Labour Force / Number of 
Household Adults. 
Education   
PropNoEd Adult Proportion of 
Household with No 
Education. 
Number of Adult Household Members 
with No Education / Number of 
Household Adults. 
PropLowEd Adult Proportion of 
Household with Low 
Education. 
Number of Adult Household Members 
with Low Educational Attainments / 
Number of Household Adults. 
PropMidEd Adult Proportion of 
Household with 
Number of Adult Household Members 
with Medium Educational 
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Medium Education Attainments / Number of Household 
Adults. 
PropHighEd Adult Proportion of 
Household with High 
Education. 
Number of Adult Household Members 
with High Educational Attainments / 
Number of Household Adults. 
PropVeryHighEd  Adult Proportion of 
Household with Very 
High Education. 
 
Number of Adult Household Members 
with Very High Educational 
Attainments / Number of Household 
Adults. 
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Table 24 Cont’d   
Demographics   
Btw16to30 Proportion of Household between 
16 to 30 years old. 
Number of Household 
Members aged 16 to 
30 years/ Number of 
Household Adults. 
Btw31to40 Proportion of Household between 
31 to 40 years old. 
Number of Household 
Members aged 31 to 
40 years/ Number of 
Household Adults.. 
Btw41to50 Proportion of Household between 
41 to 50 years old. 
Number of Household 
Members aged 41 to 
50 years/ Number of 
Household Adults. 
Btw51to60 Proportion of Household between 
51 to 60 years old. 
Number of Household 
Members aged 51 to 
60 years/ Number of 
Household Adults. 
Above60 Proportion of Household above 
60 years old. 
Number of Household 
Members above 60 
years / Number of 
People in Household. 
MeanHHAge Mean Household Age Sum of Household 
Age / Number of 
Household Adults. 
PropFemale Employable Female Proportion of 
Household. 
Number of Adult 
Females in Household 
/ Number of 
Household Adults. 
FemaleHHead A Female Household Head Dummy = 1 if 
Household head is 
Female.  
PropMarried Married Proportion of 
Household. 
Number of Married 
Individuals in 
Household / Number 
of Household Adults. 
PropDivWidow Divorced/Widowed Proportion of 
Household. 
Number of Divorced 
or  Widowed 
Individuals in 
Household / Number 
of Household Adults. 
Location   
Urban Urban Residence Dummy = 1 if 
Household is in Urban 
Area.  
Rural Rural Residence Dummy = 1 if 
Household is in Rural 
Area. 
Head Employment Sector   
Public Household Head is in Public Dummy =1 if 
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Sector Employment is in 
Public Sector. 
Private Household Head is in Private 
Sector 
Dummy =1 if 
Employment is in 
Private Sector. 
Regional Controls   
North Northern Region Dummy = 1 if 
Household is in North. 
Mid-belt Mid-belt Region Dummy = 1 if 
Household is in Mid-
belt. 
South-East South-East Region Dummy = 1 if 
Household is in South 
- East. 
South-West South-West Region Dummy = 1 if 
Household is in South 
-West. 
Head Industry Class   
Real Real/Manufacturing  Dummy = 1 if 
Employment is in 
Manufacturing 
Industry.  
Agriculture Agricultural Industry Dummy = 1 if 
Employment is in 
Agricultural Industry. 
Trade Trade Industry Dummy = 1 if 
Employment is in 
Trade Industry. 
Service Service Industry Dummy = 1 if 
Employment is in 
Service Industry. 
  
While it is true that the 2009 sample has been decimated by the specification(s), the sample left is 
a reliable representative sample and is what is available. The author has taken the appropriate 
measures according to good practise to ensure that the sample left is suitable. The 
descriptive/summary statistics for the household converted survey variables shown in Table 24 
above are presented next in Table 25: 
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Table 25: Summary Statistics; Household Variables used in Assessment 3 – 2009 LSMS Survey 
Variable Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Consumption   
FoodHH 53,357.958 
 (16,775.461) 
OwnfoodHH 246.799 
 (2.544) 
TtlSundryHH 4,979.831 
 (51.897) 
TtlCapitalHH 12,912.332 
 (161.838) 
TtConsptnHH 71,496.921 
 (16,776.484) 
LogTtConsptnHH (Log Value)53 9.762 
 (0.005) 
Labour Force Proportion  
PropSE 0.414 
 (0.002) 
PropPaidWorker 0.265 
 (0.002) 
PropEmployer 0.028 
 (0.001) 
PropUnemployed 0.156 
 (0.002) 
PropNonLabourForce 0.136 
 (0.002) 
Education  
PropNoEd 0.057 
 (0.001) 
PropLowEd 0.349 
 (0.002) 
PropMidEd 0.461 
 (0.002) 
PropHighEd 0.128 
 (0.002) 
PropVeryHighEd 0.005 
 (0.000) 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 This thesis once again makes use of the “total household consumption per capita value in the logged 
form”; the reason for this is the same as for the labour wage estimation as explained in section 4.6. 
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Table 25 Cont’d; Demographics  
Btw16to30 0.442 
 (0.002) 
Btw31to40 0.258 
 (0.002) 
Btw41to50 0.180 
 (0.002) 
Btw51to60 0.097 
 (0.001) 
Above60 0.023 
 (0.001) 
MeanHHAge 34.858 
 (0.057) 
PropFemale 0.472 
 (0.002) 
FemaleHHead 0.055 
 (0.001) 
PropMarried 0.730 
 (0.002) 
PropDivWidow 0.030 
 (0.001) 
Location  
Urban 0.516 
 (0.002) 
Rural 0.484 
 (0.002) 
Head Employment Sector  
Public 0.213 
 (0.002) 
Private 0.058 
 (0.001) 
Regional Controls  
North 0.191 
 (0.002) 
Mid-belt 0.168 
 (0.002) 
South-East 0.297 
 (0.002) 
South-West 0.345 
 (0.002) 
Head Industry Class  
Real 0.304 
 (0.002) 
Agriculture 0.004 
 (0.000) 
Trade 0.042 
 (0.001) 
Service 0.092 
 (0.001) 
N:                          6,919Households; 40,294 Individuals 
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The summary statistics indicate the following. The total consumption for households averages 
around N71,496.921 and a huge proportion of that is spent on household feeding. On average, 
households have more adult members in self-employment and then engaged in paid work, followed 
by unemployed individuals and then those “not in labour force”; the employer category is the 
smallest cluster as expected from the literature and as seen in the previous estimations. The 
educational proportions reveal that most households have adults with medium to low education, 
and then high and no educational categories: the very high education category is once again the 
smallest group. As for demographics, most households have members in the lower age categories 
and the mean age of household members is 35 years. About half of the average household is female 
and most adults report being married.   
 
The sample is balanced across urban and rural locations and most household heads seem to work 
in the public sector (for the government: an indication that such jobs are associated with some sort 
of job security as supported by the literature on developing countries). The regional controls also 
reveal that our sample is somewhat balanced across regions, and most household heads once again 
report belonging to the real54/manufacturing industry sector. 
 
As stated in section 5.7.2 , this thesis will utilize quantile regressions when investigating the 
relationship between household employment proportions and household consumption (An 
Ordinary Least Square “OLS” Estimation is included in the Appendix section, Table 32). In the 
case of quantile regressions, we can write for any household h the τth quantile in the Ct 
distribution:  
𝐹𝐶ℎ
−1(𝜏|𝑥ℎ) =  𝑥ℎ𝛽(𝜏) +  𝑆𝐸(𝜏)ℎ +  𝐸𝑚𝑝(𝜏)ℎ + 𝑈𝑠𝑝(𝜏)ℎ, ∀𝜏𝜖[0,1]                  [5.9] 
To enable proper insight from this investigation, the quantile percentage points that are observed 
in this estimation are:. 10, .25, .50, .75, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 .90. Therefore the effects of the covariates reflect the 
                                                          
54 The real sector in this thesis consists of industries including manufacturing, construction, mineral 
extraction and mining, etc.   
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quantiles of interest, in particular household consumption depending on the proportion of 
household members in each employment state. The results of estimation [5.9] are presented next:  
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Table 26: Quantile Regression; Household Proportions and Consumption – Estimation [5.9] 
 Q(.10) Q(.25) Q(.50) Q(.75) Q(.90) 
Labour Force Proportion      
PropSE(Own Account) 0.070* 0.019** -0.084*** -0.065*** -0.094** 
 (0.036) (0.032) (0.026) (0.024) (0.047) 
PropEmployer 0.360*** 0.262*** 0.121** 0.161*** 0.243*** 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.050) (0.022) (0.067) 
PropUnemployed 0.160** 0.042 0.082* 0.057* 0.121* 
 (0.028) (0.045) (0.033) (0.025) (0.058) 
PropNonLabourForce 0.130** 0.002 -0.005 -0.115*** -0.218*** 
 (0.026) (0.051) (0.032) (0.023) (0.029) 
Education      
PropLowEd -0.146*** -0.120*** -0.022 -0.007 -0.021 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.021) (0.058) (0.033) 
PropMidEd -0.075** 0.026 0.089*** 0.086 0.080** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.021) (0.055) (0.033) 
PropHighEd 0.069* 0.178*** 0.333*** 0.338*** 0.456*** 
 (0.038) (0.043) (0.030) (0.063) (0.051) 
PropVeryHighEd -0.074 -0.042 0.211** 0.349*** 1.535*** 
 (0.152) (0.219) (0.104) (0.102) (0.060) 
 Demographics      
Btw31to40 -0.033 -0.004 0.080*** 0.098*** 0.357*** 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.026) (0.031) (0.054) 
Btw41to50 -0.136* -0.026 0.120*** 0.284*** 0.501*** 
 (0.076) (0.056) (0.040) (0.055) (0.070) 
Btw51to60 -0.128 0.070 0.170*** 0.318*** 0.785*** 
 (0.095) (0.072) (0.050) (0.077) (0.124) 
Above60 0.132 0.285*** 0.342*** 0.574*** 1.202*** 
 (0.136) (0.093) (0.093) (0.101) (0.177) 
MeanHHAge 0.008*** -0.001 -0.007*** -0.013*** -0.030*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
PropFemale 0.036 0.055*** -0.015 0.030* 0.074*** 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.025) 
FemaleHHead -0.234*** -0.075 -0.182*** -0.215*** -0.163*** 
 (0.067) (0.048) (0.023) (0.046) (0.041) 
PropMarried -0.036 0.001 0.052*** 0.006 0.137*** 
 (0.031) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.025) 
PropDivWidow 0.048 0.114** 0.326*** 0.256*** 0.362*** 
 (0.044) (0.056) (0.046) (0.051) (0.060) 
Location      
Urban 0.217*** 0.200*** 0.202*** 0.184*** 0.129*** 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.020) 
Head Employment Sector      
Public 0.081** 0.092** 0.041* 0.128*** 0.015 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.022) (0.018) (0.031) 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis.
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Table 26 Cont’d      
Variable Q(.10) Q(.25) Q(.50) Q(.75) Q(.90) 
Regional Controls      
North -0.309*** -0.226*** -0.153*** -0.065*** 0.039 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.022) (0.018) (0.034) 
South-East 0.307*** 0.250*** 0.324*** 0.395*** 0.274*** 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.024) 
South-West 0.198*** 0.322*** 0.440*** 0.494*** 0.444*** 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) 
Head Industry Class      
Real -0.030 0.010 0.032 -0.019 -0.081* 
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.043) 
Agriculture 0.105 -0.060 0.172 -0.150*** -0.573*** 
 (0.407) (0.102) (0.209) (0.046) (0.044) 
Trade -0.213*** 0.058 0.023 0.047** -0.087* 
 (0.046) (0.073) (0.032) (0.024) (0.052) 
Service -0.061** -0.018 0.076*** 0.069** -0.006 
 (0.026) (0.040) (0.025) (0.034) (0.045) 
C 8.180*** 8.847*** 9.467*** 10.213*** 11.224*** 
 (0.056) (0.072) (0.047) (0.075) (0.057) 
Pseudo R2 0.0564 0.0479 0.0509 0.0519 0.0465 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis. 
 
The dependent variable for estimation [5.9] in Table 26 is the log of total household consumption 
expenditure (per-capita household consumption) expressed in naira amounts. The base category 
for occupation is the proportion of economically active individuals in the household who are in 
paid work; for education; it is the household proportion with no education; for marital status, it is 
the unmarried; for region; it is the mid-belt; for age group it is household proportion aged between 
16 to 30 ; for location, the rural area; and for sector, the private sector.  
 
The results in Table 26 indicate that households that have a higher proportion of employers enjoy 
the highest household consumption expenditure compared to any other category; this finding is 
consistent and significant. Households with a higher proportion of employers have significantly 
higher consumption levels than any other occupational proportion at all quantiles - this is 
consistent with our initial labour wage analysis; and can be translated to imply that employers have 
converted their higher income streams in terms of labour wage premiums into household 
expenditure. It also agrees with the findings of Tamvada (2010). 
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For a comparison between paid worker proportions and self-employed “own account” proportions, 
the estimation crucially shows that households that have a higher proportion of paid workers have 
lower consumption levels than households that have a higher proportion of self-employed own 
account members at lower quantiles (between the 10th and 25th quantiles) and then have higher 
consumption levels at upper quantiles (from the 50th to the 90th quantiles). 
 
This would seem to imply that households could send individuals into own account self-
employment because such activities could help contribute to household consumption in ways that 
labour wage derived from paid-jobs cannot; hence looking at the occupational status debate from 
the angle of labour wage alone could be insufficient. For example, self-employment could free 
individuals to pursue activities that benefit the household collectively and individually, while paid 
work is only associated with fixed monetary incomes where the individual is at a designated place 
of employment and can only perform contractually stipulated duties.  
 
It might also be preferable to be in self-employment (e.g to have a corner shop or venture into 
some skill area as one’s own boss) in such countries rather than to be engaged in a low paying paid 
job at the lower welfare quantiles – the skills possessed by individuals in such paid-jobs55 are not 
lofty and their labour wages reflect this. At the upper consumption quantiles however, individuals 
in paid work are more likely to possess significant educational attainments to attain such “higher 
welfare” jobs. On closer examination, the own account workers in this case are engaged in 
activities like sales, tailoring, car repairs and machinery work. 
 
Hence once again, the thesis finds a heterogeneous relationship between paid work, self-
employment and household consumption. While employers are clearly better off, self-employed 
“own account” workers are worse off at the upper quantiles while paid workers are worse off at 
the lower quantiles (unlike the labour wage estimation). 
                                                          
55 Individuals with such paid-jobs include gardners, personal drivers, security personnel unlike highly skilled 
persons at the other end of the quantile. 
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Other variables in the estimation produced results as expected from the literature; having a higher 
proportion of more educated individuals is good for household consumption and so is living in an 
urban area. Households with female heads are worse off; and households in the northern region of 
the country are also worse off in terms of household consumption, as highlighted in the reports by 
the World Bank and NBS on Nigeria. Also, having the household head work for the government 
seems to be positively linked with household consumption. 
 
Furthermore, the literature on household consumption in developing countries recommends the 
use of “Adult Equivalent Scales” (AES) when engaging in estimations involving household 
consumption. Adult equivalent scales are measures that show how much an individual household 
member of a given sex and age contributes to the household expenditures relative to a standard 
household member (Tedford et al., 1986).  This allows investigators to properly probe into the 
household consumption of each member of the household instead of the indiscriminate use of per-
capita or total household consumption.  
 
For example, in two households of five individuals with the same household consumption value, 
the ratio of adults to children and their gender could have implications for the actual amount of 
consumption obtainable by each individual. If a household has more male adults than children, the 
actual consumption each individual can enjoy is reduced as male adults typically need to consume 
more than children: thus the household with more children would actually enjoy more consumption 
if the household consumption value for both households is the same, and the per-capita value of 
total consumption could be a wrong indicator. 
 
The adult equivalent scales used in this thesis are in line with the developing country literature 
proposed by Demoussis and Mihalopoulos (2001) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1986). To test for 
robustness, the estimations were also run to specifications without the adult equivalence scales 
(and the results were robust). The adult equivalence scales used are presented below in Table 27. 
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Table 27: Adult Equivalent Scales used in Assessment 3 – 2009 LSMS Survey 
Individual Characteristics (Age and Sex) Adult Equivalent 
Conversion Factor 
Less than 1year  0.29 
Between 1year and 3years 0.51 
Between 4years and 6years  0.71 
Between 7years and 10years  0.78 
Male (age) 11-14  0.98 
Male (age) 15-18  1.15 
Male (age) 18-50  1 
Male above  (age) 50  0.9 
Female (age) 11-14  0.86 
Female (age) 15-18   0.9 
Female (age) 18-50  0.96 
Female above (age) 50  0.75 
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The above adult equivalent scales were used on the household consumption expenditure for each 
household to convert the dependent variable as recommended by the literature into an accurate 
reflection of household consumption; and the estimation [5.9] was run again as a robustness check. 
The summary statistic for the converted consumption variable is presented below: 
 
Table 28: Summary Statistic: Adult Equivalent Total Household Consumption – 2009 LSMS 
Survey 
Variable Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Consumption   
TtConsptnHH[Total Household Consumption] 71,496.921 
 (16,776.484) 
LogTtConsptnHH (Log Value) 9.762 
 (0.005) 
LogAESTtConsptnHH (Log Value) [Adult Equivalent Household 
Consumption] 
11.976 
 (0.006) 
 
As stated, estimation [5.9] was run with the log value of the adult equivalent (A.E.) household 
consumption for households as the dependent variable in place of the indiscriminate per-capita 
household consumption used in Table 26, and the results are presented next: 
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Table 29: Quantile Regression: Household Proportions and A.E. Consumption – Estimation [5.9] 
Dependant Variable 
LogAESTtConsptnHH 
Q(.10) Q(.25) Q(.50) Q(.75) Q(.90) 
Labour Force Proportion      
PropSE(Own Account) 0.022** 0.016** -0.160*** -0.083* 0.067 
 (0.042) (.046) (0.032) (0.044) (0.885) 
PropEmployer 0.365*** 0.304 0.164*** 0.140*** 0.661*** 
 (0.061) (5.140) (0.063) (0.045) (0.202) 
PropUnemployed -0.022 -0.083 -0.092* -0.030 0.215 
 (0.068) (0.839) (0.050) (0.039) (1.668) 
PropNonLabourForce -0.065 -0.022 -0.167*** -0.132*** -0.186 
 (0.052) (6.270) (0.035) (0.037) (1.280) 
Education      
PropLowEd -0.049 -0.032 -0.056 0.062 0.150 
 (0.050) (4.848) (0.038) (0.052) (0.785) 
PropMidEd 0.228*** 0.236 0.190*** 0.339*** 0.400 
 (0.046) (0.783) (0.036) (0.055) (0.505) 
PropHighEd 0.519*** 0.613 0.680*** 0.861*** 0.947*** 
 (0.067) (4.222) (0.048) (0.062) (0.285) 
PropVeryHighEd 0.569** 0.248 0.415** 0.562* 2.101** 
 (0.247) (13.247) (0.180) (0.337) (0.948) 
 Demographics      
Btw31to40 0.026 0.124 0.002 0.171*** 0.260 
 (0.048) (0.587) (0.029) (0.035) (1.009) 
Btw41to50 -0.296*** -0.025 -0.179*** 0.231*** 0.411 
 (0.102) (4.820) (0.046) (0.069) (0.839) 
Btw51to60 -0.446*** -0.065 -0.390*** 0.193* 0.492 
 (0.098) (8.532) (0.072) (0.100) (2.053) 
Above60 -0.336** 0.087 -0.390*** 0.331*** 0.625 
 (0.168) (10.574) (0.109) (0.119) (2.515) 
MeanHHAge 0.032*** 0.013 0.024*** 0.003 -0.009 
 (0.004) (0.325) (0.003) (0.003) (0.032) 
PropFemale 0.176*** 0.161 0.109*** 0.135*** 0.073 
 (0.043) (0.857) (0.017) (0.021) (0.822) 
FemaleHHead -0.602*** -0.443 -0.376*** -0.454*** -0.415 
 (0.062) (5.017) (0.024) (0.036) (0.497) 
PropMarried 0.281*** 0.337 0.216*** 0.211*** 0.166 
 (0.043) (0.776) (0.032) (0.052) (0.723) 
PropDivWidow 0.471*** 0.436 0.396*** 0.455*** 0.516 
 (0.075) (5.323) (0.050) (0.101) (0.462) 
Location      
Urban 0.447*** 0.431 0.332*** 0.230*** 0.265*** 
 (0.021) (3.034) (0.021) (0.020) (0.093) 
Head Employment Sector      
Public 0.104* 0.104 0.009 0.130*** 0.145** 
 (0.061) (1.987) (0.023) (0.031) (0.057) 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis. 
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Table 29 Cont’d      
Variable Q(.10) Q(.25) Q(.50) Q(.75) Q(.90) 
Regional Controls      
North -0.380*** -0.349 -0.173*** -0.067* 0.050 
 (0.048) (6.957) (0.016) (0.036) (0.049) 
South-East 0.298*** 0.344 0.370*** 0.406*** 0.406 
 (0.055) (4.229) (0.028) (0.029) (0.274) 
South-West 0.130** 0.294 0.469*** 0.497*** 0.480 
 (0.062) (2.479) (0.028) (0.031) (0.909) 
Head Industry Class      
Real 0.056 0.039 0.022 0.033 -0.132 
 (0.041) (2.461) (0.028) (0.021) (1.306) 
Agriculture -0.303 0.390 0.031 0.106 -0.255 
 (0.347) (0.466) (0.109) (0.128) (0.211) 
Trade -0.076 0.006 0.106*** -0.001 -0.041 
 (0.056) (1.783) (0.036) (0.049) (1.648) 
Service -0.023 0.055 0.108*** 0.040 -0.154 
 (0.029) (0.856) (0.037) (0.027) (0.426) 
C 8.841*** 9.871*** 10.497*** 11.553*** 12.473*** 
 (0.125) (1.698) (0.090) (0.078) (0.810) 
Pseudo R2 0.0567 0.056 0.0809 0.0819 0.0875 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis. 
 
Once again, the base category for occupation is the proportion of economically active individuals 
in the household who are in paid work; for education, it is the household proportion with no 
education: for marital status, it is the unmarried; for region, it is the mid-belt; for age group it is 
household proportion aged between 16 and 30; for location, the rural area; and for sector, the 
private sector. 
 
The results in Table 29 yet again indicate that households that have a higher proportion of 
employers enjoy the highest household consumption expenditure compared to any other category; 
this finding is consistent and significant. Households with a higher proportion of employers have 
significantly higher consumption levels than any other occupational proportion at all quantiles - 
this is consistent with the findings highlighted in Table 28. 
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For a comparison between paid worker proportions and self-employed “own account” proportions, 
the estimation once more crucially shows that households that have a higher proportion of paid 
workers have lower consumption levels than households that have a higher proportion of self-
employed adult members at lower quantiles (between the 10th and 25th quantiles), and then have 
higher consumption levels at upper quantiles (from the 50th to the 75th quantiles; the 90th quantile 
differences are insignificant).  
 
This finding is consistent with the results shown in Table 28 when the adult equivalent scales had 
not been used to operationalise the total household consumption. Note that OLS estimations 
presented in the Appendix, Table 32 do not offer us this insight. This highlights the importance of 
this thesis performing quantile regression estimations as opposed to settling for OLS estimations 
commonly found in the literature. 
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Moving on to more detailed  comparisons between paid worker proportions and self-employed 
“own account” proportions, Figure 29 presents the log adult equivalent consumption on the X-axis 
and the cumulative probability on the Y-axis for the proportion of self employed “own account” 
workers and paid worker proportion households respectively, for below 25th, 25th – 50th, 50th-75th 
and above 75th quintiles.  
 
Examining each of the plots in turn, it can be observed that belonging to one employment category 
does not guarantee a higher household consumption amount compared to members of the other 
employment option; rather it depends on the welfare quantile to which the individual belongs, as 
consumption clearly improves/increases for each occupational category as the plot-lines move right 
for each group.  
Figure 29: Household Consumption Cumulative Distribution Plots:                                                         
Self-Employed (Own Account) Vs Paid Work 
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Finally, Figure 30 confirms the findings from Table 29. The blue line representing the self-
employed “own account” proportion can be seen on the right hand side of the distribution in the 
first diagram, but as household consumption increases across the CDF quantiles, observe the red 
line representing paid workers crossing over from the left hand side to the right hand side of the 
graph diagrams, indicating that the paid worker sample at the higher quantiles enjoy higher 
household consumption in these ranges.  
Figure 30: Self-Employment Vs Paid Employment: Household Consumption Quantiles 
HHSE: Prop of Household in Self-Employment.  HHPE: Prop of Household in Paid Work.
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These results clearly relate to the theoretical arguments that the self-employed are not a 
homogenous group who can be defined as all being either “pushed” or “pulled” into self-
employment. The self-employed “own account” workers at the lower end of the distribution 
(represented by the blue line) enjoy higher consumption levels than the paid workers at the same 
level, and can be argued to be influenced by pulled effects. At the other (right hand) side of the 
distribution, however, the paid workers (represented by the red line) experience higher 
consumption levels than the self-employed “own account” workers, and in line with the literature, 
the self-employed at this part of the household consumption distribution will normally be 
categorized as pushed.  
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4.8.1: SUMMARY OF RESULTS - LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND HOUSEHOLD 
CONSUMPTION 
 
 
Figure 31 : Conceptual Model (Labour Force Participation and Household Consumption) 
 
In this section, the thesis has considered that households could be strategic in terms of how they 
participate in the labour force. It has postulated that households might decide how many 
individuals they will send into each occupational category as all individuals in the household 
possibly jointly seek to maximise the total consumption of the household. 
 
It has found that households that have a higher proportion of employers enjoy the highest 
household consumption expenditure compared to any other category; this finding is consistent and 
significant. Households with a higher proportion of employers have significantly higher 
consumption levels than any other occupational proportion at all quantiles - this is consistent with 
our initial labour wage analysis; and can be translated to imply that employers have converted their 
higher income streams, in terms of labour wage premiums, into household expenditure. This also 
agrees with the findings of Tamvada, 2010. 
 
When the thesis compared paid worker and self-employed “own account” proportions, it found 
that households that have a higher proportion of paid workers have lower consumption levels than 
Household 
Consumption 
Labour Force Participation 
• Paid Work  
• Employer/Firm owner 
• Self-employed 
• Unemployed 
• Not in labour force  
 IIIB 
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households that have a higher proportion of self-employed adult members at lower quantiles 
(between the 10th and 25th quantiles), and then have higher consumption levels at upper quantiles 
(from the 50th to the 90th quantiles). 
 
This shows that the self-employed consist of individuals who are better-off than the paid employed 
in the lower welfare quantiles and worse off at the higher ones. These results are robust to alternate 
empirical specifications. From the literature, the self-employed at the lower quantiles would be 
described as being pulled into self-employment because they enjoy higher welfare levels, while 
those at the upper quantiles would be described as being pushed into self-employment as they 
appear to be worse off than their paid employee counterparts.  
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4.9:  ASSESSMENTS SUMMARY 
 
Together, these three assessments enable the thesis to look at the occupational status incidence and 
its consequences from different angles. We are able to decide if any occupational statuses represent 
a disadvantaged or an advantaged group, in terms of education, labour wage and household 
consumption. In addition, since one of the themes in the literature is that men and women may 
experience self-employment differently, the differentiation in terms of gender can help to draw 
further insights empirically on whether gender affects the occupational incidence in a dissimilar 
way.  
 
Furthermore, the thesis can indirectly test the notion by the three assessments that the self-
employed are experiencing push or pulled self-employment. 
 
1. In the first case, if the thesis observes that the self-employed are chiefly less educated 
individuals, then it could be true that lack of educational qualifications and skills “pushes” 
people to find work in this sector, since it can be hypothesised that they have been rationed 
out of the paid wage sector due to their lack of formal education – a prerequisite for formal 
wage employment in Nigeria and indeed other developing countries.  
 
2. In the second case, if the thesis observes that the self-employed are actually worse off in 
terms of labour wage compared to their paid work counterparts after controlling for 
observable characteristics, then this would provide some evidence of pushed self-
employment. This would stem from rationality, as judicious individuals should opt for the 
employment option that gives the highest returns to their endowments so as to maximise 
utility from consumption which is derived through labour wage/income.  
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Hence if the self-employed persist in a lower labour wage earning occupational option then 
it could be for either non-pecuniary reasons or because they have no other option, 
indicating pushed self-employment with regards to labour wages56. (This thesis does not 
consider non-pecuniary reasons for employment.) If they already belong to the higher 
labour wage earning occupation then they are clearly rational and have chosen their more 
favourable option, signalling pulled self-employment. 
 
3. Finally, since members of the household could choose to maximise joint utility by ensuring 
that they achieve the highest possible expenditure stream, they can opt for occupations that 
ensure their joint utmost possible consumption. The third assessment will thus enable the 
thesis to further test the push-pull hypothesis from the point of view of households. If a 
higher proportion of self-employed household members increases household welfare 
(measured by household consumption) then there is evidence of pulled self-employment, 
from the benefits of a higher consumption to be derived, and vice-versa. 
                                                          
56 There are arguments that earning less by self-employed individuals is compensated by other factors 
such as freedom and other non-pecuniary factors.  HAMILTON, B. H. 2000. Does entrepreneurship pay? 
An empirical analysis of the returns to self-employment. Journal of political economy, 108, 604-631.So 
this finding doesn’t necessarily mean the self-employed who earn less than paid workers are pushed into 
self-employment, even though it can be inferred by their lower incomes that they are worse-off. It 
becomes push self-employment when they are in such jobs out of necessity i.e. they want to move out of 
such jobs to earn higher incomes but cannot i.e. they seek to enjoy maximum utility given their 
observable characteristics – which the econometric modelling/assumptions imply. 
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1: SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES, METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
The concern of this thesis was to understand where differences in labour wage and household 
consumption levels come from, as they relate to any of the employment statuses in developing 
countries. To enable a clearer insight into these issues the conceptual model below was introduced. 
 
 
Figure 32: Conceptual Model (as Figure 2) 
 
The section of the analysis labelled “I” sought to answer the question: “How does educational 
attainment affect the probability of holding any of the employment statuses in a developing 
country?” By investigating this question, the thesis aimed to discover patterns in educational 
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attainments (if any) in developing countries as they affect the occupational statuses expressed in 
the conceptual model.  
 
The section of the analysis labelled “IIIA” sought to empirically analyse how labour wage is 
determined by labour force participation status after the thesis had observed in part “I” how 
educational attainment reflects occupational status. Finally, the section of the analysis labelled 
“IIIB” sought to determine how household consumption is determined by the proportion of 
individuals in each labour force participation category.  
 
The thesis made use of the simple probit and multinomial probit models for the first assessment 
on educational comparison, and it made use of Heckman corrected Mincer income estimations and 
quantile regressions to estimate labour wage premiums and penalties in the second assessment. 
The third assessment, analysing household consumption, made use of quantile regressions and 
CDF plots so as to investigate the labour force participation dilemma in detail.  
 
In doing this, the thesis followed the models and techniques of Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2009), 
Bargain and Kwenda (2011) and Tamvada (2010) for the three models respectively, while 
accounting for any potential econometric issues by following Parker, 2009, Bhaumik et al., 2013, 
Koenker and Hallock, 2001, Demoussis and Mihalopoulos, 2001, Maloney, 2004. It made use of 
micro-level data of the NBS (2014), who were kind enough to furnish the researcher with the 
Nigerian Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) data for the years 2004/2005 and 
2008/2009. The thesis also made use of reports by (Reynolds et al., 2002, Global Finance, 2014, 
DoingBusiness, 2014, BritishCouncil, 2012, ILO, 2014) and also the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor  reports (GEM). 
 
The reason for these analyses was because Harris and Todaro (1970) along with Ranis and Fei 
(1961) advocated a model that assumed a stagnant and unproductive informal sector which serves 
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as a refuge for the urban unemployed and for new migrants who resort to informal self-
employment and unemployment. Those authors constructed an explanatory model of developing 
countries’ transition from stagnation to self-sustaining growth. A number of concepts evolved 
involving urban unemployment, rural-urban labour migration and the welfare implications of 
various policies. One of the salient presumptions was that if there is a higher minimum wage in 
the wage sector those in the agricultural sector, the self-employed and the unemployed would be 
worse off compared to wage workers. 
 
Consequently, as regards developing countries, there is a large branch of the literature that views 
individuals in the self-employment sector as being pushed there due to lower welfare levels; this 
school is sometimes called the pessimistic class (Haywood and Falco, 2013). Jhabvala et al. (2003) 
propound that informality in developing countries, consisting chiefly of the self-employed, is 
fundamentally a survival activity of the very poor and of disadvantaged workers who are typically 
unskilled and less educated.  
 
This view is further advocated, by Turnham and Jaeger (1971), Squire (1981), Fields (1980) and 
Lewis (1954) who classify the self-employed in developing countries as the “working poor” who 
engage in such activities to escape unemployment. Gindling and Newhouse (2012) report that the 
self-employed in developing countries work for themselves and earn little either because they have 
been rationed out of wage jobs or because they prefer the autonomy and flexibility of self-
employment; and for several years the dominant view was that large numbers of self-employed 
workers in developing countries reflected the rationing of employment opportunities in the wage 
sector, due to regulations or efficiency wages above the market clearing level (Fields, 2004, 
Tokman, 2007, De Mel et al., 2010).  
 
However, the pessimistic view of the self-employed in LDC’s being a disadvantaged group is being 
challenged by an optimistic school of thought that argues that self-employment in developing 
countries may be a desirable employment option that individuals self-select and opt for due to a 
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variety of reasons, some pecuniary and others non-pecuniary (Maloney, 2004, Bosch and Maloney, 
2010, Bosch and Maloney, 2007). In addition, lately, there appears to be a merging of the opposing 
schools of thought into one whereby the self-employed are seen as made up of both advantaged 
and disadvantaged workers (Mandelman and Montes-Rojas, 2009, Fields, 2004, Fields, 2007, 
Cunningham and Maloney, 2001, Günther and Launov, 2012, Fields, 1990). De Mel et al. (2008) 
also finds heterogeneity among self-employed workers in Sri Lanka and reports that the self-
employed should be viewed on two levels; those who are clearly disadvantaged and lack the 
potential to grow, and others who are advantaged.  
 
Also, Tamvada (2010) measured welfare by household adult equivalent per-capita consumption 
expenditure for Indian households, and used quantile regressions to find strong empirical evidence 
that the self-employed who employed others (employers) had the highest welfare in terms of 
consumption, while the self-employed with no employees (own account workers) had slightly 
lower returns than salaried employees but a higher welfare than casual labourers. His study proved 
that the well-being of the self-employed relative to that of wage employees can vary significantly 
across the earnings distribution, and also that not distinguishing the employers from own account 
workers could be misleading. This heterogeneity in the self-employment phenomenon especially 
in developing countries, and the fact the literature has only begun to account for it, forms the 
context of this study. 
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5.2: MAIN FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This study has made contributions to filling a gap in the labour force debate in developing 
countries’ literature relating to the welfare implications of occupational statuses, specifically self-
employment and paid/wage work. The reader is once again advised to be careful to understand the 
caveats when interpreting the results as a full range of observed and unobserved variables are not 
included in the conceptual model. As stated at the beginning of this thesis, the aim was to find out 
where the differences in labour wage and household consumption levels come from, as they 
depend on any of the employment statuses in developing countries.  The results found are 
summarised in Table 29 as follows: 
 
Table 29: Summary of Findings 
Hypothesis Nigerian Data Prediction Thesis Finding 
 
Hypothesis 1"𝐻1"  
Educational attainments will 
affect the probability of 
belonging to an employment 
status in a developing country. 
 
 
 
The Hypothesis 1 addresses 
the portion of the conceptual 
model labelled “I” which 
seeks to answer the question: 
“How do educational 
attainments affect the 
probability of belonging to 
any of the employment/ 
occupational states in a 
developing country?”  More 
specifically, the thesis aimed 
to investigate if more educated 
individuals were to be found 
 
The thesis discovered that 
self-employed individuals 
generally tend to have lower 
educational attainments when 
compared to wage 
workers/paid employees.  
 
However, a closer 
examination reveals that 
employers tend to have quite 
similar educational 
attainments when compared 
to wage earners while self-
employed “own account” 
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in self-employment or paid-
employment/wage work.  
 
The literature that was 
surveyed in section 2.3.1 
highlighted that it is expected 
that as individuals become 
more educated in developing 
countries, they will opt for 
paid work over self-
employment.  
 
This means that the expected 
pattern for the data from 
Nigeria is that more educated 
individuals will be engaged in 
wage work/paid employment 
while less educated 
individuals are expected to be 
in self-employment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
workers tend to have lower 
educational attainments 
compared to wage 
workers/paid employees. 
 
Thus educational attainments 
affect the probability of 
belonging to an employment 
status in this developing 
country, Nigeria. 
 
 
261 
 
 
Hypothesis Nigerian Data Prediction Thesis Finding 
 
Hypothesis 2 "𝐻2"  
Workers experience a labour 
wage penalty or premium 
depending on their 
occupational status in a 
developing country. 
 
 
The literature that was 
surveyed in section 2.4.1 
highlighted the theoretical 
expectation that self-
employed individuals in 
developing countries will 
experience a labour wage 
penalty when compared to 
paid workers/wage earners.  
 
This means that the expected 
pattern is that individuals in 
self-employment in the data 
from Nigeria should 
experience a labour wage 
penalty compared to paid 
workers.  
 
The Hypothesis 2 addresses 
the portion of the conceptual 
model labelled “IIIA” which 
seeks to empirically analyse 
how labour wage is 
determined by labour force 
participation. By performing 
this analysis, the thesis aimed 
 
The self-employed generally 
tend to experience a wage 
penalty when compared to 
wage workers/paid 
employees.  
 
However, a closer 
examination reveals that 
employers tend to experience 
labour wage premiums when 
compared to wage earners 
while self-employed “own 
account” workers tend to 
experience labour wage 
penalties compared to wage 
workers/paid employees. 
 
Quantile regression estimates 
show that a majority of 
employers experienced labour 
wage premiums while only a 
few of the self-employed 
“own account” workers, 
especially those at the  upper 
262 
 
to discover if there are patterns 
in how occupational statuses 
affect labour wage. Precisely, 
the thesis aimed to investigate 
if paid/wage workers typically 
earn more or less than self-
employed individuals 
conditional on observable 
characteristics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
end of the income 
distribution, reported labour 
wage premiums compared to 
paid workers. 
 
Thus the thesis found that 
workers experience a labour 
wage penalty or premium 
depending on their 
occupational status in this 
developing country, Nigeria. 
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Hypothesis Nigerian Data Prediction Thesis Finding 
 
Hypothesis 3"𝐻3"  
In a developing country, total 
household consumption 
expenditure will depend on the 
composition of employment 
status of the employable 
household adults. 
 
 
 
From the literature that was 
surveyed in section 2.4.2, it is 
expected that self-employed 
individuals in developing 
countries are disadvantaged 
across a number of welfare 
indicators when compared to 
wage earners.  
 
The expected pattern is that 
individuals in self-
employment in the data from a 
developing country should be 
worse-off in terms of 
household consumption when 
compared to wage earners. 
This also means that having a 
higher proportion of self-
employed individuals in the 
household workforce should 
have a negative relationship 
with total household 
consumption and  having a 
higher proportion of wage 
earning household workforce 
should have a positive 
relationship with total 
household consumption.  
 
Having a higher proportion of 
the self-employed “own 
account” workers in the 
composition of the household 
is associated with 
significantly increased 
household consumption at the 
lower quantile levels (until 
around the 50% quantile), 
while having a higher 
proportion of paid workers at 
the upper quantiles is 
associated with significantly 
increased household 
consumption levels. 
However, the employer 
category remains consistently 
above both of the other two 
categories over the whole 
range of household 
consumption. 
 
To summarise, the thesis 
found that total household 
consumption expenditure 
depended on the employment 
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The Hypothesis 3 addresses 
the portion of the conceptual 
model labelled “IIIB” which 
seeks to determine how total 
household consumption is 
determined by the proportion 
of household individuals in 
each occupational category. 
By performing this analysis, 
the thesis aimed to discover if 
having a higher proportion of 
a particular occupational 
category is beneficial or 
detrimental to household 
consumption.  
 
 
status composition of 
employable household adults 
in this developing country, 
Nigeria. 
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These findings (from Table 29) can be further analysed as follows when brought into context with 
the pushed/pulled self-employment debate: 
 
1. As regards self-employment and education. When those in self-employment were treated 
as one group i.e. employers and own account workers were not separated into distinct 
groups, the probability of being in self-employment fell as individuals reported higher 
educational attainments - indicating that the more educated individuals became, the less 
likely they were to choose self-employment as an employment option. This effect was 
stronger for women and agrees with the finding of Van der Sluis et al., 2005.  
 
2. Also as regards education and employers. When self-employed workers were split into two 
distinct groups of employers (self-employed with employees) and self-employed “own 
account” workers (self-employed without employees), quite interesting patterns emerged. 
Employers reported similar educational attainments to paid workers, and women 
employers in particular were found to have a sizeable amount of education. Self-employed 
“own account” workers, on the other hand, reported significantly lower educational 
attainments similar to those of the “non active” labour force.  
 
These indicate that employers have educational characteristics different from self-
employed “own account” workers; and this ought to be taken into account in the developing 
labour force literature. Hence the view of the self-employed as a collective group has to be 
updated, and distinctions made among the self-employed workforce between ‘employers’ 
and ‘self-employed “own account” workers’ if researchers are to aim to derive meaningful 
conclusions. 
 
Taken together, these educational results seem to indicate the following: 
 
a) The self-employed in the first instance might actually be a disadvantaged group since 
they tend to have lower human capital in terms of education; an attribute where high 
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attainment might be a requirement for getting paid sector jobs. This seems to point to 
and support the claim that the self-employed have been rationed out of wage sector 
jobs (Harris and Todaro, 1970, Lewis, 1954, Gindling and Newhouse, 2012) since 
they do not have the requirements for such jobs in the first place. This gives credence 
to the pushed self-employment argument, as the self-employed in this sector cannot 
move out of this employment option even if they wanted to, and thus they might be 
engaged in this occupational category out of necessity. 
 
b) In the second instance, employers have quite similar educational attainments to wage 
earners so it can be argued that they could have chosen the wage employment option 
if they wanted to, as they have the educational qualifications to opt for wage work/paid 
employment. Since they chose to be employers of labour, two theoretical/hypothetical 
factors could possibly have led to this choice; it might be through necessity, or they 
could have been pulled into this sector by opportunities they found. Since they have 
dissimilar educational attainment levels to those of the self-employed “own account” 
workers, the former is unlikely. Also employers are the smallest sample size found, 
and given the considerable constraints on starting a business in developing countries, 
it is most likely a deliberate and thought out decision – indicating pulled self-
employment. However, it could be a mixture of the two pressures as well.  
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3. As regards labour wages. When the self-employed were split into “own account” workers 
and employers, interesting distinctions could once again be made. Quantile regression 
estimates show that a majority of employers experienced labour wage premiums while only 
a few of the self-employed “own account” workers, especially those at the  upper end of 
the income distribution, reported labour wage premiums compared to paid workers. The 
assessments conducted also revealed that the labour wage penalties associated with self-
employment were quite substantial till around the 10th and 20th percentiles when the labour 
wage penalties started showing signs of reduction, becoming income premiums at the upper 
percentile regions, probably due to the minimum wages that occur in paid employment and 
not in self-employment, and also because of the nature of the activities being carried out in 
the various employment statuses. 
 
This points towards the argument that while a significant proportion of the employers 
correspond to the advantaged pull self-employment category, only a few of the self-
employed own account workers who fall in the range of these advantageous upper labour 
wage quantiles can be classed as pulled. On closer examination, the self-employed own 
account workers who experience such premiums are most likely to be engaged in more 
rewarding/highly skilled activities, and are more educated than typical self-employed own 
account workers. (They are engaged in activities like accounting, spinning, retail, writing 
and distributing technological goods, unlike other self-employed own account individuals 
who do not earn labour wage premiums and are mainly engaged in activities like car 
repairs, sculpting and petty trade). 
 
Specifically, the thesis finds that there is indeed an ordering of incomes into low-income 
self-employment (which seems to be found mainly in the own account self-employment 
occupational category), medium-income paid employment, and high-income self-
employment (which seems to be found mainly in the employer occupational category); 
and this corresponds to a similar ordering of low human capital, medium human capital 
and high human capital among the labour market participants, expressed through 
educational attainment.  
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4. Finally, but very significantly, as regards household consumption. Having a higher 
proportion of the self-employed “own account” workers in the composition of the 
household is associated with significantly increased household consumption at the lower 
quantile levels, while having a higher proportion of paid workers at the upper quantiles is 
associated with significantly increased household consumption levels. This also supports 
findings from the other analyses since it finds heterogeneity in self-employment. However 
having a higher proportion of employers is associated with significantly increased 
household consumption at all levels, as already found by Tamvada (2010). 
 
Although Tamvada (2010) did not find the distinction in adult-equivalent household 
consumption between the self-employed and paid work proportions of households that is 
found in this thesis, this has implications for the labour force debate. It could imply that 
self-employed individuals could be engaged in activities that contribute to household 
consumption, but these activities are not captured by labour wages as such.  
 
This also indicates that the self-employed “own account” workers are mostly pulled into 
self-employment at the lower quantiles but pushed at the upper regions. Taken together, it 
indicates that to enjoy pulled self-employment, individuals should typically be well 
educated employers of labour or engaged in “own account” self-employment, but only 
when the benefits in terms of labour wage or household consumption outweigh being in 
paid work. This is because some self-employed “own account” workers, albeit a minority, 
have the benefit of pulled self-employment as well. 
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5.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The policy implication of these results thus involves relevant policy makers pin-pointing who they 
want their policies to address, and not using a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to all members of the 
self-employed workforce, as clearly, employers are distinct from self-employed “own account” 
workers.  Policy makers might need to deliberate on a divergent range of measures to meet the 
different needs of these dissimilar members of the workforce. 
 
Also, as the thesis finds that education increases the probability of being an employer or engaging 
in paid work, or of occupational statuses associated with higher labour wages and household 
consumption levels (especially for women), this study also contributes to the literature on the need 
for educational programmes in developing countries.  In relation to theoretical debates, this thesis 
also finds that both push and pull self-employment can exist in developing countries, but most 
employers of labour can be classed as experiencing the pulled type of self-employment – a 
distinction much needed in the developing country labour force literature. 
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5.4 FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This thesis gives evidence of segmentation and heterogeneity in the labour force of developing 
countries and in self-employment in particular. Future research should be careful to distinguish 
sufficiently in empirical investigations between the different groups of the labour force and 
especially the self-employed. Moreover, there is an opportunity for research into how the 
distribution of these employment statuses changes over time and how it influences the different 
indicators (labour wage and household consumption) measured.  There is also room for research 
as regards non-pecuniary indicators and the effects of infrastructure, government policies and other 
externalities on labour force probability rates, welfare and the performance of businesses.  
 
Furthermore, as there exists a scarcity of research about the nature of self-employment in 
developing countries especially in the Sub-Saharan African context, this thesis fills a significant 
gap in the current literature, while showing that there is still room for research in other countries 
with similar characteristics; hence cross-country research would be highly beneficial, to strengthen 
the literature. In addition, an investigation into the nature of self-employment, using time-series 
panel data, would be highly beneficial to the literature and the current questions being investigated. 
As regards gender differences, an investigation will be relevant that takes into account the cultural 
or perceived roles associated with gender in developing countries and the economic variables 
studied in this thesis.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 30: Correlation Matrix– 2004 LSMS Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Age Urban Unspfd Noed Loed Mided Highed VryHied Married Houselnd localang North Southeast Soutwest 
Age 1.0000              
Urban 0.0145 1.0000             
Unspecified 0.2448 -0.229 1.0000            
Noed 0.0047 -0.055 -0.118 1.0000           
Lowed -0.130 -0.043 -0.373 -0.146 1.00          
Mided -0.160 0.1944 -0.381 -0.149 -0.47 1.0000         
Highed 0.0885 0.1072 -0.149 -0.059 -0.18 -0.188 1.0000        
VeryHighed 0.0762 0.0881 -0.067 -0.026 -0.08 -0.084 -0.033 1.0000       
Married 0.4224 -0.025 0.2518 0.0297 -0.12 -0.155 0.0329 0.0470 1.0000      
HouseorLand 0.000 -0.184 0.1683 0.0225 -0.02 -0.104 -0.054 -0.0291 0.0517 1.0000     
Locallang -0.126 0.2580 -0.597 -0.077 0.182 0.2957 0.1438 0.0719 -0.1399 -0.1226 1.0000    
North -0.046 0.0031 0.2990 0.0744 -0.17 -0.114 -0.021 -0.0257 0.1779 0.1445 -0.1910 1.0000   
Southeast -0.028 -0.282 -0.216 0.0129 0.183 0.0405 -0.052 -0.0193 -0.1731 0.0095 0.0345 -0.388 1.0000  
Southwest 0.1123 0.4010 -0.107 -0.070 0.007 0.0884 0.0388 0.0419 0.0045 -0.1337 0.2090 -0.309 -0.4139 1.0000 
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Table 31: Correlation Matrix– 2009 LSMS Survey 
 Age Urban Noed Lowed Mided Highed VeryHid Married Houselnd locallang North Southeast Southwest Female 
Age 1.0000              
Urban 0.0210 1.0000             
Noed 0.0561 -0.0621 1.0000            
Lowed -0.0538 -0.0949 -0.1512 1.0000           
Mided -0.0956 0.0783 -0.2278 -0.6695 1.0000          
Highed 0.1333 0.0469 -0.0834 -0.2452 -0.3694 1.0000         
VeryHighed 0.1180 0.0195 -0.0341 -0.1003 -0.1511 -0.0553 1.0000        
Married 0.3145 0.0065 -0.0300 -0.1275 0.0560 0.1003 0.0327 1.0000       
HouseorLand 0.0036 -0.0882 0.0260 0.0442 -0.0379 -0.0190 -0.0060 -0.0410 1.0000      
Locallang -0.0427 0.0805 -0.2466 -0.2088 0.2333 0.0929 0.0193 -0.0104 -0.0380 1.0000     
North -0.0886 -0.1391 0.0437 0.0017 -0.0123 -0.0162 0.0080 -0.0281 0.0746 -0.0920 1.0000    
Southeast 0.0537 -0.2284 0.0661 0.0528 -0.0731 0.0024 -0.0192 0.0426 0.0069 0.0702 -0.2694 1.0000   
Southwest 0.0335 0.3227 -0.0642 -0.0215 0.0554 -0.0077 -0.0097 -0.0174 -0.0674 -0.0128 -0.3573 -0.5093 1.0000  
Female -0.0735 0.0008 0.0469 0.0897 -0.0351 -0.0789 -0.0571 -0.0558 0.0102 -0.1178 -0.0169 -0.0091 0.0354 1.0000 
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Table 32: Results of Multinomial Probit Analysis [5.1] [Marginal Effects] - 2004 Survey 
(Educational Base Category – High Education) 
 Male Female 
Independent 
Variables: 
Non Active 
1 
Paid Work 
2 
Self-Employed 
3 
Employer 
4 
Non Active 
5 
Paid Work 
6 
Self-Employed 
7 
Employer 
8 
Age in years -0.157*** 0.0712*** 0.0719*** 0.0139*** -0.120*** 0.0415*** 0.0741*** 0.00453*** 
 (0.00802) (0.00718) (0.00722) (0.00214) (0.00770) (0.00313) (0.00676) (0.000713) 
Age (squared) 0.00173*** -0.000756*** -0.000818*** -0.000154*** 0.00127*** -0.00045*** -0.000765*** -0.00046*** 
 (0.000102) (8.71e-05) (8.96e-05) (2.40e-05) (0.000101) (4.05e-05) (8.78e-05) (9.21e-06) 
Urban -0.0246 0.0351 0.00232 -0.0129 -0.0477 -0.000887 0.0486* -6.07e-06 
 (0.0383) (0.0296) (0.0262) (0.00855) (0.0291) (0.0120) (0.0261) (0.00281) 
No ed -0.253*** -0.251*** 0.525*** -0.0210*** -0.129 -0.0808*** 0.221** -0.0111*** 
 (0.0328) (0.0186) (0.0374) (0.00615) (0.110) (0.00899) (0.110) (0.00224) 
Unspecified -0.224*** -0.285*** 0.539*** -0.0296*** 0.0663 -0.162*** 0.114 -0.0190*** 
 (0.0449) (0.0180) (0.0448) (0.00631) (0.0859) (0.0194) (0.0831) (0.00435) 
Low ed -0.251*** -0.216*** 0.491*** -0.0233** -0.0602 -0.129*** 0.199** -0.00942** 
 (0.0533) (0.0291) (0.0501) (0.0103) (0.0871) (0.0186) (0.0845) (0.00415) 
Mid ed -0.174*** -0.149*** 0.340*** -0.0172 -0.0656 -0.0599*** 0.131 -0.00585* 
 (0.0566) (0.0301) (0.0552) (0.0123) (0.0834) (0.0193) (0.0818) (0.0068) 
Very high ed -0.130 0.0895 0.00520 0.0352 -0.0102 0.153 -0.179*** 0.0358 
 (0.0807) (0.0809) (0.121) (0.0336) (0.169) (0.114) (0.0638) (0.0446) 
Married -0.361*** 0.0992*** 0.244*** 0.0183** -0.119*** 0.00823 0.114*** -0.00305 
 (0.0304) (0.0329) (0.0345) (0.00715) (0.0300) (0.0139) (0.0238) (0.00395) 
Houseorland 0.0572 -0.0701*** 0.00257 0.0104 0.0229 -0.00127 -0.0156 -0.00605** 
 (0.0393) (0.0263) (0.0315) (0.0103) (0.0291) (0.0150) (0.0254) (0.00257) 
Locallanguage 0.00439 -0.0230 0.0158 0.00279 -0.0622 0.0208 0.0352 0.00615 
 (0.0359) (0.0337) (0.0376) (0.00709) (0.0381) (0.0166) (0.0324) (0.00424) 
South-East 0.0391 -0.0865*** 0.0729* -0.0255*** -0.229*** 0.0385* 0.198*** -0.00755** 
 (0.0429) (0.0327) (0.0381) (0.00776) (0.0393) (0.0218) (0.0419) (0.00323) 
South-West 0.00503 -0.0720*** 0.0817** -0.0147 -0.269*** 0.0400* 0.232*** -0.00390 
 (0.0377) (0.0275) (0.0348) (0.00898) (0.0329) (0.0232) (0.0342) (0.00464) 
North 0.0118 0.0167 -0.0504 0.0218 0.274*** -0.0228 -0.246*** -0.00519 
 (0.0364) (0.0306) (0.0361) (0.0158) (0.0280) (0.0193) (0.0228) (0.00416) 
N 10,206 10,206 10,206 10,206 8,191 8,191 8,191 8,191 
Log-pseudo 
likelihood 
-56425771 -54282972 -54081612 -54081132 -45092930 -43684483 -43624372 -43623821 
Frequency 2,932 2,624 4,197 453 4,633 1,045 2,361 152 
Wald (Prob > 
chi2) 
7281.91*** 7281.91*** 7281.91*** 7281.91*** 3108.79*** 3108.79*** 3108.79*** 3108.79*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1: Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
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Table 33: OLS Regression: Household Proportions and Consumption – Estimation [5.9] 
Dependent Variable 
LogAESTtConsptnHH 
Q(.10) 
Labour Force Proportion  
PropSE -0.049** 
 (0.020) 
PropEmployer 0.122*** 
 (0.035) 
PropUnemployed -0.045* 
 (0.024) 
PropNonLabourForce -0.069*** 
 (0.023) 
Education  
PropLowEd -0.022 
 (0.023) 
PropMidEd 0.085*** 
 (0.023) 
PropHighEd 0.315*** 
 (0.026) 
PropVeryHighEd 0.356*** 
 (0.075) 
 Demographics  
Btw31to40 0.105*** 
 (0.022) 
Btw41to50 0.176*** 
 (0.039) 
Btw51to60 0.240*** 
 (0.056) 
Above60 0.567*** 
 (0.076) 
MeanHHAge -0.008*** 
 (0.002) 
PropFemale 0.059*** 
 (0.012) 
FemaleHHead -0.186*** 
 (0.025) 
PropMarried 0.018 
 (0.018) 
PropDivWidow 0.206*** 
 (0.036) 
Location  
Urban 0.186*** 
 (0.010) 
Head Employment Sector  
Public 0.064*** 
 (0.018) 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis. 
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Table 33 Cont’d  
Variable Q(.10) 
Regional Controls  
North -0.135*** 
 (0.016) 
South-East 0.332*** 
 (0.015) 
South-West 0.389*** 
 (0.015) 
Head Industry 
Class 
 
Real -0.028* 
 (0.016) 
Agriculture -0.186*** 
 (0.070) 
Trade -0.013 
 (0.028) 
Service -0.004 
 (0.020) 
C 9.553*** 
 (0.051) 
R2 0.08 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis. 
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Table 34: Heckman Estimation [5.4] – Entire Sample (Table 19b) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
Log (Annual 
Income) 
Age in years 0.033*** Employment = 1 Age in years 0.370*** 
  (0.010)   (0.007) 
 Age (squared) -0.000***  Age (squared) -0.004*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
 Urban 0.123***  Urban 0.126*** 
  (0.017)   (0.030) 
 Unspecified 0.014  Unspecified -0.454*** 
  (0.041)   (0.067) 
 Low Ed 0.207***  Low Ed 0.175** 
  (0.039)   (0.068) 
 Mid Ed 0.344***  Mid Ed 0.216*** 
  (0.040)   (0.069) 
 High Ed 0.783***  High Ed -0.099 
  (0.046)   (0.081) 
 Very High Ed 0.999***  Very High Ed 0.124 
  (0.062)   (0.148) 
 Male 0.251***  Male 0.964*** 
  (0.023)   (0.028) 
 Married -0.002  Married 0.337*** 
  (0.017)   (0.031) 
 Christian 0.053  Christian -0.002 
  (0.069)   (0.110) 
 Muslim 0.032  Muslim -0.147 
  (0.070)   (0.112) 
 House or Land -0.087***  House or Land -0.175*** 
  (0.027)   (0.043) 
 LocalLanguage -0.033  LocalLanguage -0.047 
  (0.021)   (0.035) 
 South-East 0.092***  South-East 0.322*** 
  (0.023)   (0.039) 
 South-West -0.099***  South-West 0.462*** 
  (0.024)   (0.041) 
 North 0.039  North -0.240*** 
  (0.026)   (0.040) 
 EmployerofLabour 0.126***  Constant -7.965*** 
  (0.033)   (0.175) 
 SelfEmp -0.160***    
  (0.017)    
 Constant 10.602***    
  (0.254)    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis. 
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Table 35: Heckman Estimation [5.4] – Northern Region (Table 20) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
Log 
(Annual 
Income) 
Age in years 0.079*** Employment = 
1 
Age in years 0.349*** 
  (0.024)   (0.017) 
 Age (squared) -0.001***  Age (squared) -0.004*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
 Urban 0.223***  Urban 0.211*** 
  (0.043)   (0.064) 
 Unspecified -0.089  Unspecified -0.004 
  (0.091)   (0.121) 
 Low Ed 0.123  Low Ed 0.184 
  (0.096)   (0.137) 
 Mid Ed 0.256***  Mid Ed 0.393*** 
  (0.095)   (0.133) 
 High Ed 0.653***  High Ed 0.316* 
  (0.108)   (0.167) 
 Very High Ed 1.081***  Very High Ed 0.746 
  (0.167)   (0.510) 
 Male 0.378***  Male 2.077*** 
  (0.135)   (0.066) 
 Married -0.003  Married 0.219*** 
  (0.050)   (0.075) 
 Christian -0.129  Christian 1.385*** 
  (0.470)   (0.493) 
 Muslim -0.266  Muslim 1.099** 
  (0.469)   (0.491) 
 House or Land -0.103*  House or Land -0.140* 
  (0.058)   (0.078) 
 LocalLanguage -0.050  LocalLanguage 0.157* 
  (0.064)   (0.089) 
 EmployerofLabour 0.123*  Constant -9.888*** 
  (0.067)   (0.586) 
 SelfEmp -0.166***    
  (0.048)    
 Constant 9.737***    
  (0.847)    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis. 
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Table 36: Heckman Estimation [5.4] – Middle Belt Region (Table 20) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
Log (Annual 
Income) 
Age in years 0.026 Employment = 1 Age in years 0.313*** 
  (0.021)   (0.016) 
 Age (squared) -0.000  Age (squared) -0.003*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
 Urban 0.144***  Urban 0.365*** 
  (0.042)   (0.066) 
 Unspecified -0.033  Unspecified -0.529*** 
  (0.110)   (0.166) 
 Low Ed -0.047  Low Ed 0.410** 
  (0.112)   (0.173) 
 Mid Ed 0.144  Mid Ed 0.587*** 
  (0.118)   (0.174) 
 High Ed 0.520***  High Ed 0.196 
  (0.123)   (0.194) 
 Very High Ed 0.713***  Very High Ed -0.232 
  (0.165)   (0.277) 
 Male 0.112  Male 1.205*** 
  (0.072)   (0.065) 
 Married -0.053  Married 0.553*** 
  (0.048)   (0.071) 
 Christian -0.248  Christian 0.048 
  (0.151)   (0.210) 
 Muslim -0.160  Muslim -0.186 
  (0.152)   (0.209) 
 HouseorLand -0.113  HouseorLand -0.269** 
  (0.071)   (0.105) 
 LocalLanguage 0.114**  LocalLanguage -0.338*** 
  (0.048)   (0.070) 
 EmployerofLabour 0.001  Constant -7.256*** 
  (0.069)   (0.370) 
 SelfEmp -0.158***    
  (0.044)    
 Constant 11.379***    
  (0.581)    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis. 
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Table 37: Heckman Estimation [5.4] – South East Region (Table 20) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
Log (Annual 
Income) 
Age in years -0.062*** Employment = 1 Age in years 0.394*** 
  (0.019)   (0.012) 
 Age (squared) 0.001***  Age (squared) -0.004*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
 Urban 0.090***  Urban -0.044 
  (0.029)   (0.055) 
 Unspecified 0.172***  Unspecified -0.471*** 
  (0.063)   (0.131) 
 Low Ed 0.362***  Low Ed -0.187 
  (0.057)   (0.120) 
 Mid Ed 0.472***  Mid Ed -0.092 
  (0.058)   (0.122) 
 High Ed 1.025***  High Ed -0.344** 
  (0.075)   (0.155) 
 Very High Ed 1.123***  Very High Ed 0.022 
  (0.109)   (0.365) 
 Male 0.247***  Male 0.531*** 
  (0.030)   (0.048) 
 Married -0.019  Married 0.401*** 
  (0.028)   (0.053) 
 Christian 0.139  Christian -0.048 
  (0.085)   (0.162) 
 Muslim 0.176  Muslim -0.069 
  (0.193)   (0.366) 
 House or Land -0.046  House or Land -0.077 
  (0.041)   (0.076) 
 LocalLanguage -0.068**  LocalLanguage -0.045 
  (0.028)   (0.054) 
 EmployerofLabour 0.197***  Constant -7.540*** 
  (0.066)   (0.275) 
 SelfEmp -0.116***    
  (0.028)    
 Constant 12.766***    
  (0.463)    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis. 
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Table 38: Heckman Estimation [5.4] – South West Region (Table 20) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable Independent Variables 
Log (Annual 
Income) 
Age in years 0.043** Employment = 1 Age in years 0.462*** 
  (0.020)   (0.016) 
 Age (squared) -0.000*  Age (squared) -0.005*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
 Urban 0.068**  Urban -0.148** 
  (0.031)   (0.071) 
 Unspecified -0.183*  Unspecified -0.393 
  (0.108)   (0.252) 
 Low Ed -0.020  Low Ed 0.209 
  (0.099)   (0.235) 
 Mid Ed 0.100  Mid Ed -0.105 
  (0.099)   (0.233) 
 High Ed 0.553***  High Ed -0.464* 
  (0.107)   (0.245) 
 Very High Ed 0.803***  Very High Ed 0.232 
  (0.121)   (0.337) 
 Male 0.221***  Male 0.387*** 
  (0.029)   (0.058) 
 Married 0.036  Married 0.265*** 
  (0.031)   (0.065) 
 Christian 0.089  Christian -0.310 
  (0.199)   (0.325) 
 Muslim 0.098  Muslim -0.166 
  (0.199)   (0.325) 
 House or Land -0.093  House or Land 0.044 
  (0.073)   (0.163) 
 LocalLanguage 0.057  LocalLanguage 0.028 
  (0.057)   (0.126) 
 EmployerofLabour 0.183***  Constant -8.271*** 
  (0.067)   (0.479) 
 SelfEmp -0.228***    
  (0.030)    
 Constant 10.333***    
  (0.501)    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis. 
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Table 39: Heckman Estimation [5.4] – Male Sample (Table 21) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
Log (Annual 
Income) 
Age in years -0.015 Employment = 1 Age in years 0.470*** 
  (0.011)   (0.011) 
 Age (squared) 0.000  Age (squared) -0.005*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
 Urban 0.199***  Urban 0.003 
  (0.020)   (0.048) 
 Unspecified -0.111**  Unspecified -0.207 
  (0.053)   (0.131) 
 Low Ed 0.097*  Low Ed 0.008 
  (0.050)   (0.120) 
 Mid Ed 0.231***  Mid Ed -0.198 
  (0.050)   (0.120) 
 High Ed 0.717***  High Ed -0.744*** 
  (0.057)   (0.135) 
 Very High Ed 0.850***  Very High Ed -0.644*** 
  (0.075)   (0.199) 
 Married -0.005  Married 0.841*** 
  (0.025)   (0.058) 
 Christian 0.014  Christian 0.225 
  (0.088)   (0.175) 
 Muslim 0.014  Muslim 0.243 
  (0.090)   (0.178) 
 House or Land -0.050  House or Land -0.235*** 
  (0.033)   (0.075) 
 LocalLanguage 0.002  LocalLanguage -0.118** 
  (0.026)   (0.057) 
 South-East 0.139***  South-East 0.068 
  (0.028)   (0.060) 
 South-West -0.137***  South-West 0.197*** 
  (0.028)   (0.063) 
 North 0.001  North 0.150** 
  (0.030)   (0.067) 
 EmployerofLabour 0.115***  Constant -8.582*** 
  (0.038)   (0.276) 
 SelfEmp -0.086***    
  (0.021)    
 Constant 12.001***    
  (0.277)    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis. 
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Table 40: Heckman Estimation [5.4] – Female Sample (Table 22) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
Log (Annual 
Income) 
Age in years 0.079*** Employment = 1 Age in years 0.331*** 
  (0.020)   (0.010) 
 Age (squared) -0.001***  Age (squared) -0.003*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
 Urban -0.016  Urban 0.221*** 
  (0.032)   (0.042) 
 Unspecified 0.143**  Unspecified -0.437*** 
  (0.066)   (0.089) 
 Low Ed 0.369***  Low Ed 0.229** 
  (0.063)   (0.093) 
 Mid Ed 0.534***  Mid Ed 0.393*** 
  (0.069)   (0.095) 
 High Ed 0.962***  High Ed 0.354*** 
  (0.081)   (0.116) 
 Very High Ed 1.393***  Very High Ed 1.005*** 
  (0.122)   (0.311) 
 Married 0.022  Married -0.005 
  (0.028)   (0.043) 
 Christian 0.083  Christian -0.080 
  (0.108)   (0.149) 
 Muslim -0.028  Muslim -0.373** 
  (0.113)   (0.152) 
 House or Land -0.135***  House or Land -0.122** 
  (0.048)   (0.062) 
 LocalLanguage -0.092***  LocalLanguage -0.054 
  (0.034)   (0.048) 
 South-East 0.081*  South-East 0.498*** 
  (0.048)   (0.055) 
 South-West 0.068  South-West 0.745*** 
  (0.055)   (0.058) 
 North 0.082  North -0.586*** 
  (0.068)   (0.060) 
 EmployerofLabour 0.172***  Constant -7.035*** 
  (0.062)   (0.243) 
 SelfEmp -0.326***    
  (0.031)    
 Constant 9.381***    
  (0.530)    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis. 
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Table 41: Heckman Estimation [5.4] – Entire Sample Robustness Check (Table 23) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
Log 
(Annual 
Income) 
Age in years 0.044*** Employment = 1 Age in years 0.358*** 
  (0.014)   (0.006) 
 Age (squared) -0.000***  Age (squared) -0.004*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
 Urban 0.168***  Urban 0.180*** 
  (0.018)   (0.027) 
 Married 0.000  Married 0.059** 
  (0.017)   (0.028) 
 Christian 0.095  Christian 0.070 
  (0.072)   (0.105) 
 Muslim 0.046  Muslim -0.139 
  (0.073)   (0.107) 
 House or Land -0.114***  House or Land -0.213*** 
  (0.029)   (0.040) 
 LocalLanguage 0.146***  LocalLanguage 0.354*** 
  (0.021)   (0.027) 
 South-East 0.058**  South-East 0.320*** 
  (0.025)   (0.036) 
 South-West -0.160***  South-West 0.399*** 
  (0.026)   (0.039) 
 North 0.006  North -0.259*** 
  (0.028)   (0.037) 
 EmployerofLabour 0.124***  Constant -7.346*** 
  (0.034)   (0.154) 
 SelfEmp -0.331***    
  (0.017)    
 Constant 10.821***    
  (0.351)    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis. 
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Table 42: Heckman Estimation [5.4] – Male Sample Robustness Check (Table 23) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
Log (Annual 
Income) 
Age in years 0.009 Employment = 1 Age in years 0.448*** 
  (0.012)   (0.010) 
 Age (square) -0.000  Age (square) -0.005*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
 Urban 0.263***  Urban -0.062 
  (0.021)   (0.046) 
 Married 0.018  Married 0.847*** 
  (0.026)   (0.058) 
 Christian 0.052  Christian 0.172 
  (0.091)   (0.174) 
 Muslim -0.001  Muslim 0.238 
  (0.093)   (0.178) 
 House or Land -0.080**  House or Land -0.233*** 
  (0.034)   (0.074) 
 LocalLanguage 0.158***  LocalLanguage -0.145*** 
  (0.022)   (0.050) 
 South-East 0.123***  South-East 0.151*** 
  (0.028)   (0.059) 
 South-West -0.159***  South-West 0.224*** 
  (0.029)   (0.062) 
 North -0.054*  North 0.159** 
  (0.030)   (0.066) 
 EmployerofLabour 0.119***  Constant -8.301*** 
  (0.039)   (0.252) 
 SelfEmp -0.231***    
  (0.020)    
 Constant 11.639***    
  (0.289)    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis. 
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Table 43: Heckman Estimation [5.4] – Female Sample Robustness Check (Table 23) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
Log (Annual 
Income) 
Age in years 0.058** Employment = 1 Age in years 0.326*** 
  (0.023)   (0.010) 
 Age (squared) -0.001**  Age (squared) -0.003*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
 Urban 0.016  Urban 0.310*** 
  (0.035)   (0.041) 
 Married 0.006  Married -0.041 
  (0.028)   (0.042) 
 Christian 0.160  Christian 0.040 
  (0.110)   (0.149) 
 Muslim 0.001  Muslim -0.424*** 
  (0.116)   (0.153) 
 House or Land -0.163***  House or Land -0.191*** 
  (0.050)   (0.061) 
 LocalLanguage 0.078**  LocalLanguage 0.268*** 
  (0.034)   (0.040) 
 South-East 0.025  South-East 0.542*** 
  (0.054)   (0.054) 
 South-West 0.008  South-West 0.771*** 
  (0.060)   (0.057) 
 North 0.081  North -0.613*** 
  (0.073)   (0.059) 
 EmployerofLabour 0.152**  Constant -7.034*** 
  (0.064)   (0.228) 
 SelfEmp -0.511***    
  (0.029)    
 Constant 10.361***    
  (0.590)    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01Standard Errors are Reported in Parenthesis. 
 
 
